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TocltüG and Pomon Britain ni# apecia! reference to the AgrlGOloe,
In order to uodcratond the nritlngo of Tocltoa Qbicb deal nitb 
%'oDon Drltoin need to knod oomothlDG of bio ideao cKprooGod, 
in the to tollty of hlo \9orI%3 and oloo corrolato then t^ ith our) 
knoolcdge of Homan Frltoin derivcd from otbor oourcco* loclud" 
log arc 0(clogy and provincial admlDintratlon#
Gcction 1 doolo oitb Tael tun the mon and bio Idooo: bio orlglDG
probably in an CQUGOtrion family living in Gollio Rarboncnoio; 
sl-lo rloG in the Gonatoriol order to bigb office and ocqulaition 
of a great reputotion no an orotor* It ona a groat career 
%bich apanned the ««terror*^  of Domitian and the coup nbiob brought 
Trajon to pORcr# TljeoG eventn marked bio apirlt# In the midot 
of theoo ticeo he turnod to historical criting, chioh proved to 
bo a ouitablo vohicio for the eispreaaion of hio idoao#
gcctlcn a e%amineo the Afiiricolee, the oubjoot of nhioh cam hie 
onn father in iG^# It is oomothing of 8 '*troct for the tlmea"
08 cell 80 8 guide to aucCGGcful governorship* vhicb might not 
get the renardo that might have been oKpected. Agricola muot 
be, ceen, honever* ci thin the content of provincial adminlatro** 
tion,'Ond the oenotoriol curauG# both of ohiCb ere e:mmined#
ccctiqn otndiec Tacituo^a referenceo to&e geography# anthro#' 
pology and ethnography of Britain. Our dependence on thio 
materiel continuée to bo great (except in the matter of geo-
Section 4 reviei98 the material covering the province before the 
Qcceanion of veapnoian*
Section 5 etudicG the province under the Flavians up to tW 
recall of Agricolo# oith on e^molnotion of the fate of the 
northern conquests#
.Tocituc remains our principal literary source for the history 
of the province# Archaeology nheda light on matters tibore 
Tacitus io ailent or uhere hio te%t Imo been lost; but for 
the moot port ohercver Tacituo con be checked by ouch remains 
or from the other sourceo bio ecoentiol veracity ia vindicated#
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HmODROTION:
Monr tlio literacy souroGC available for tlic study of Romn Britain 
do vltac Aftrlùdiào lopas largo; thou(^  there are aooounto of particular 
oplsodos In tlie AnnalB and Iliatorlca* All throe coao from the %)on of 
Cornelius %citus* in addition there are paaaagea from Dio Caooiue and 
Guetonlua wïiioh throw lld^ it on the Roman occupation of Britain# However# 
AfOrlcolaD cg^ peare to have a certain lAoleneae about it#i At first 
sif^ it a life ie dealt with which eeome to be of crucial importance for the 
history of tlio province# juliue Agricola wao lemtue Aummti pro praetorO 
(governor) of Britannia for an unprecedented period# in hio biogra]^ the 
Mstory of t!ie provinpo up to tho end of hie govemorahlp oooms to be 
eunmirisod# "Scioscro and paste" hiotorians (1 ) mi#t t3iinl: that
here# at any i^ te# they had a source wMdi they ml#it talie oafolsr as 
their nain authority# onto %Woh other imtorial could bo added in order to 
complete their collar# On this view On* Julius Agrloola is tlie history 
of Roman Britain in the first oentiny ÀD# (2 )#
This may bo true; but It cannot be accepted witl^ l^ amination* We sliould 
no? be naive to accept any sOuroo or autdiorliy at face value# r&my errors 
have ^ w n  from sudi slmplloity# It behoves tM historian to know not 
only Ms own presuppositions but those of his aut^ iorities# History is 
re-onactcd In the mind of authorities as much as in the mind of tlie 
historian# %%ero ought to be no passive surrender to the spoil of 
anotlior*o mind# In re^enaotlng tlio post in his mind tlie historian 
oriticices it# foms his own judgment and so corrects whatever errors he 
oan discern# It is a labour of active and thorefore critical thinking
(3 )
We must enquire# tlicrcfore# as best wo may,by aSldng was the question 
posed by the author Iiimsolf # as a result of wliioh ho wrote as he did? 
we cannot find out what a person means merely by studying the overt 
content of their statements# l^ hat people say often has an ulterior 
meaning, (4 ) Professor Hodgson# writing of BlMlcal oriticlm# put
the point well when he wrote; "%1iat must the truth have been if it epp^ 
eared lD:e this to men v^ io thought like timt?"# (3 )
Thus# for us to Icnow the truth, os for as wo can# it ^ pears to be 
essential for us to begin not with tîio A/^ lcola(: but with its author; 
Cornelius Tacitus# Vhat wo consider to be tlic trutli about tlie 
will emerge wlion wo Mve rQ**enactod tlie past for ourselves and teased 
out Tacituses own rowqnaotmont of it# in rosponso to the question lie had 
posed for himself ondwliioh he was answering when he composed tliis wcr?:#
Tvo slioll have to accept the oubjeotivity of the result# That is inevitablo#
2Ho more can we yoam for the "oolontlfio hlotory** which thou^ t^ It oould 
givG Ù8 iBKsediato O3q>0rionoo of an event "wlo os Olgontlloh grnmGOn lot**# 
la oil that follom it will bo well to rmembor ty how olmder a tliroad 
hango our Imowlodgo botli of Taoitue and M e  wotke# Tlio menueoripte ero 
fow in number and it is not easy to produce a rooeivod ta&t of univeroally 
aooopted readings* Ports of tlie maauooript are missing but the tozt of 
4^ioolaf nuDoare to be ontiro witliout either ominoiono or dielooatlone* 
Arrloolaf# \Germnia and ^ ialoms eecKa to belong to one tradition* 
There \?ao a manunoript of the Germania at the monaatmy of Fulda (Hoeaen 
Naseau# Germany) in tlio pih Century# A little later. Adam of Bremen eaemo 
to liaVG ueod Agg^el^ o$11 in hie hietoiiy of tlio ohuroh in Hamburg# SO 
it ie thought idmt there was probably a copy of Üie ^ mzieolai at this 
important monaetie.Qentro of learning# Furthermore# it ie dear that 
tliero was a copy of it at t!ie laonastery of iJlonto Caeeino# with wMch 
Fulda had doeo lW:e# einoO its librarian quoteo from it o»1133# Tliero 
follows a long period during #ioh noticing io knom of the manueoripte 
and from the eHonoe of mediaeval authors it eeeme oloar tliat. %0itU8 was 
not wolWmown# Cioero and llvy are far ; o o popular writore, Reom about 
1422 rumours began to oiroulato about the orretenoo of Reman Metoriool 
manusoripta in Germany# Rooearoh followed and wen oompleted by publication# 
Annalp and the Hietorieo are in Ü30 eamo cane and depend upon the same 
monuGorlpt. eource#
TIiODO are the v/or3m of Tacitue# so far ae in known# Tlio order of coc^sit*^ 
ion is broadly,agreed: Am^lcoW*# Geir)ani&# Biotories Annals# The Dialogue 
may fit in betv;oen Gormania and the Hietories* It is not regarded as a 
very early iiror):# ae me ouppoaed in tîic pant# The order ie not important 
from the point of View of the preeent otudy e&oept in one particular#
There iq/%ommoniy held view that it with the A/^ ioolai^  that Tacitus 
launchea Mmeelf as a Mstorien# If this is indeed true# and there are no
substantial reasons for doubting it# #cn he is# at tliis stage# an
approntioo and not yet a master crsftizman# This will serve to make /us amre 
that there might be certain imbolancoo wliioh a more experienced writer
m^it )iave overcome but which he bad rmiovcd by #e time he wrote the later
works# Certain attitudes may be evident that arc absent from later works# 
Others may persist tlwou^ iout# After all# we do assume# genorolly# tliat 
tliere le some development in a poreon*s thought during the course of life#
It is these attitudes# whether changing or constant# idiioh we .seek to 
elucidate# in order to ootablidi some means of ansecsing the way in whWi 
events ore not oMy described but intoipreted* These Tacltcan views have 
to bo derived from his writings on histcriool events# since tliore is ncid;cre, 
else from wliich tliey con bo garnered# Wlike seme historians he wrote nO
'3
autobiography and none of his contempomrios oo::^ osod orltlosl studios of 
him. Other tlim Ills om works wo have nothing# oxoopt a few roforeooos 
in the lottors of the Younger FUry. (6 ) bollovod t&mt his
f:?lond*s wW:0 iTmlld jWVO to bo Imortal# If only booauoo ho was suoh a 
porfoOtlonlst# ore novor satlsfiod witli yourcolf"# ho wrote# Does
that mean that W  oonotantly revised his w(#ts# ui) to the vory moment of 
pUblloation? also learn that he was a most eloquont orator, who had 
delivered tlie oration at üie funeral of Verglnlus Rufus (7 ) and had
acted in court with Fliny* Such o&porlcnoe might bo expeoted to affect 
his Mstorioal style*
Together they mijLit have been regarded as #e two most distinguislmd 
lit<mncy figures of the day# &o personal touches from Pliny are 
intorostlng but do not throw moh lig^ it i#)n üie values wliioli Taoltus 
hold* #  do# indeed# see a dim reflection In a mirror# However# from a 
varioty of sources wo can piece togot&ior so o-üiing both about the man 
himself and his Values* %  comenoe the former.
:œ2iœ 1
cmmitas TAomjs.
1*1. The ï'îan.
1*2# Eis Ideas.
1.3. Britain in the writings of Tacitus#
1#4* Literary Features.
1*5* Tacitus and other historians of the first century
1*6. Tacitus as a historian*
1 *7* conclusion*
Footnotes.
i.T* SfE .
Taeltm ma bom between 54 m d  $6 ## % ê  aotml date io imoerWn*
It 18 infmzted tW Meiofius^  whmfs at 17#3*# 75 A3) eeese to W  
oleâaay indioaW as its dramatic locus* At i#2# Tacitus refore to 
hlmoelf an luvmla adRKadwi wliloh would m: o »ilm about 18 at that time* 
Thereafter tlie root la derived from the aoiml eegueme of promtlom 
in tiiG senatorial {Oureue honoroa. wlt)üa épeolflo ^  limite# (8 )*
A certain Cornellua Taoltue me Imom to the mder Pllay (9 ) but
thin la olear]y not our autlior# This m n  m e  proourator In Gallia 
B^gtoa* Inhere he me oonoemed with flmnolal affaire# Blnoe Taoitue 
le a rare cognpmm m  laay infer that tli&ie a forebear# Furthermore# ae 
t!io Younger Pliny states that he and Taoltua were llfWong frlenda# It 
ie possible that the two families had bem friendly with eooh other 
before their gmeratlon# If this in so# 'Wien m  have eome knowledge of 
the hletorian^ s antmedente# of which# perhapa# the moot Important la 
ills oquootrlan origins# We need not Infer# liomver# #iat both Pllqy and 
Taoltue hailed Wie same provlnoe# tliougii pW)eps both of them were 
provlncitjle#
"Tranopadane Italy# Narbonensls or Spain * somewhere in that provincial 
and dynamic som la the home of Comellue Taoltus^  writea Sir Ronald 
syme (1Ô )# thereby embraolng a lorge tract of empire# Romvor# he
norrm?o the oholoo down to Narbonenole# Flrot# ho drawa attention to the 
marriage of Taoltuo with Wie daiy^ iter of Agrloola# % e  governor In hla 
eeareh for "olmraoter# education end promiae In a oon»ln»law m y  have 
preforrod not to lool: boyond tlio borders of Horbonenala"# No doubt this 
oonolderatlon m y  Iiàve erosaed the mind of Agrloola but if it did then 
Tacitus gives no sign of it# No qmet for a suitable son*.ln*law Is 
rovoolod in the Second# and more slgnlfioantiy# the inoorlpt#
Ions from ITarbonensle provide evidence f<w the exleteneo of four moltli 
resident there# (11 )# All of them oomo fn^ Wio native end not fikr&
the colonial areas of tho Vooontil end In particular from Vaslo# dhls 
Cyme oln^ ÿlos put as a place and area of hl(^ : culture# bolng doaonstrated 
by the eplondour of its monuments# os tR3li no Its general contribution 
to arts# letters and government, From this place came Afranlus Buerus 
(12 ) who mo tutor and minister to Nero# In addition tliere mo
Duvlus Avltus, a consular# who commanded four legions on the lower Rlilne# 
There Is o knot of Influential connexions here i?lilch link Horbenensls with 
Belgica# together wlt!i some people t&iom tlio forebears of Tacitus mlg^ it 
3mve served# All put togetlier they mleht provide us with a true back"* 
ground but In the last resort wo 3)ave to grant t3mt all Is surmise# os
5.
even himsolf Walts, Tlie army of ôvldOAOO is **not quito enoi# 
to prove tho hiotorW^o *p&trla* It mid^t# ho wrltoo# have boon 
oomo other city of NorhoAonolo; pooolhly tho *Votuo ot immtrlo 
FbrlolulWolm ooloni&",( Afsrl# 4*1#) orgunont fWeo »*It
dooB not matter moh# the plooo where a man happens to he bom le a more 
aooldont# toZllhg mtlilng about rank or origin* It le not hie *patrlà*
(13 )* Tinsse# it can be however# #at Taoltue wrltoe of GalHo
lends with ImowlWge# dlGoemmmt end ey#athy# (14 ) ao the reader
m y  discover for !)lmeolf# and tMo would tend to qtrengtlien the argument 
in favour of Norbonenols#
Furthermore, tlio cognomen Taoltus need not bo euppoeod a latln word#
Doth location and etatuo show it to be native to North Italy end tliO 
^barbarian fringe** It has been argued tWt the ^ Wool^ glvoe a oortaln 
prominence to the pSilloeopMoal olrole of Poetus (15 ) whose family
woe Paduan# Furüiemore# Tacltue la auprocod to have a senee of guilt 
about this gra^ p* #%lo la argued from 2*1* and 43*1* Howver#
It may be equally argued tMt #iose mentioned ore ein^ed out oa the moot 
elgnlflcmt victime# in common estimation# ae well ae that of the writer#
It eeeme quite clOor that ho oxperlonood regret about tho period as a 
whole#rather Umn for any group In partieulcir witliln It* %e mention of 
Idvy at 10*3# Is alee held to betoken a Tranopadmlon origin, (ki tlie other 
hand Livy woo a Mstorlan whose mr!c wzv rolovmt to that of Tacitus# at 
tliat point, Curoly reforenco is made to !dm on that account rather then 
on grounds of local feeling* Even the iie enoe of eeveral Tronopadanlans 
along with %icltus in tho will of cannot be rogarded os decisive*
Friendship must be allowed some port* (16 )* Smse arguments
advanced by Koestorman (17 ) do not clinch the doclBlon in favour of
Nor^ Italy rather tlion southern France* It is the counexion with Agricola 
that tends to locate him with Hie govemor^s patrja in conjunction wltli 
the epigrepMc cvldenoe#
We may conclude tlien tliat Tacitus m o  a provincial# perhaps of Gallic stock# 
who originated in Narbononsls* the son of m  equestrian flnanclcl offlpiol# 
serving in Gallia Dolglo!^  ^ d  tlio tm Gêimanles* "'Éieso Comelli are a 
new family# rising in the service of tho Caesars and discovered at the 
moment of transition" (l8 )* He Ic# tMrofore# a man very much In the
mould of his father^ in«^ law# Julius Agrloola# whoso dat#tor he married In
At this time ho commenced his public career# under tho mperor Vespasian# 
os he openly admits at the beginning of tlie #ct^S&os;(1,1,)Tho roferenoo 
is# perhspB# r:i,tlier too vaguo for us to give it a clear Interpretation#
. 8
and 80 it in our Imowledge of 0.^^ a in tlio impérial porvioo as a 
wholo that wo infer 3)io proposa and co ^ roximto date for appointmento 
hdKUr .
Tho grant of tlio latuo olavm {tho riCrit to wc.*r tho brood purple etripo)# 
which govo aWosion into tho oonatorial order# came from Vespaolm# t:ho 
doubtleoo provided M e  first eppolntmmt oc tMbfunue Mlitm# He was 
mmeetor eometimo betwom ?8 end 82# Tho appointment cannot be more 
preoieely dated m d  this means that W  ore imahle to determln# wliether thé 
post was held under Vospaeien# Titus or Donitioa# (19 )" 9?wo or
three years later hé mi(^t well hove boccmo tribune of tW plebs if he 
did not receive m  aodlleohip# Ho m s  ^praetor in 88 m d  Mso 
oulndooimvir saoris feciundls# in #iich capacity he took port in the 
Soeoular Oemos of that year, To hold such a priesthood# at tMt stage# 
ml^t be t]ioug#it to betoken not only à man Of ability but one in favour#
It does seem oS thou^ i he had# by now# achieved eminence os a lawyer and 
an orator of eloquence in Rome#
After his prootorship it appears as thou^ i he was absmt from Rome for a 
period# "It Is a fair maoumptlon tMt Tacitus ccmaMed a legion# os did 
nevus homo ambitious to sec Ms name on t)ie Fasti# " argues Gyme# 
but tlicn he addé# "otherwise a civilian employment might be. swnised#"
(20 ), Tfie latter might bo preferrW. becauso Tacitus has not almys
been well regarded as a military historian# Ms battle scenes are often 
masterly reconstructions of atmosphere# with their brilliant evocations 
(/I of he#>sm# the disinte Mon of morale and sudden reversals of fortune# 
but taotlcally they "often create more factual problem than tliey solve"# 
Generals do not win battles very often thoy lacdc a control plan# even 
if they croate an atmosphere# It is liord to tiilnk that one who liod been 
a competent loftàtus leMonis would Mlcw military capacity to be clouded 
by the attmpt to create rhetorical effect# (21 )# hod he been an
incompetent legato# Imwever# it would# surely# hove counted o^nst M m  
\?hen M^er ap^ s^i^ itzaento were being cmoldered# Tacitus does not %pear 
to have suffered any check, MUier the battles wore confused and the 
doGcrlptlons aim to convey tho difficulties of ccmprdiension and control 
or he m W t  be thou^ i^t to have passed to a civilian appclntment rather 
thnn to a military posting, mere i?ere# In foot# a nuraber of mitablo 
offices open to an ex^ praetor, cuch as tlie govomence of a province of 
tlio appropriate grade# But wo cannot even guess intelligentdy at this 
g u b e r n a t o r ià p o o t  he ml(^ t )WVC held. At tl)e oosMetion of that tom, 
however) he became cuffcct consul in 97 and attained the lü^teet office 
open to a senator in 112 or 113 when he boc-'^ 'o Prcconcul of Asia* It
was the climax of hie career# (22 )
Zbproeiee os the description of tlie couree of Taoituo*e public offices 
is#, at many points# timt we do knoi? is important# First it siiows that 
#en he turned to Mctorlcal ntudlee ho m s  a mature man of over 40; 
assuming tliat the ^ mïlcolafX io tlie first work he ivrote and published 
about 97* (23 )* Second, he had led an active life in public sorvico*
If Edmrd Gibbon could write in hie AiitobiOr^ enby of his two md a Imlf 
years of ^ Wlitary servitude" os a captain in thé aroy# that it gave him 
a clearer notion of the plialonx end legion and "the captain of t!ie 
Hampslilre Grenodioro (the reader m y  smile) has not been useless to the 
liistorian of tho Roman E#ire"# "Wim# how mmh mre valuable for the 
writing of history must have been the experience of one who spent a life* 
time in political affairs# during #ich im held the principal offioos of 
state# All tills gave Tacitus direotlmowlodge of how the empire was 
governed# for his perception was placed at right level to see it*
The o%pm?ionoc burned hnto his spirit and mar$;od it permanently#
1#2. Hia IDl^ G ' , . ^
Of tlie emperors Tacitus had Imown or studied* Voqpasian stood out as the 
only one whom office 3iad Improvod# The rest had been corrupted by it* he 
thou^t# Tim rule of the MeVions proved to be a descent into tlie abyss* 
Titus had but a short spell of supreae power after the death of M s  father* 
Vespasian* Mien death carried off the elder so* tho younger* Domltian* 
ruled in Ms stead# He gradually reduced the senatorial order to a state 
of terror# (24 )# Yet there was no opposition* Timre was no sliow of
indepondonoo from 9kioitus anymore than from o(^ne else* In later days he 
seems to have reacted against #at mig^ it be called the retrospective 
opposition of Ms Cont^orarios# Such hindsi#t ms botli usdees end 
vainglorious* It prooloimed the sin of silence during t!ie dark years# 
Tliose who have forfeited their self'^ rcspect hod bettor moderate their 
statements about the past* since it involves their role in it* (2$ )
Tliore m y  be a sense in which Tacitus %9as never able to come to terms wi# 
public affairs end himself after this *dork nWit of the soul*, %%hatevcr 
ideals and hopes have been hold* it \7as nonetheless a political fact 
that sinco the Battle of Actlum power had boon conoentrated in the hands 
of one man. Tliere iTus no osoope from tliat reality# Its inescapable nature* 
Iioiirever* produced moral degeneracy* First* the emperors become men whom 
power and authority distorted# Few men hod more experience Of public 
affairs than Tiberius but even he was ruined by the i2%)oct of absolute 
power* Domitian did not even liave that protective cover# Not only was ho
young when ha ooae to power but uo #o younger con had beon held bock 
and placed under the elmdow of hie able older brother# Hlo euoceselon 
to the tlirone t^é devastating# Hie Inêlotenoo upon being uddroseéj us 
Hurloo (lord) me pyGqitomatlo of the Infootlon# Tho whim of tlio prlnoo ' 
woe now tho eln^ e^ tliread upon which human liapplnoee hung* Second, ae à 
reeult, people wore oorr%%>tod# For them there was no protection from tW 
(dmractorictloe of euoh a political and eocial ë^ '^étem: %^ ich imre envy, 
hatred* flattery* eyco^ m^noy, euoplolon* ocplonage* eecrot trlale and 
emmary executions# The Institutlone of ooolety were reduced to impotence# 
Tliey neither a^ ctralned the prlnco nor protected the people# But* the 
world Rome liàd loot ## complete with ite traditional volueo and inotltut'* 
lone could never bo recovered# Tacitus nccms to 3iavo rooogclsod tliat, 
but the effect m s  to *spllt* hia pereoi^lty# Domltlan lay on the 
conGolonoe of hl#4P-lnclplod man* Ac a result ho imMtea like one 
idioso Integrity has been violated# Tho qa^a indlmmtio wMch me 
charaotorletlc of 3)êan Swift wan conotantly procent In tlie Roman 
Mstorlan* It Ctanlfectod Itaelf In Mo moral préoccupation* constant 
probing of motive and his Inteipretation of events # Perhaps It Was this 
attltudo that made à historian of him* end gave him such a hl^ oease of 
vocation* If tho evil could not bo undone* then at least it could be 
expoeod for what it ms# After the years of euffooating silence men 
should not be allowed to forget $diat really had Ii^pmed, nor should they 
be permitted to ^ oss ovor their own part in tliose hideous days#
There may have been a second spur# "All history is contemporary history" 
wrote Benedetto Croco in on aphorism become famous# It means
that ue must ask what was happening to ïMïltun and his contemporaries at 
tlie time he was writing# Biblical scholars !%avc sliosn clearly how the 
OospMs not only deal with their overt contents but also reveal something 
of tlio preoccupations of the time in which they wore ifrltton# Their 
sits im loben dlsclosos t})0 situation of tho early church* Thus* the 
time Tacitus wrote the Awlcola'# Damitian was dead# Could it be that It 
\7as both tlie maxcy of Bomition and more that the stimulus to histoiy? 
Agricola* Tacitus inritos, was happy in Ms dcatli# ZIo ims delivoi^ d fzxm 
the tyranny of evil days* Yet ho did lose sometliing by M s  untimoiy 
demise; tho sigïit of the accossion of Trajan# {Oiis Vfas* Tacitus alleged* 
on event prophesied by Agricola and, indeed* prayed for# ( Agrl# 44*3* ) 
/^ mricola!! e ivritos Symo# is a manifesto on behalf of Trajan*s new 
aristocracy^ # (26 )# At last the nei? mai wore able to enter* honourab&y,
upon their inh(%?itancQ* The Afcrioola cxpcundod tlielr moral and political 
ideals# It is not done in any systematisOd fasMon; ratlier they arc
9dlacloBQd gradually by tho portrsyol of one w a  takm to be r^reseatatlve 
of the olosB* Mieee new patrlolono liad carried tholr famllleo forward to 
the field of honours but tiad been denied their reward, deoplte their 
nodeety and eklll In éteerlng a course between cxtravaganoe ond economy * 
sober unobtrusive vlrtuee# Tliey were neither heroic nor epectaoular, They 
were provlnolale cinlntalnlng the anolent virtues of frugal merit end rustic 
valour* (27 )*
Any reader of tlie AfTlcola- msy see readily enom^ tliat It Ic an Idealised 
portrait of a man# i%at le not so easily perceived le the possibility that 
It le the Idealloatlon of a tdiole class* If tills is so, then tliere can be 
but little wonder that during the bleok years Of Donltlan they lived with 
a "sense of injured merit"# Mie last Hevlen had prevented them from taking 
their place In social and political affairs# instead there had been the 
years of silence* Time In wlilch men could grow old and die* ( Amel, 3*2# ) 
The period had merely sliom that good men could live and %%>rk even under 
a bad mperor; but they were denied tlielr roward, ( Agrl* 42#3«) Agrloola was 
frustrated after he left Drltala by jealousy end pique# Tlie new men could 
only be stunted growtlis In the sliadow of the orlnoens# There was no trace 
of the Independence that liod mar&ted the old nobility# €n the omtrory these 
aspirants to tlie lilgliOst dignity had bro%^t with them puiosmthe maid: of the 
equestrian order from #loIi tliey sprang# I^desty and discretion were to 
remain their hall marks# Of necessity, llbertas ms replaced by obseguium# 
Even among those v^ io governed provinces, êubordinatlon and obedience were 
necessary virtues, when confronted by the iqirlos wlio ms also Imoerator#
Even after everytlilng had been well done, w  Agricole found, a man mlf^ it be 
denied Ms reword#
The days of Horva m d  Trojan brou#it happy relief* PezAmps, at last, they 
could groi? under the rule of aympatliotic rulers; "ubi sentlre quae veils 
et quae sentias dlccre licet"# ( Hlst#1#1#) It was, porlmps, easy to write 
this but the hope ml^ it yet be bli^ t^ed* lias the brief reign of Nerva a 
false dawn? How did Trajan oomo to "merge" os his suocéssor? And Tdiat 
caused the nomination to tolre place? Has tlioro a bloodloso coup brou^t 
about by tho army 0(mmnders, who rmombered afresh timt emperors can be 
made outside Rome? Nhllo ëymo lias not boon able to chart tlio course by 
w!ilch Trajan mo ad^ Qited by Nerva, he lo oulto clear about Its Implication 
for Taoltuo# Ho argues that as suffeot consul in 97 Tooltus was at tlie 
heart of affairs, during what mo, perhaps, tho crucial period# Tliero he 
found tliat both Norva and llbertae were but an episode# Strong end enduring 
tendencies hod boon orrosted but for a moment# Thm they resumed their 
oourse* *%e military ollgarclqr, aided certain men In the bacI%ronnd,
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were firm m d  subtle# Tlmy rcoouod the state frm a brief Interlude 
of I^dbertas*, set It book on a proper path of government, depOGOd an 
Inoompotent ruler (for cuoh in effeot was their action) and Inotailod one 
of their dace os I^mperatori" (28 )*
Dleappolntment thus fell upon the new hopes# There oould be noticing, otlier 
then paealvlty In nuoh a political order# Anything elee wan both futile , 
end dangerous# m  thio Interpretation the deil#.t in the new order 
expreseed in both the /u^cola^ and, to come extent, the ^ otoriee my 
have etarted as genuine pleamire but ended as convmtional otatomente of 
loyalty, stopping hliort of flatteiy# (29 )# Some declaration of
loyally me Üio cine oua non of continued participation in public life#
Those in power# generally, do require explicit loyalty f:com their prlnoipal 
oosociatea# WithdraiW. from public life could alwoya bo oonoidered but 
tliat wan quite againot tho tradition of the claoe# A man ini#it bo wMt he 
would ** farmer or Motorian but tlmt diould not engross the whole of hie 
concern# It ms  only in the field of public life that could be won
by an appropriate dlcplay of vlrtuten# To âbotoln from politico me 
imavla ot Inortia# (30 ), Thue men ouch ae Tacitue were driven
romoraeleoely into dongeroue mtore oe eurMy ae thoir predeceeeore#
However, they were not the inevitable opponento of the now It
hod, in fact, mode them# even tliou^ i it %%ad mastered them# Miere wan, 
doubid.e8Q, frustration .among tho men of principle end aplrit* In the 
abeenoG of any real open political debate it ml^ i^t have been that hietory 
afforded a suitable, thoi# dioguieed, outlet# Pointé miglit bo made of tlic 
past and into the past that could not bo mid of the present end in it# An 
anolynle of fundamental contemporary iesuco could be taken fxxm tlie preemt 
and rooted in the past# Such disouscion mi#t be eafer and could also 
appear detached# Tacitue invoked both truth and iii^ artiallty as neoeaaary 
virtues for historical writing# Those wlio profoea invidablo fidelity to 
truth, he argued, must speak not only without affection but without hatred# 
3h such terms he declared Mmself at the opening of the Histories# However, 
we may regard him as more committed than such statements indicate*
The fires lit by the events contemporary trXth Domitian, Herva and %ajan 
flicker throu(]^ i tlie pagos of his \wsrks, as moy bo seen readily by those %dic 
liavo on eyo for typology# By tMs means a figure in the past can be made 
to stand for a person contofi^ orary i^ ith tho writer# Thus, in the 
GMba is a "type" for Nerva# Dotli wore rulers tjio came to power after the 
ouddon downfall of an eotablislied d;^ maoty# They botli lost control of üié 
political and military positions with which wore confronted# As a 
result there was a danger tliat both tim miire and the capital wO#d be
dragged dom to ruin# One failed completely and died by vlclenoe; the 
other eleo failed, porhapo In a mere dieguléed fat^on, and died before 
hie politiool ifgpotmce oôuld be mnifeeted* {Thouf^  tlieee at the oentre 
of events lD:e the suffeet ooneul, miglit wdérstmd tho properties of the 
situation etraigdit awey#) Each of tliem had been obliged to appoint a 
BUOOGseor# Ih botli oaeoa there wan the poeelbility of geronotooraoy and 
a revolt by the guard#
However, typology is rarely able to be totally ooneiGtent in the eetablleh* 
ment of parallèle* Thio doee not matter, einoe the purpose in not a 
complete ollogory but the giving of hints about the present in tlie IWit of 
the poet# A few coinoidenoes ouffice*
The /umolé# being meli greater in scope and Varieiy than the earlier works, 
make the typology more difficult to Bustain# Furthermore one muot always 
remmbor how mWi of tlio work ie mieeing# Some general typology mirait bo 
attmpted, tlioug^ i it ie intGresting to note that Syme ie more reetraiaod about 
the "citB im leb<n"of the /umola than he is for the other worke# Attention 
may be drawn to two pointe# 1* Mio description of Tiberiuo ie Buqtained, 
powerful and damning# Ho in held to stand for Domitian, who happened to 
admire him, os well ac for all those who bear autocratic monarchical Aile#
2# Tiberiua could bo a warning to Trajan oince both had been diotinguiehed 
goneralo who come to power in later middle life# If history ie thou#it tO 
afford exomploB, thm mi(^ t Tlberiue be on oxemplo of how not to be on 
empero:^  If tlio Af^ icolae doocribee the loyal official, tlum the Anmle 
delinmtoe the teaiq^ tatione of power for thooo in oupreme command#
Few writore have odvcnoed this second opinion, but once this typologloal 
argument hon been developed, on the boeio of Tacitue*B cxperiencoo, tlien it 
cannot be ruled out* None of hie oontemporarioo, hoi^ ever* coemed to wish 
to keep tho memory of Domitien fresh# They preferred to blot it out# And 
Trajan went Me own way to triiraphe indiffèrent to the odmonitione of 
writoref However, ovm if Tacitus makes reforonoe to tho liappy timoe of 
Trajan os emperor, it is quite clear that tliroug^ iout hie worix; there is 
continuous critlcim of monarcliioal autocracy, The genez^ inqiort of the 
history arid its typos c m  hardly be missed#
Tlie suggestion of Syme that tho experience of Tacitus os suffect consul in 
97 vns more influential t!im tho impact of tho rule of Domitim is valuable, 
oven if we consider it to be somowhat over*#stated# Ono factor tlmt must 
lead to restraint is tlie sheer difficulty of writing o number of 
over a considorablo period of time in wizioh a most elaborate typological 
structure is introduced and sustained tIirou#out a description of a most 
varied serios of events# From the explicit words of Tacitus himself, not
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least in tho Aaiealar, an important place muat be found for the of foot of 
tliose Gilmt fiftqen yearo under Domltlm end wimt #éŸ W Ü G d  for tlio 
oonotitutlonnl ismio of tW wnoroliy* Tho addition of tho exporlmoes of 
97, In a gon^ml show that the Iilstorlon oontlnuod to ho affected 
hy ovento oontompomry^Mtli _ lilaeelf, Miloh, therefore, to ooiao degree affect 
Me undorôtandlng both of pant end prooent# Tim oheorvatlon, first of all* 
helps to oKplaln W w  àn eloquent ziietorlolan booamo a otudont of history, 
aeoondly It ma):ee alloi^ nce for tlie pOBoibility that Taôituo grew in 
oapacity ae a hietorimi end did not remin on omtorical pampMoteer* The 
Annale deiaonetrato tho powere of one who Me mturod# oonoemed, perhape, 
lose with typolo^ tlmn in fomer time* but poseoeeed of an undiminlehed 
moral concern# Bronte are ocrutlnlecd rather than eubjectod to the 
application of crude pditical critéria. Extending Syao*e argument* could 
it bo that the wcret fears of TacitUo rmre net realieed?
Trajan elwwed himeelf to bo neitlmr Domitian m r  Tiberius but himself* He 
was one of the no oi* along with Tacituo# who Iiad olao paseed tlirou^ ii the 
ëiadow of the voile'. For him* an well ac for cthera* the bad old tinea 
were never to bo olio TOd again. A connidoration of the later career of 
Tacitus dmwo tliat nomoMw ho* too ; oamo to temo with tM new regime* Hie 
appointment ae Prcconeul of Asia can be regarded ae evidence for tlmt# 
(112*113). No ruler would have accepted* let alone proponed* for the eupreme 
provincial appointmmt open to a senator* tlie nomination of a man #o wae 
unsympathetic to W  regime. One #o was hostile to it could never have 
been tolerated in such a responsible position* He must have been %)ersom 
^tg# If then schcloz^  Mve been right about the Taciteon perspective m  
tlic esporors derived from his experience of Domition end the Trajonio coup 
tlien one con only infer tlist tlioreoftor hO "wrote out" M s  anxieties frm 
hinself* end by time he had done so:, found that conditions were not os 
terrible as he hod feared.
Nobody soems to doubt that the woz3:s of Tacitus were published in M s  
life**time. The letters from rliny moke that clear# There is nothing to 
suggest that they wore held back for political reasons. Whether were 
first delivered at public readings or disominated in written ferns probably 
any literate Roman could take tho points and understand the types* Indeed* 
they may have seen much tliat eludes ue* Could they really have missed the 
doublG entendra? Could govenimont offloiale* let alone Informers* have been 
blind to the implications of what this famous orator declaimed and wrote?
Even if it were thought to be merely a pose* and therefore not tolccn seriously 
by the author* it might still have been Carefully scrutinised for its effect
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on others# It Is hard to thlnl: tMt hie oonteaporarloo did not under# 
stand idist ho meant# Aooount must iiavo boon to3ton of his works# ^oro 
Is onou^ i In tho history of tho oqplro In tho first oontury to Indloato 
tliat tliG l#orlGl court took note of literature# Taoltuo iwis surely 
assessed, and not found wanting, at least by the time that ho was 
oonaldersd for the prooonsulshlp# Again, tho argument of Syme:; can bo 
extended: Taoltuo ml i^t now bo spooking for Influential parts of the 
now reglmo# Ho had started out as tho private spokoemsn of a class 
personified In Agricola# Now imd a wider role# Sie common oxporlonoe 
of Domltlan and tho coup of 97 etrongtlioned tho ties #iloh bound mombots 
of that class togoMier# Tcajan and hie supportors identified them# 
selves with that oritlolsm of the old regime# Thoy had all been tlirou#i 
those evil days# New it was over with the hope of better times to come# 
Thou#^  constitutional forms co dld never regress to ropublicanlom It was 
now their empire# HenCefortli it would be different#
1.1# miTAHI IN n  OF W m T G
%?hore, then, does Britain feature in those corridors of i#orial poiTor? 
EveryWiing that has been written so far rnv't^ ^^ n^repared the reader 
for the onowor that it lioo on the margin of imperial politics#
Mstory is metropolitan centred# It could not have been otherwiso# . 
the nature of tlie Roman state itself, Sie provinces had elgnlficanoe in 
relation to tho politics and policies of the capital# Romo was the only 
centre round which Other activities could be grouped# Frofessor 
TrevorwRopdr, I belieVO, caused onnoyanoO among Block nationalists ro le 
years ago by su^esting that Africa lacked history before tlie white man 
come# There is a sense in which the same is true of the provinces of the 
empire# ThtQr could be described antliropologically as it were; end the 
Germania is on illustration of that ^ a^nre.of rating# But the Celts# 
for example, had no tecïmiques of writing which v;ould enable them to 
transmit a reoord of events# They hod, tlierefore, no means of producing 
histo:^ # Both were providod by contact wit!i the Rmons, end thus we 
know of them Mthin a W i n  framowork# Tho provinoos in this wey had 
significance in relation to events in tlie capital, Hiat is not to soy 
that what we have is of little use. It con be most voluoMe but one must 
be aware of tlio total peropoctivo witMn which it is written# Hhat is 
more damaging is tho loss of somo saotlons of tim works of Tacitus#
Sie coures of evonts described witliin the is contained witliin,
what appearo to be, a corofully planned structure# Tho work, it sooms,
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was to consist of tlnzoo nootlons, wltliln #lo2i thera were to W
sl% books* TSiG divisions are ofton dearly* not to o@y sharply, stated, 
Within tills plan each year was dealt with* There are soma i^ ocqitlons, 
however, and of tliese Britain is one. Here and there the events of 
several years are brou^ it together, wrltas Taoltus, In order to prodnoa 
a Gontlnhbns iiarrattve (31 )# #ouJi darlty Is thereby
brought to the writing, problommf dating are po od for the modem 
historian, as wo shall see later oh* Within these aootions there is aleo 
a certain dramatic pattern* Contrasts are heightened by the jinxtaposition 
of oharactorioations, which give ll^t and Shade to the narrative and 
sharp&A the moral contrasts* In the first section, devoted to Tiberius *s 
i%lc, Germanicus is the dominant personality, in the second it is 
Sejanus. #ie form of composition is thus "contrapuntal" " theme ogainot 
thme to borrow a term from music, However, about half of the 
estimated work is lost. Section 1 dealing with Tiberius survives; 
section 2 is loot until the year 47 lu raachod, In book 5* Hie invasion 
of Britain is thus completely missing, together with the initial 
expansion of the provinoial boundaries* Hie last part of tho reign of 
Nero has also disappeared, leaving only a few euigaatio phrases about 
Britain to which attention will be given later* The reader will, at 
onoo, iieroeivc how fragmentary tho references k , Britain must be and how 
great, therefore, must be the historian*s hopes of the j^lcolaé*
If Britain is not tiie centre of the Roman stage for Tacitus, we must 
beware ourselves of making the province the centre for any interpre^ kation 
of the Roman world* It would be dangerous for us to attaapt to deal 
typologioally witli the principal choraotors of provinoial history in a 
way that made them tho fore-runners of national sOlf-consciousness,
Hiere is, after all, a statue to Boudicca in the shadow of the Houses of 
Parliament; The monument and its location liave à clear import# she 
rallied opposition to foreign oppressors and drew togetlicr all those 
for whom patriotic independence %?as dear* Tlioro fw be no statues to 
cither Goratacus or Calgacuo, but their speeches have been absorbed* 
Merotgully we know enou^ i of ancient history to recognise the device, 
and shoiild respect it, Hmoydides put it well whon he wrote that he hod 
composed spoeohos expressing thouglito proper to the ocoasion, os he 
imagined the speaker mig^ it have expressed them.
In the liglit of our earlier examination of tlie pre-tocoupations of 
Tacitus and tho ways in which he expressed tliem, could bo naive if we
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wore to eoiisldor tîio spooolios - Hiuoydldesn in intention# British 
poroonalitloa could bo mom rolatod to Roman politico than native 
ideology# Hiey ou^ it to be ocmtinioed for hidden oritioiomo of 
iesmo with wMch Taoitue wan oonoomed# Hmn Carataouo opoWco for Hie 
Gilenced nobility. OIaudiiw*e attempts to glorify hlmsolf conforred 
additional glory on Goratacue in dofeat### On reaohing tho dale he 
npdte in tliese toms###^ mmiliation lo my lot, glory youre... If yon 
wont to rule the world, done it fMlow that everyone elee weloomee 
enelaveoont?* " (Ann#12 5;^ .^ catgacpG ' :eeminde readers of the freedom 
that liae been lost forever# Drltone are tlie last people on earüi to 
bo free* unoorruptod end unoonqnerod# ready to figit for freedom end no# 
repenting of failure, (Agri# 31,32) One need not oonolude t3mt tho 
Hmoydidean element io wholly lacking, anymore tlian nood assume tMt 
Taoltun eschewed the rlietcricien^ e etook in Wide of aotting out a oaeo 
with wMoh he disagreed# But hietorical narmtivo as a #olo end epeeohee 
in particular afforded the political oritio m  appropriate form of 
cover. Dr. johneon was, at a later date, to talœ advantago of tho 
device when he reported parliamentary debates in tlie guise of deliber­
ations hold in the chamber of a fictitious republlo, His readers Mew 
well enougi liow to demytliologise the contmts* miat they could not 
know, as he later admitted, was that he did not attend the Houses of 
Parliament but made up tho reports liimsOlf inserting into them suoh 
criticisms of affairs as he wished to make. We shell not wisli to press 
the point to for; but merely notioe again that thOn the importance of 
the "Gits im leben is conceded then the structure end contents of 
hieterical writing come under a different Mnd of scrutiny, Hie approach 
bGoomes more critical, even sceptical, Now ell tho spirits arc to be
Tlie total result is not to givo us more lmotd.cdgo of the affairs of 
Roman 33ritain but to make uo more consoious of the bias of the matorW, 
that hove, Hie light, as it were, is refracted throi# the pri# of 
the mind of Tacitus, wMch was lieavily ooctmied with matters other than 
an onolyois of tho state of life in a provinoc to the extreme North West 
of the empire. He jls a partisan, despite ell protostations of 
impartiality. His claim to be unbiased because he did not have tlie 
incentives to political power is beoldos the point, Hio fact is that ho 
liod a different incentivo for the slipping of his material, Qyme and 
other scholars have made tliat abundantly clear. It only remains for us 
to agree that past experiences may twist tho account as offeotivoly as 
future hopes, (Ann* 1,1#)
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1.4. saræümy #
IVo now draw attention to certain otbor foàtüroc of the wozbe ôf 
Tâcltna# which by com&arlBon with our previous dlGauaoion can only bo 
re&ardGa as eoaowhat less important# BonotheleBS they do have & 
bearing 'upoa the interpretation of the tests*
The style is difficult even though the effect is superb* Raoine 5%8 
right to name him the master painter of antiguity* the worke have 
been shaped more by the conventions of oratory than by the *pr88oppo8* 
itiona of critical history»* %&re significant, however, ore the major 
preoccupations which wc have just ê%amiBeâ# Of acme account, but in 
the second rank arc 1# his hatred of the mob* (&%1 jbi 3%nfWknfUrc 4Ww) 
]]og]uljac() ojT laooe* SStia iis aweithgar (SuaqprdLsing no# imusucLl* gSioiiati he 
W2W3 (& (sribic (%f iBcnazxdhgr lie laaai fW) (leawi0&S&w& jfdof (leoKüKcacsf* ][t jls t&wo 
iscKiatMSidLal o3,&sw3 lie t&pïwilxla# !2# 3Ie Ihawe si cwBidbain j%is%yinat:lon 
sdLt&k sKKcfaas# imhidi ssiagbt Ibe ccwisdLdk&rcHl sk iSeedairG (aostaon tx) laarxy 
swiojLcfkt IiiErtoüüiGüRG* smdl a ]pr%ao{>cty)aa;icH% Tfitdb (%nc t&tose (iKiHSidLeiioG; wua 
3Pix)badbl5r totoSljf (sisriIjLBKi* It; liS, pfKcha&ps;, tcitdbin tdbis aiiljLtELigr (xsntxasdk 
iatoj; ZbfitKïin is besd: tuidkxcBlbood. SSic jpzxyvijacs) SRSS <)fH2 cxT lübe priiKsiiwal 
"blwaalaces cüC tgas* 1dbz%yuf#ioiit Ikhe first (seaitiiqr* It wswa iilsc "tbs; Ewock 
jsigndLfixaant (laalitdLcn i%) IKhe tcsradllxxcsr ojf IKbc ecapijcc# iSearvduDO tâiar& 
imas tüiG iclüled& cd? (qpcwcafxlcwis iii wSiicâi ocfulxi Tbé {&3JS$CLQGrecl *
tüiajb Btoscb jba%x3%r&ant <)f Bk%æui T/jjrtUGs lit ]?ucdLic s&fjü&ijps,# {&uK)h & 
cidLtesraxan 'Btnilxi s&fjB&crt fiol: cw&lar iKhe cltojkce odT Ibogxlca Tjui; GulsK) Iwbe* 
magnitude of the treatment they received*
g&scitiis IiEws t)QS%& ieanfoaSBlar (ücdÜbixils&ekl ais si csiljLtziigr bulErboorlcwi* SSoaie 
adkt43itiioii Gmoib %)C igiifesi tx) iühe Bsatrtear* ]pajct3uC%CLECclar safrwie BkHamss&i iwas; 
:p;%c1%lcüilaüc&cr iaoamgs# lie *iv'e%3%3cl tdboi; s& SKxzsse jnsKCZsitj&ve t&ion /kniwals)
Iji# ;)1"»39 could laoasSlar t>e aToiwid evan i*i tdbis; t&GGdLljLtaa%y lof 
ewit&w>3%3# TliG ifcswiG# dis iiot told %&102X5 IKke tooocyps i&CKCG etsitduczwad# cap 
sdiere ibhe iKitlKLeiS t?Q2%s jSouyghd:* ZaisiscEwl id%»?e j&z# iaigpss arid TSondsKCf; 
and boo owanor CEspl^y trooRlc# tZhe rw3CK>unt (>f ]8o%idi(%CEi*8 zsabGwLljkon lOdHl 
jbcBfc to ÏK3 0(%nedldj%rcHl fut (letàll. bialcw?# fkazxi lib iis ssncRigïi 1%) 
üfoüüaooi'G Küzin tdiiuoi;* iragpienézas* üShojce *%%%2 si anasdber cdf ix)3j%ts, <>f a 
general kind, tobo weighed against this*
1* A historian must take GOme thinge for granted in the minds of his 
readers* The difficulty oriBOG when what woo in thoimind of jbis first 
readers cannot be transmitted to those of later generations* 2* It la 
not always oloar what points of geographical rcferenco Oacltus could 
use that would convey anything to an audience in Borne* wOuld they 
know where the half*loglon%ry comp at longthorpe stood in relation to
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the campaign in Anglesey? How could the location of the auxiliary campc 
in the midlands be firmly placed in the re8der*8 mental frame os he 
studied the text, somewhere south of the Alps? Precision only has 
importance when writer and reader have common geographical knowledge 
in adequate detail. That cannot be presumed for the first century Romas 
in mediterranean areas of culture. The campaigns must often have been 
vaguely understood events tnking place "up North". Particular incidents 
might have been clear, but yet may have stood on their own rather than In 
any coherent frame of reference , Even though Tacitus's general striving 
for brevity sometimes over-compresses matters, what he docs write is 
vigorously presented and uncluttered by superfluous detail. (32 ).
The latter point is not unimportant in relating tho changing and ofton 
confusing positions within a military conflict* 3. The outcome of the 
battle might be considered more important than the details of its course. 
Vignettes might be more illuminating than the tracing of a complete 
tactical and strategic plan, if there were one. Battles are often 
confusing actions* It is not cosy always to comprehend what is going on.
The gonoral's control overall might bo weak, through no fault of his own 
but because there developed a series of scmi-indepcndent skirmlsheo 
within the whole battle area* If treated in toto, assuming that there 
were sources to make it possible, the total effect wo;ld be episodic, 
and confusion the worse confounded. Some part of the event may be taken 
to illustrate the whole and the role of an individual or group taken as 
renretentative of the arcy. It may not be "total history" but it can be 
representative *
That is not to excuse errors. Tacitus, like Homer, nods. How could 
Gartimandua have adorned the triumph of Claudtus in 43 by an action she 
took in 51 ? How could the Brigantes have stormed Colchester? It seems 
uhlikely that Tacitus toured the empire to verify his references, so we 
must accept that he could hardly bo more accurate than his sources. But 
what might bo excused is uncertain because we do not have acceco to his 
primary mtorisl. On the other hand, given the paucity of the manuscript 
tradition, it may be that the text is corrupt from the hand of a faulty 
copier or the false ideas of on improver. Hevertholess, like ell human 
beings, Tacitus mde errors, ;;as guilty of omissions and had his outlook 
distorted by his prejudices, I^o historian has been acquitted on all 
tlirce charges# There is a vagueness about Agricole's second year in 
Britain tlict one might not have expected. There might be some error in 
dating the rebellion of Boudicca. The site of her final defeat is uncertain. 
Perliaps it was not near anywhere in particular; or perhaps the terrain
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WQG more Important than the map referenee# On t e other band when a 
more preolse location wa given at iWs Graupluo, it bao not been much 
more help to sobolaro who find the site of that battle equally eluoi^ 'G. 
Fismlly the reader may prefer to Guapend judgment until the military 
paasageo have boon studied as they occur in the history of the provinco*
Hero it trill be sufficiont to note the criticism levelled against Tacitus 
and romlnd ourselves that there are certain factors which taken together 
tend to draw the sting of the accusation.
We know well enough that there wre established conventions in writing 
histozy in the ancient world. The use of speeches was one. There were 
others to whidi attention id.ll be given when the hature of the Aj^ ricola 
itself is studied. Here we should note that Tacitus's battle pieces 
follow a fairly constant procedure# 1. The Homan order of deployment is 
given. The legions are mentioned specifically but the auzilla not.
2# The battle order of the enozqy is then given, 3. The speech of the 
Homan commander comes next* 4» To be followed by that of his opponent,
5. The terrain is then described# 6. The initial attack comr^ onces.
7. There in a chock on the Honan offensive, 8 A final attack carries the 
day. 9. Roman losses are given* Within this scheme there arc tableaux 
of incidents together with a numbor of anecdotes* It is those last two 
features that give lifo and movement to the battle. Ho doubt the army 
suffered periodic checks within a conflict but it is hard to imagine that 
the)" occurred at the same point each time. The modern historian would see 
the situation somewhat differently. The end of üie initial attack wouM 
bo seen as the completion of phase 1 after which the battle would develop 
further* However, that was often the most difficult port of tlie conflict 
to control and it was thei^ efore often the point at ifhich localised bcttlos 
broke out and the overall picture became obscured* The general effect 
of such a presentation is to stylise the event, as carefully constructed 
speeches halt the flow of the action. However, critical analysis, after 
the event, - a modem convention - may be said to have the same effect.
Once again we must be aware of the nature of the souces available to us 
and take account of them in our attempt to use them for the history of Romn 
Britain (33 )*
Within these conventions, however, we can see the oxtent to which Tacitus 
is interested in the individual. For him, as for Carlyle, history is the 
biographies of innumerable people. It is their personalities which shape 
events, and determine policies* People mould the structures: Augustus 
made the princlpate. Yot t)iey are also altered themsolves by the 
organisation; Tiberius, even with his groat experience, was changed# The 
quest for motivation is crucial. Prom it folloK moral judgments* By these
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canons of aasesstsnt people are brought before us as either good or bad.
"It saems to m", ho wots, "a historian's foremost duty to ensure «at 
oerlt is rooordod and to confront evil deeds end words with t!is fear of 
posterity's denuaoistions", ( A ^  3 £Û At the same time Taoltuc grasps 
the mental environnent within whioh people live. That is not just n 
question of stating policies and desoribing characters it is rather the 
evocation of an afcsoephers which though present is elusive. For example, 
ïaoituo writes that during the terror of the treason trials people îjere 
afraid to hold converoations indoors and preferred to talk out in the 
open where there was leas chance of boing ovor-heard. The ir.oidont hits 
off the social clinato proclsely, ao anyone who has worked for ths 
Anglican Church in South Africa will know for thsaaclvea, Ono oiiigle 
item conveys the Impact of the whole, This is why, doopite all the 
convositiona, his descriptions of battles cake ooispellins reading. The 
whole is greater than the description of the parts. She droma is all, "What 
interests and stimulates readers", ho wroto, "is o geographical docoription, 
the changing fortune of a battle, the glorious death of a commndor."
The quotation sums up ths discussion, idvit wc have from liis
pen comes from a considered style of writing. What has been the subject of
criticism stems not from vfcalcnass but from forethought.
His military interest is inevitably associated with the progress of 
empire. There ia a certain regî-et at the lack of an espanaionlEt policy. 
CoEparod with earlier times it was a circumscribed inglorious field.
"Tiberius was liaooior to have secured peace by prient negotiation then ix 
bo had fought a victorious war". 2 64) Public service has a hum-drum
aido/luich it was not, always easy to find a suitablo theatre for the 
exercise of the traditioml Honan virtutem. ttoough which AgS «^S^ t be 
acquired. Such action, as there was, could easily be sagntficd both for 
tho sake of di-acatio contrast and to evoke tiie old ways of the lost republic. 
Tacitus is thought not to Jiave stressed the blessiuES of Imperial rule.
Too often ho is romrkcd for the words put into tho mouth of Calgaouc!! 
"robbory, butohoiy and rapine they falsely call empire; and where thoy 
laako a dosort they call it paace." { ^ .  31). The sentence ahould bo 
rcgardod, more properly, as soatiikents proper to tho enety commander 
seeking to lift the morale of bin troops, cjqarcssed with tho skill of a 
aastor rhetorician, presenting both sides of tho case, Tacitus hardly 
glosses the nature of Roman rule. If ho draws attention to tho defects of 
tho emporors he also recognises tho fears which the a &.t e ia. evoked.
(34. )
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argueg, once laore with great ingenuity, tliat if there is any lack of 
balance In the writings of Tacitna, it must be because he could aamum the 
Romn peace, with its ooneequent concord anS proeparity. It did not need to 
be stated because everybody kneif it* Argumente from silence are rarely 
snticfying# % ^  smack of special pleading* The oonolusion of l^oMond 
ie preferable, becauce it deale with what is said and wliat ie not said#
He wites that Tacitus showed the double face of Homn rule. (35 ).
One small point to be borne in mind is the evident admiration of Tacitus 
for nqirthom barbarians in general on account not only of their valour but 
for their love of liberty* Perhaps they reminded him of the days when Rom 
was young end free* They heightened the picture of hie own times by 
sharpening the contrasts*
The aura of doom is not, however, so easily disiiersed* The Histories 
being concerned with the coups of the year inevitably concentrate upon a 
period of troubles# The Annale* are a more extended and mature work* They 
portray a wrld with neither light nor hope# The bleakness of the age 
comes through msat clearly* There is the forbidding presence of the 
emperor, the suspicions aroused by informers, tW sudden prosecutions, the 
trumped up charges, the i^ ysterlouo and sudden deaths, the suicides and a 
general feeling of insecurity# The set pieces convey all this and even 
subordinate clauses maintain the tension* Tihcrius , we are told in on 
aside, had soldiers to escort him* (Ann* 1*y*) The military base of 
imporial power is hinted at and tho continuing military atmosphere evoked, 
to be stressed fk'om time to time later in tho persons of tlie Praetorians and 
their commanders#
The harshnosG of the times is made worse by the use of rumour* The reader 
is given a hint about something and then told it hoe no substance; but the 
dnmgo has been done* The suspicion has been aroused* "I should record 
a contemporary rumour##* rumours always proliferate around the downfalls 
of the great##*# %  own motive in mentioning and refuting the rumour has 
been to illustrate by one conspicuous instance the falsity of hearsay 
gossip and to urge those w^io read this book not to prefer inorediblq 
tales - howover widely current and readily accepted - to the truth unblom#' 
ished by marvels" (Am* ^ After the death of Agrioola it is rumoured 
thot he was poisoned# Comiseration was enhanced ly it6 persistence* "I 
would not venture to assert", he continues, "that we ha-ye any firm evidence." 
(Agri* 43#) The reader begins to suspect an ulterior transaction between 
himsolf and Tacitus* Though denied it has been implied* The oumulative 
effect of innuendo can be as persuasive as luoidly^  presented incontrovertible 
evidence*
21
Hoifovcr, to the contrary, wo should note how large a place rumour holde in 
the affairs of loen. Error, surmioe and phrases mlaunderatood can produce 
a potent mixture, made, perhaps, the worse ty dependence upon word of 
mouth within the confines of a fairly email social group* in this case 
the senatorial and equeetrian clasees resident within tho orbits of the 
court and capital# The rumours of a sooiely help detennine its atmosphere 
as much as Its everts acts# Account should, tlmrefore, be taken of them# 
Their repeated use as part of a running criticism of the emperors makes a 
critical reader fear some special pleading#
Such writing does seem bound to tarnish the brightness of imperial rul4> 
ond it adds to the opinion that Tacitus has not dorm justioe to quality of 
life during the first century# Fundamentally the argument is that the 
history of the empire is more than the hlstoiy of Home and its uppor classes 
and mb# mile Tacitus was describing a period of almost continual 
metropolitan unroot the provinces enjcyed peace and prosperity, as a great 
deal of archaeological evidence oho## Once Romo is left behind there is a 
sunnier kind of life# 3he purges of Domitlun disturbed few people in 
Britain or any other province for that matter, the argument continues#
Tlius if Tacitus had written within a different perspective and chosen 
different events to relate the picture would have been different# This is 
a difficult argument to refute# Bad things been different then the 
impression given would have been difforont from what it was& Is the 
Gvidonce so soloctive so os to bo tantamount to wilful distortionZ 
Perliaps it may be admitted that Tacitus did not aspire to write a history 
of the provinces, unlike i'iommsen# He did not even try to composo a social 
and economic history of Rome# In his major works he treated of a year of 
political revolutions and gave an annalistic account of what seemed to him 
to be the most significant events in the empire during the first half of 
tho first century. Within that framework the portrayal of character, the 
evaluation of events and people together with the description of the social 
atrr.osphere seems to be the major thec%*s# He conveyed all three from his 
sources and from his knowledge of his own society# It was the world of the 
capl"Wl. But what was true of Rome might well have boon true of the 
provinces# Could Roman governors, generals and administrative personnel 
liUve been indoperdent of those who appointod them? The nature of impezdal 
government made this largely impossible, as wo shall see when the 
honorum is studied# I:or could tho native peoples escape the consequences 
of Imporial policies, Tlie shadows of intrigue and suspicion could not help 
but fall over those who worked in provincial administration. To think that 
thlups might be diffei'ent in the provinces is to overthrow the principle of
22
accouutGblllty, oo ovMent in Honan hlotoiy* Tho impact %my have been 
3j@so novere and imodiate but tho tenoion and tho resultant insecurity 
cannot have been aboent# It sooms to be generally agreed that the revolt 
of Boudicca was eparW off by decialons made In Bom and turned into a 
conflagration by the harsh ineptitude of procuratoriul staff#
A utudy of the corn measure found at Carvoran, with the naw of Doaitian 
oxcieed, mkeO the point mre vividly, and iHu8tr0tcs idiet cannot be 
argued from the archaeological eviddnoe. Once the mneuro had been used 
with DomiAn'e name on it, tMn it had been obliterated and, perhaps, put 
to use again# Sombody had to give an order for tho name to be removed. 
Archaeology does not tell ue how or by whom. It is unthinkable idmt within 
an airny it could have been done on local initiative# It muot have consâ 
down the chain of comand originating in the reaolution that damned his 
memory# At each level of the chain the recipient had to be clear that it 
vms 8 legitimate order that he recoived and was required to transmit# It 
also Md to be acoeptable to him porsonally. This is olways an important 
factor, and never more so than in times of political upheaval# &^fho would 
be Qooountable if questions wero aslted about idiat had been done? The action 
mukec clear that events in Rome had their effect upon tho minds of 
government officials end amy personnel and that must have rubbed off to 
soma dogreo onto the natives themoolves; not least, perhaps, in the way 
they were actually treated# It is tho written sources rather than 
arohaeologicar : ^  convey the tentai state. It might be Inferred 
archaeologloally but it is not a very sensitive Instrumnt# Thus, if we 
had no literary evidence about the life of the capital (suring tho first 
century, covered by Tacitus, archaeology would toll of a groat city, whi(A. 
enjoyed a prosperity far groater than that of any of tho provinces* We 
might then conclude that those %)ho lived there at that time enjoyed tho 
best of all possible worlds. When the literary evidence is examined it 
becomes apparent that this could hardly have been possible# Pear was a 
significant element and it must have had its effect upon tho quality of 
life itself.
Tho dominant power of the prince os overshadowed iAiGm all# A :ind of cruel 
necossity had made the devolution of powor into the liands of one man 
neoossar$. Tacitus conveys this not only explicitly but implicitly in 
extended piocos Of writing ifhioh convoy the feelings of fear and suspicion 
with &7hich G reader can identify, perhaps out of his oim oi^rience*
Slnco the provincial evidence for a life core relaxed and happier than 
that of Romo is almost entirely archaeological, perhaps, too much should 
not be Inferred from the artefacts about the mental quality of life thore#
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In both oases the mterlal level of life my ho clear enough but to infer 
happinoos from thoco rcmins alone would be dangerous. We Shall see, on û 
number of oconclone, throughout this study-how the apparent vacillation 
of the central government my well have inhibited the policies of the 
fiovornors of Britain» The empire was a leyiathanjiflth the brain centre at 
Rom which directed all the parts and determined, üieroby, thoir state of 
being*
1.5. TlGITlt'3 AND HISIÜRIAN;:)
It my bo that enough Ms been written to mice, i., the reader's mind, tho 
Ouostion whether Tacitus should be regarded'as a reliable historian. How 
does he compare with other witers of the same poriodT He is in fact 
virtually the only historian we have.
Ouetonius (born about 69) prirnz'ily a biographer, who wrote within a 
fairly rigid fromwork, one of whose effects is to mke it difficult 
to.understand tho context within which certain anecdotes occurred. Those 
vivid touches add variety and IndavidtioJixty to tnc texu, liA.e toe pliables 
of the Hew Testament, wliich Mve also lost their .sit%.jiIL.k]^ , in mny 
oases. HoverthelesG, the stories do tlnxAr a certain light upon one or two 
events in Roman Britain but, in general, the works of Suetonius are hardly 
comparable with those of Tacitus.
Dio Cassius (born about 160) irroto a comprehonsivo history of Rom, but as 
with Tacitus, a considerable portion is missing, wliile other ports survive 
in an ebbroviotcd form. Thore a:G, indeed, sections dealing with Britain, 
to which reference will be mode in the appropriate sections, mcjr arc not 
j^thout their usofulness# However, we cannot bo suz'o of Dio's sourcos. he 
may have been dependent, in largo Measure, upon Tacitus hit.selL. all 
events ho can hardly have ignored him. rnrthez^ore, it icisu surolv bo 
assumed that ho possessed -Tacitus's full t02ct, wnicn ww luck, anu v«hxch 
oust inliibit, to some degree, our comparison of the two.
We are left,then,with Tacitus so virtually our significant literary 
courco. He is nearer to the tiioes of wliich he tvritos; his works arc more 
detailed and greater in scope than those of other writers. Insofar as 
CO: parisons can bo mde it is not lâth otlicr literary but with arclinoological 
sources. Even then the connecting points ere tantslislngly few; but where 
thoy do occur the veracity of Tacitus is confirmed# An inscription giving 
0 Gumory of a speech delivered ly Oleudius is strikingly similar to 
Tacitus's report of it. (36 )# "He is easily tlic boat literary source
for the events of the early Princlpate that we possess. On him, therefore, 
we have to rely for our knowledge of a critical epoch in tM history of
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WùBtom c iv ilisa tio n ."  (37 )
1.6# TACITITS AS A iqSTmm:!
Poriiapc thîG last point Ms juot prevonted tho roador froi: osking whether 
TaoituD cho.ild bo rogordod as a kiotorlGn at all* Ilicri thnt cooms to have 
boon wi'itton appears to Mve treated him no a draimtiot m'iting in 
narrative form or considered him no o cioraliet toachlng tlirough historical 
e::zn.iplOG. ïgy loo-d.ns for typos sM symbols As ifell as the effect of tho 
Gits lebon ncACh that soomed to bo clear has bocoæ cloudy end things that 
Goomod certain have disappoarcd* Tacitus could be going the way of the 
writers of tho Neir Testament 1
Too much sco%]0 should aot bo allowed, hozfcver, to those acts of scholarly 
ingenuity# They stem, for the r%)ot part, from a GcriouB attempt to find 
out whether nnythiikg fi-osh can bo gleaned fro/n the text, if it is studied 
in another irn^y# However, if they'ai^  alloiTod full rein thoy can dissolve 
iiuch of tho mtorial and prodaeo Gcopticism wliicli doubts whether anything 
can be knoi-m at all about the past# History then becomes a problem of 
luiowledao.
Wo historian writeo without bias. Indeed nobody witoG without a bias of 
Gozae kind# That is because "hiotozy is not an exact acloncG but an 
interpretation of humn affairo" and so "opinion and varieties of opinion 
intrude ac inevitable factors". Bias is therefore any pcrGOnal interpret­
ation of historical events# (35 )# Tho skill in izitorpretotion Ilea
in both recognising and alloifing for it# Becanse history may bo considered 
eontemporar}" history it does not follow tMt there is no knowledge of the 
past# ^ ^.^9 is true tlmt one cannot have immedloto or ezistontial 
experience of the pact, it nny bo poGsiblo in a seoord-hard or derived way# 
The reign of TibarluG, for example, is not iævitabl^ ' the Lilliput to tho 
rule of Domitian# Tacitus thought that he was witing histoiy am not 
allcgoiy of some klM# His dislike of Domltian, in whidi he WSG not alone, 
comes through the pages of the ;ip:ricola\ very clearly# To extend it aa a 
typology for use in tho A?inalo is questionable and imneeessary in tho 
Histories# It my bo that contemporary events, at the tim of their 
composition, sharpened the historian's td.t and no added venom to Ills 
political ideas but it would bo rash to infer either fabrication or 
distortion# Even liio uoc of rumour, %7]iich 3-}roduces a kost inoidlous effect, 
should not bo reckoned totally against Taoitus# Hlietber wo call it rumour, 
gossip or "Mck-ground briefing" such talk is a significant element in 
social and political life# People, including those are not actually 
managing tho levais of povTor, do discuss public affairs together* They
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make resumptions, infer conolusiom and mrk out proMbilities* The contents 
of none of these tronsaétions my ho oomsot but if they become prevalent 
they acquire a certain authority, of which, account mst be taken in the end.
ikiiaour GORetlnBG acquiree suoli force thst it doss afreet the projiXirvies of 
a situation. Agricola m-; not liavo boon poisoned by Domitian but peri#s 
few would have been surprisec had he been guilty ol the deed# ihe force of 
the rumour shows the degree to which the Emperor wee alienated from the 
sonatorial class.
Boi^ ovcr, we Mvo but on iMirect concern with these mttero. Our interest 
lies in those aspects of Tocitoan studies which wo can use for tho study of 
Roman Britain. Tliese other mtters have significance insofar as they 
illumina to tliat subject. He shall see later on that a good deal can be 
gleaned from Tacitus and that the qiiest need not end in scepticism.
It is just because so much my bo inferred that the task is the more 
difficult and thus tho results are nndo somwhat more unsure. How nuch 
easier it z/ould have been if oîixy ho nad wrrt uOii a polxuicax. or box acal 
testamont! bnfortunatols^  thore is no such source avui]nble to us. We have 
to work from his i^ rritings and the roferences to him, fex^  as they are, in 
latin literature, together with & libtlo epigraphic evidence.
1.7# CÜ/GLUSim
Ko may summarise this section about Tacitus the man thus* ne was born into 
an equestrian family that probably came from Harbononsio or at least from 
Gallic lands. Having boon admitted Into the senatorial order he followed a 
career in the public service, during which he acquired a considerable 
reputation as on orator. During the reign of Nerve he turned to historical 
studios, stimulated initially by his (cqxarlcnce of t)ie emperor Donitian, 
whc^ he thought treated his father in law, Agricola, Md]y. Theroaftor, 
while not abandoning his political career, he produced a series of 
brilliant)^ ' iwitten works. %  his uræcmitting criticism of the emperors 
it is assumed.that-he disapproved of monarchical rule on the grounds that it 
was bod for the mn himself and for those over whom he ruled. He seems to 
have longed for the dayo of the old republic, even though ho recognised 
the nocoosit^ r of the princimte. At tho same tim ho was dooply concerned 
with liuTrmn motivation, so that periodically ho witoo like a moralist. Ho 
was no optianict. The Roman political world is bligk and unenlivened by 
hone. The intensity of lii# writing) seomsto mks/unlikely that he was, lit 
fmct* a nooeui'. It ifcs indeed a world of strife and tension, at many timea; 
nor could it bo assumed that justice woald prevail. The exercise of powor 
by frail mon prevents such an equitable result. Ihe gods rarely appea* in
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tlie works of TaoiW Wt bo has one significant commnt about them: they
appear to be more concerned with the punishment of men than with their 
welfare. It is, therefore, an inoonsietent world* "The more I tliink 
about history, ancient and modern", he wrote,"the zaore ironical all 
human affairs seem", (/mnals 3.18.)
This, then is the context within lAich the historian of Roman i^ italn must 
handle the works of Tacitus. Tho province appears within a non-British 
fram of reference, confined to particular opioodcs rather than inthe form 
of a continuous narrative, except for the ARricolafi. It raises our expect­
ations and we should examine it in more detail.
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roon:OTE8.
(1) Tïiis iG a tomi iiood by R.G.Collingifood to doscrlbo tho oonstruotlon of 
"a pato^ nmrk hiotoiy wliooo mterialc word dra%m from 'authorltloo', tMt 
iG, from tho works of proviouo hiotorlano who had already written tho 
hiotorieo of particiiWr GOOiotioG at ^ mrtioular tlmoo." Soo R.G.Collingifood, 
%o Idea of Hiotory. (h:ford. 1946# p.33#
(2) Tlio Toach vouraolf history Gorioo prooooded very much in tlilG faoliion. 
Tho history of a mtion at a particular tim ms built rcuM a ainglo 
important individual. Roian Britain was dealt with in a ainglo volume 
dealing with the other three and a half conturies. Thoy wore dealt with 
in Gi% and a Mlf pages at the end of tho book. The iwiting was redoomd 
by the quality of the author'o presentation. A.R.Bum. A(]^ iGola OT^  Romm 
Britain. London, lot.ed# 1953
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2.1. ITS PLAGE IN THE WORKS OF TAGIRS
It iB generally agreed that the AmrlGoM Is an early work; probably 
tho first, written In 98 (Aerl. 3.1#) This was the sam year In whleh 
the Germania was ooE^aed, but wag written before It if Agzi#3,2-3 
means that Taoltna had written nothing before It. The references to 
Domltlan make It clear that It could r^ot have been published in the 
llfe-tlme of the emperor; nor could much of it have been used as the 
funeral panegyric for Agricole himself, who died while Domltlan still 
ruled. Topicality would be lost, however, if publication were delayed 
mch beyond the assassination of 96# ■ It any be assumed that the work was 
published early In the reign of fra^A^ Me is incntioned but not as 
Trajan appears as one who is "daily increasing tho happiness of the 
times." (AKri.3.1. ) Put together these poiiAmight indicate that 
Tacitus was writing while Morva was alive and after Trajan had boon 
adopted as his successor. Thus the date of publication is to be placed 
between end of Ootober 97 when Trajan was nominated and 2gth J azmary 98 
when Nerva di#d# .
A certain caution might be registered about tho date,- Literary 
conventions are not always either infallible or invariable# Pliuy in 
his PanemriGUS refers to llorva oneo as but five times without
the epithet# 8o in Afrricola!, c#44 Trajan is writtoiAa This
my mean that he was emperor (since the title does not seem to have been 
used of one who was Caesar) for Trajan could ziot hove been so mentioned 
with propriety during tlie life-time of his prodeocssor. It is not 
unrea sons bio to conclude 1 » that the Ac^ lcoiai'r was published early in 
the rule of Trajan and 2. that it was largely written during the princlpate 
of Nerva. The work came before the public, then, about four and a half 
years after the death of its subject, bocauee Agrioola died on 23rd 
August 93# There was, thus, ample time foi^  the revleion and amplification 
of any material that Tacilms might have used had he delivered tho funeral 
address#
The Agrlco^ ni is thoreforo the first liiatorlcal work of a distinguished 
orator and politician who cooposGd it at the prime of lile, while reacnmg 
tho height of his career, but when ho was also something of an apprentice 
to the profession of historian.
2.2. ITS NATURE AND fURPü^
There Is no proof, however, that the A%ricol8( ' had its origins in the 
literary form of the panegyric pronounced at the funeral of famous men,
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but the temptation to assume it often seems to bo almost IrrOolstible#
Would the faml3y have invited anybody elGO when the dead mn'a son in 
law was one of :the foremoat orators of the day? The social and political 
eondltiona of the time might imll have decided them against auch an 
invitation;
If, then, it could be shown that the structure and content of the 
AjRrioola followed the conventional form of such panegyrics, it might be 
inferred reasonabjly that it was here that the work had its origin.
Obituary notices were congwsed under these heade; reference was made to 
a person'n faially, background, financial and marital achlevementa, hie 
spirit and capacity* Thus the traditional Roman virtues of fame, vlrtus. 
pniims and ingenium were covered# FinaDy the panegyric closed with 
remarks about tho person's ability as on orator and perhaps one or two 
other slight points# ( i. )#
The reader will at once perceive that Tacitus deals with all these headings, 
in varying degrees, during the course of the work. It would be hard for 
en:7 blograpby to avoid them# ( 2. ). The argument therefore is hardly
conclusive#
Perhaps the ARrlcola should be regarded as an eulogy# Here again there 
were standard conventions derived from Greek models, Unless there were 
special factors one might reasonably expect a son in law to write an 
encomium of his father in law if he writes a work about him! However, if 
the Aarioola is a biography in a laudatory style a degree of scepticism 
will be proper for its use in the history of Roman Britain# There could 
be a glossing over of events at some points, and some alterations at 
others, with a view to giving the subject the most favourable interpret­
ation# Polybius had occasion to remark that mtters dealt with in an 
encomium must be given extended treatiaent in histories because the former 
was committed to praise whereas the latter aimed to give both a true 
account of events and demonstrate their causal connexion# Tacitus does 
not pay any attention to any defects that Agricole might have had# If 
not eulogistic^ , within the literary conventions of the day, it certainly 
has idealistic overtones, which will repay careful examination*
Sallust may be influential in the composition of the A^ricolar. There is 
evidence of his influence upon Tacitus's prose style, (*3, ) His
forms of writing my have been absorbed as well. The Bellum lumrthinum 
and Catiline bear some resemblance to the AfTlcolar * The former arc 
biographical studies rather than biography and ths latter clearly has more 
in it than biographical information, For emmple, there is the ethnogra#iic
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end geographical section, together with the survey of the earlier 
history of the province# We my  admit, therefore, that the A^slool# 
is something of e hybrid: a mixture of biography and hietory# ( 4. )
Hoifever, a good deal depends upon what is thought to constitute 
biogra^ iy# A certain allowance met be made, first of all, for the 
creativity of %Gitue# Ke ia not necessarily the sum of his Greek and 
Intin predecessors, respected as they may be# Whatever deviations 
apparently occur can be shown to be related to his subject; Agricole#
The geogra#iical background sets the scene# The previous histoiy of the 
province puts Agrioola in perspective # The battle scenes give colour 
and e change of pace to the narrative# The introverted charscter of the 
eii^ ror heightens the personality of Agricole himself and suggests a 
brooding sinister background presence throughout the governorship# 
Dramtically, the Battle at Mona Graupiua la tho climax of the book; 
the summation of the policy prosecuted over seven years# Within whatever 
kind of framework, we may consider it demonstrated the yjrtmL of Agrioola 
and established his fspa# If the actual conduct of the Battle of El Alamein 
is as relevant to the biography of Viscount Montgomery as its result, then 
so is Mono Graupius to Agrioola# It the last action of a groat public 
oervnnt for whom the rest of his life was spent in unnecessary retirement#
The biographical nature of tho work stands out clearly, whatever 
affinities m y  also be found with other litorazy form# The condusion 
also accords with %ie stated intention of the author, for which com place 
ought to be found# (Agri#1 #4*) Nonetheless, the idealistic nature of the 
writing cannot help but strike the reader# Agricole is e mn without 
blemishes# Ho other character appears in the works of Tacitus so untouched 
by weaknesses# For this some ^ lunation mist be found# The eulogy my 
afford some reason for tiiis# But is it only s man wno is oeing idealised4 
It could be that the imrk is an for a whole group of people who
entered government service and remained in office during the reign of 
Domition# Enough has already been written to demonstrate the effect upon 
Tacitus of the latter years, of Ills rule. During that time mny pooplo 
remined in office end not a fet; survived ly tho practice of silence, 
nodestio and obsecniium# The Afcricolay ^ as o whole my be regarded oc a 
tribute to them and constitute a reminder thot good things can be done 
even in a state ruled by an evil autocrat#
As Richmond has written, the book stands in a significant relationship to 
tho political background# ( ) Ror^ noless ths strong personal
feeling of the writer comes tlirough in the last chapter where Agricole
%±8 designated nlun: the highest iiralse to which a Roman could espire# He 
mo a good general and an able governor idlth high Intelligence whose every 
capacity was allied not on)y to Gclf-effacement but to loyalty to the state# 
Here my be tho clue to the meaning of the portrays
the ideal governor* It le a handbook on leadership written in pemonal 
form# The character and capabllitlea attitudes and ettributee to mich 
a public servant $hou3d aspire are written into an account of the career 
of the authors father in law# The Ap:;^ colar. could usefully have boon put 
into the hands of a young m n  entering the vlginltlvlrate# The steps of 
the career are clearly marked# The role content ie described together 
with the attributos necessary for it^ discharge# Oivll administration 
takes its place alongsido mllitmy affairs* Attention is drawn not only 
to the somi-antomatlo promotions on the lower rungs of the curons honorum, 
but to the elemnt of personal choice by the emperor, in particular, in 
tho higher rm^s# Though n man might have the capaoit3)^ and the willing­
ness to serve he night bo passed over and denied his just rewards # Inner 
integrity and tho ideal of self-loss public service oonstituted the only 
certain, if inner, reward# "Tacitus places tho governor of imperial times 
in the tradition of the great republican conquerors and demonstrates to 
y Romans of the princlpate a W)" forward from the dlsast rous inert 
which threatened to dominate them entirely." ( 6. )
Behind the description of role content and personal attributes lies a 
clear presupposition about overall policy; the expansion of the state 
should bo the aim of the ideal governor# This pursuit, alone, gives 
adequate scope for the exercise of virtutes and the opportunity for their 
reward# We may now soe why Britain is Important in the eyes of Tacitus# 
After Augustus decided to hold the boundaries of empire and Tiberius came 
to prefer peaceful dlplomcy to war the opportunities for such display 
wore limited# The Invasion end conqiiest of Britain was tho principal 
theatre for their ettainmnt# The province was and thus the fioM 
on which fern could be won through a suitable lnjmnium_militare. Hence 
the importance of Agricola's years of campaign by which tribes were 
brought into the orbit of empire# Tliereafter the province was also the 
territory in which Roman life and ways could be brought into oxistenoe 
through the exercise of interzritas. and iustltM*
The fact that Agricola never appears elsewhere in the surviving works of 
Tacitus and that Britain lies on the side-line of imperial politics do 
not mtter# Agricole was the ropresentetive governor and Britain the 
reprosantativo province for tho ideal, style and characteristlcs neceosazy,
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in the eyes of TmcituG, for true public servants. If, thon, Agrioola, is 
the ikon of tho jLofratue aumisti it heoomeo neconoary once more to enquire 
behind the oersona or orosonon to see if reliable information can be given 
to us about Roman Britain through the pagéù of the &SliSo3ëi ,# ^  
mrtlGular, has %citue been able to draw" upon the personal observations 
of his father in law and so give ue some kind of first haM account of 
_Eritamiia?
Tm miilB o? TEB AORIGOmi
What then is the value of the work? If everything Tacitus writes about 
the reign of Domitian is true, then we m%ht think tMt Agricola end 
Tacitus would both have a certain reserve about a candid exchange of 
views relating to Britain, the governorship and subsequent retirement.
In times of terror it can often be public affairs that are talked 
about within a family for fear of spies even witliin the household, 
Agricola's career might have been over but that of Tacitus ciearly was 
not. Both might have feared arrest in any case* Even innocent conversat­
ions about public affairs could bo twisted to destroy poop^* Domestic 
and general subjects might not bo affected quite so much, Do, there is 
the observation, which proMbly caitK) from Agricole, abouti his early 
predilection for philoso^# and his rnother's procqpt action in dealing 
with it* The general shape of North Britain and configuration of 
Scottish coastline which Tacitus describes might hsvqcriginated in tho 
descriptions of Agricola, However, we must remembor that Agricole 
himself did not ciroumnavigatG Britain so that it is possible that the 
information came from an officer of tho fleet. The descriptions of 
military strategems and of urban policy might have come from Agricola 
himself, if not directly then tlirough the file copies in the archives,
The asides about romanisation being merely a form of enslavement, (Ag^ ,21 ] 
seem oharaoteristically Taoitoan, Tho possibility of his being Govomor 
of ^ i a  could relate equally to club-land gossip as to a domestic 
conversation# His withdrawal as s candidate for the proconsulshlp of 
Asia might be interpi'oted in a variety of ways* Brcn^ beating Is one, 
but a fixed determination to remain retired is another. Once out of 
Britain Agricole maintained a life of quiet and silence. Cumulatively 
the impression is given of ciroumspection of a high order during tho later 
x'eers of his life which coincided with the terrors of Domltlan, If one 
knew of the dangers of reminiscences, the other doubtless appreciated 
the risks of the untimely question. Thus, it might bo that the extent 
to which Tacitus drew directly upon the memories of Agricola could be
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limited: perhaps a point about Northern goography, some analysis of his 
oppononts' military equipaont, and tactics, statements of ration strengths 
nixl other logistics, - that ndght bo about all. The rest could have com 
from other literary sources or first hand discussion, and the official 
archives# On this mterlal Tacitus could place his own interpretation 
and shape it for his own purposes# The historian of Rcmnn Britain will 
always need to remmber that his own perspective is different from that 
of Tacitus and that the Agricolar is a refroctoiy text for his purpose#
2.A. AN AmbYSIS OF THE CONTa^*
Of the 46 chapters 7 are devoted to introductory and concluding mteriel, 
with 3 chapters alone devoted to tho death of Agricole# His birth and 
youth take 1 chapter, and .so do the combined offices of quaestor., tribmo 
of the people and praetor# His appointment as legionary legate and 
governor of Aquitaine mrlt one chapter apiece# Previous governors 
warrant 2 chapters, Paullimio and tho rebollion of Boudicca are given 
another 2# 3 are devoted to the condition of Britain; 1 to the policy 
of Romnization, end 10 to the set piece at Mono Grsupius# Britain 
takes 28 of tho 46 chapters in nil. Moro than half the wrk is indeed 
dovoted to Britain but nearly e fifth is given over to the flnol battle 
piece# The military element is clearly a major part of the work. Much 
of its significance must depend upon our essessmnt of the governorship 
of Agrioola, not least in relation to his predoceooors# This will also 
help us to determine tho importance of the Battlo at Moim Oraupius# 
Together these elements suggest the character of tho ideal governor.
This is more important tlmn the province administerod. He ought then to 
understand the office in which Agricole displayed his Virtutes# This 
will help us undorstand the subject, tho author and tho history of 
Romn Britain somewhat hotter#
2.5. THE ÜEÎJATORIAL GimiR
How did a porson such as Agrioola com to bo the Governor of a province 
ouch as Britain? %^niat personal and official resources did tho office­
holder need? l%ot did the Bn#ror think roquloito in his lieutenants?
If m  can answer some of these questions we shell not only understand 
Agricoin better but also gain som further Insiglit into the history of 
the province#
The government of tho empire comprised a nmabor of adnu^ Tiistmtsve 
'systems' ^to use ((%t^%%ly inter-rolatcd and partly in parallel but 
all of tMm came together in tho household of the nrinceos# All powers
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and authority were delegated. Only in liim were they inherent. TMt 
was the !k)mn revolution oonaolidoted after the Battle of Actium.
(Hlot.1 #1.) Personal rule, however, is dependent upon consent as well 
as sanotions. %e monarch depends upon the loyalty of others to act for 
him. His will is implemented by subordinates with whom he Ms a zautuol 
dépendent relationship# In the end the rule of the nrlnceos must be 
acceptable by those ;^io implement it and are affected hy it. If it is 
not, then, the coup d'etat becomes the engins of political change. 
Augustus had built his power upon the army wMch he had recruited end 
which swore personal loyalty to him# Once secure in power, ho addressed 
himself to the govermnce of tho res mbllca. Though operating vdth a 
certain n«)desty he concentra tod in his own person the principal powers 
of the old republic. Thereafter he had need of advisers and assistants 
to execute his policies. The former wore about him but the latter often 
hod to be away inthe provinces for extended periods. Tho selection of 
such men was of criticai importance# An "overmlghty" subject could 
threaten tlio state and ovezthrow the soverè%n; and an inoompotont one 
could be equally dangerous.
The various provincial administrative systems were arranged in ranks 
having boon derived from the ropublican mgisti^cies and Pompoy's method 
of appointing delegates with local powers. With all these we arc not 
imediately oonoemed. Our interest lies in the section tAiioh involved 
Agrioola; the high rsiüclng post of ;i,qmtus AumsM^nro nraetore# For 
the post it would seem as if some form of appropriate training and 
expcrionoe xmre required, coupled with the right kind of personal 
capacitios, for the appointment was, a# we shall soo, a deimnding one# 
Augustus had divided t%ic proflSges of the empire into tm categories.
1, There were those whicli he bad, os it were, handed bsckt) tho Donato 
and which thereby resumsd the ropublican pattern of govcmordilp# This 
ontolled an annual appointment, into a province wliioh contained no 
troops, lAloh no governor could legally raise. Mad be done so it would 
have been regarded as high treason. If a military preaence were 
required then he had to apply to tho nearest imperial province. Even 
though he had been appointed hy the Senate the gcrvernor was not free 
of imperial control for he received instructions from tho emperor as 
did his opposite number in an imperial province. Thus the emperor did 
not fail to take an interest in Africa, Asia, Baetio^ , Gallia 
Kcrbonensls, Sicily, Sardinia, Illyrlcum, AcMea, Macedonia, Crete, 
Oyrcne, Gyprus and Bithynia, it vms merely that his methods here were
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rather moro Indirect. 2. Some provinces the emperor reserved for his own 
direct personal attention, and these he governed through hie legates plus 
some which were governed by procurators# ( The latter were mainly small 
like Judaea and the Alps, but there were larger ones like Egypt and the 
muretanlas.) The main unito of the arny were stationed in these areas. 
Britain came into this second category. It was a major theatre of war 
during the second half of the first century, it contained either three or 
four legions and constituted a large tract of land in need of pacificstion 
and GGttlement# There were,in addition,numerous auxiliary units and a . 
fleet, one of the few maintained by Rome* The Gerisanloo and Bannonia also 
contained large forces. By tho time Tacitus wrote it was clear that any 
of these armies and governors could overthrow the govomment in Rome,
Thus, great care Md to b@ taken about tfiose wno were appointed to high 
coomand in them.
It hardly seems possible for an emperor to have remlned unaware of the 
political Implications of the armies In the provinces. Provincial 
governorships were critical for tho well being of the stato and the safety 
of tho emperor; thus it was not an area of government that a princeps 
would allow to rest in other hands. Epigraphy affords us records by 
which we are enabled to understand the steps of the carew that reached 
its climax os a provincial governor of the most senior status, ( /?' )*
Tbose who wore it^ gati Aufqisti wo nroeto;re invariably cams from the 
senotorial class, into which they had been bom ora (footed. One may, 
therefore, ref,9r appropriately to e senatorial cursus honorum and place 
it alongside that of tho equestrians and of those below that rank, all of 
which had their distinctive oharacteriotlcs.
A senator was v;!lr clarlsslms who began his career informed by tho old 
Romn ideal of jzubllc servico. Traditionally the business of this upper 
olasG was politics. ( 8' ). The activity was to be carried on, however,
by reference to cei'tain clearly defined personal attributes. Of those 
the critical one was vlrtus: a word almost incapable of%)quivalent, in 
English. The word meant the winning of pre-eminence and glory through 
the execution of great deeds in tho service of the state. Tho opposites 
were Imavia and inertia: a refusal to play a part in politics. For a 
nsan to iflthdrew from public affairs "to cultivât.© his o\m private interest 
was siiïiply unfitting. Once vlrtus ms invoked, glorj& and were the 
moans through which it was expressed. Tho latter is more of a neutral 
term than the formr for it consisted mainly of what people said - 
reputation - and as such it may be either good or bad. however,
was much more positive for it consisted of fam transformed into praise
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fpr right actionc^  which were particularly «îeritoriouc, because they were 
of service to the state* If those were the goals for achievemnt, the 
correlative attributes were ambltlo and fldes. A man muat strive 
personally for a good end; that Is true pmbltlo. rather than any form of 
self-seeking* He must establish bis good fslth on which all relationships 
must ultimately depend.
Time and chance affect all men# Ho one can escape the Irrational and 
unpredictable nature of fortuna. It was félicitas that was needed here* 
napoleon♦a question of any general is fundamental: Is he lucky? A man not
only needed adequate capacities but also the right sort of conditions in 
which to display them* The opening chapter of the Histories, and to some 
extent the beginning of the AEricolae, show how difficult all this might 
be In evil times; and the fate of Agrlcola himself displays a servant's 
dependence upon the character of bis superior officer* On the other hand, 
there is a sense In which, at least among the perceptive people, a man's 
vlrtutee could be appreciated. Those who were rightly motivated could be 
carried forward by homo artes and would reap their reword* These social 
skills depended heavily on both modestia and obseguium. Obedience to 
lawfully constituted authority ms crucial and a lack of self-display an 
adornment to the good men#
If the emperor needed able men, they required an appropriate field for 
action* The administration of the pro%in#S8 proved to be a large enough 
field for their abilities, and enough to stimulate the desire for the 
supreme office among some# They upheld the state whether the emperor was 
an unstable juvenile, a scholar or a repressed sadist* Even when the 
emperors were themselves odd, the appointments to these governorships did 
not be com crasy* There was a quiet, steady, hidden sanity about the 
Imperial provincial administration* The system proved to be better than 
its occasional personification* Thus It was that the same sort of men 
were appointed throughout our period of study, even though we cannot be 
sure of the exact procedures through which they were appointed* The 
emporor could not havo known personally all six hundred members of the 
senate, who were expected to progress through this series of offices, with 
the exception of the consulship (to which all could not aspire)# Reliance 
raist have been placed in part upon recommendations whether by officials 
for their subordinates or who asked for thoir friends and
relatives* Ro doubt corruption and favouritism were not absent either; 
but much of all this is hidden from our eyes*
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was the normal start for the overwhelming number of men known to ue in the 
service of the emperor at senatorial W^l*
Within tho vlpintlvirate there were certain welghtinse# 
perhaps, have been of higher social atalading* That would show statua rather 
than estlmted capacity. It would seem aa though a hl^er percentage of 
jIV viri got the highest #poW%nente in the imperial service# 
ponetales seem to have some ii;^ rial favour and perhaps could expect it in 
the years ahead. III viri canitales had no such expectation. We do not 
imorf in which group Agricole served and thus we do not xnow what kind of 
patrons re he had secured* However, since he arrived at the consulship by 
a short route, we could Infer that he had good backers, or was of exception- 
al ability — or more cynically that the Flavians were so short of good men 
tlist they had to bring on whom they could to fill tne posts of empire 1 
The next stage was the post of military tribune. This was the almost 
invariable praotloe. There were over 20 legions to which they might go* 
However, not all future senators held the tribunate, Perhaps there were as 
mny as elglit out of twenty in any given year who did not do so. On the 
other hand there were some who served in more than one legion, nadrian, 
for example, served in tlu'eo; but two was perhaps mors norml# Some were 
tribunes to close relativmw^  It scemfj ppobablo from this practice that 
senior officers were ab&e to recommend appointees to the emperor; so no 
doubt the influence of friends and olients was brought to bear upon them, 
when the time came for them to make submissions, There la, thorcj-oro, 
no need to assume that imperial initiative was normative; thou^ i, doubtless, 
it occurred frm time to time. The length of service in the legion was 
probably about two to three ^ roars# A sin^e year would have been somewhat 
inefficient* Furthermore, with the number of men available in relation to 
the number of posts available, some career pacing would seem to be inevitable. 
The age at wliich the young men entered the müitar)' service is not clear.
It was probably about 19»"20* As tribunes tliey were technically seconds in 
command of the legions* However, lest it should seem as though the legate 
was served by an inexperienced youth, we should remembor tîiat the other 
fivo tribunes ware equestrians who had arrived at that level after an 
oxtended period of service. They supplied tho exporionce which lacking 
in the latlolavlus and wliioh might even need supplementation in the legate. 
This would be the case particularly where tho tribunate was the only 
military appointment held before a mn beoam lesatus leEioniG. aW also 
le^ TAtus Aufniotl. in a province wliore thore might bo a im^ ber of troops 
stationed*
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We loiow of very few cases where a nan returned to oommnd the legion in 
which he had been tribune or Indeed even returned to the emne province,
Hor did they normlly govern provinces whoro there ifore erniies in which 
they had held the tribumte. Agricole again was eomethlng of an exception.
Re held his tribunate, legateship and governorship all in Britain, This 
mlghtÿ in the end, have had a bearing on tho extent to which the mperor 
thought that he could be useful]y employed elsewhere.
At 25 the young man could hold the quaestorship. This was betrioen 5 and 7 
years after entering the viRintivi3@te. during which period he had both 
gained civilian and military ox^rience and been in contact with a number 
of senior government officials and officers. Since there wore 20 quaestors 
elected each yoar all entrants into the vigintivimte oouM, in due course, 
assume the office. Any deficiency caused by death or loss of properly 
could be made up by late entrants. The quaestors were divided into groups;
(i) 10 for the proconsuls of the senatorial provinces, allocated by lot.
Their tenure of office began on 5 December but their proconsuls did not 
enter office until 1 July, so Uiey met have spent some time in Rom beforo 
setting out to tlisir new duties. During this waiting period they had to 
provide, with the other quaestors, the games which took place in late 
December, They and the other categories were mainly financial officers, 
(il) quAQStor urbanus tho title of one group which romined in Rome 
during their period of office. During the Republic there liad bsen two mn 
with this title end it is generally assumd that this praotlce oontlnuod, 
though in fact the constancy of the numbers is for from certain. Their 
duties included supervlsioh of the aerariu^_#t_u r ni But since they lost 
this task during the prinolpatc the nu#ers may woll have varied,
(111) quaostorep consulum. There my have been four of them, 2 to each
consul ,
(Iv) quSGstores aumisti. It is often assumed that there wore ttfo of them; 
but ell we can be certain of is that there were more than one, (After the 
time of Antoninus Pius this title disappeared and was replaced by 
candidetus Caésaris.)
The role of tho quaestor was akin to that of personal assistants, 'fhose 
assigned to tho Emperor were required, if necessary, to read speechos in 
the Senate. Onco again, here wub an appointeront that gave men an insight 
into tho workings of government, wliich stretched thoir capacities but did 
not burden thorn vrith any fiiml executive responsibllltleG. Agrioola 
a quoostorship by lot in Asia, one of the senatorial provinces.
Between the quaestorshlp and the praetorshlp there seems to have been a
42
ctatutozy 5 year Intervol, that a mn  oouM com to the latter
offiOQ In his ^ th year* During that period he might become either 
tribiinuo ?)lebie or podll^. He mighty however, be completely at leioure# 
rhtriciann were, by definition, precluded from the poet of trlbuma 
plebla or aedllle oleble. They were also exempt from the other post 
intermdlate between the qmestoreblp and the praetorahip;
(narullm. A few m n  held two quaeetorehlps but this my be accounted 
for by unexpected deaths and tho neceoelty of neouring a replacement* 
Periodically we find men who have been ^ dlocti inter cmaGntor^ p&: but 
that is more characteristic of the second than the first century, with 
which we are concerned, A^ich men wore from holding the
quaestorship* Some found sorious occupation as loRaizps to a proconsul*
14 wore required each year and though mat of them were drawn from the 
pi^ etorlans e number were taken from among the ex-quaestors and ex-tribunes* 
Pinnlly a number could serve as VI vir_ eouitum lk>mnorum at the isnnual parade 
the review of the knights# Tliis was an annual event and though an 
honorific post, it was thought worthy of mention by over 100 senators*
There wore 10 tribunes and 6 sediles in office each year* Thus, of 
the 20 quaestors, from two years earlier, one or two must Mve failed 
to secure election; since it seems unlikely that there weio 4 patricians 
entering tho Senate eveiy year# Some, at least, of W s e  who failod to 
secure election may have been allowed to omit the office by 
trlbunloios or aedllioioa# The emperor might confer this status upon 
equestrians who had not boon through the earlier stages. The Boat 
favoured men in each year were elocted as Candida tun jCaosaris, with tho 
emperor's backing#
The appointments mntioned hero bocam more and more ornamontal rather 
tlian functional* They wore a ceromonlal way of marking time before the 
senior magistracy was reached at the age of 30, when a mn could beccmo
praetor*
During the course of tho 1st century the number of praotorships rose from 
12 lnADl4to18bythe end of the century* Early deaths and withdrawals 
from public life, with the addition of together with the return
to GOR^tition of patricians my have meant that those wlio sought 
tho office would generally get it* Once again, the mat favoured, 
including all the patricians, wore oandidatijkiesarlo* There were a 
number of men in the Scnato who had oiaitted tho office by adlcction, 
together with a number of new men imo were brought in idLth the rank of 
ex-p’aetor.
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After tho praetmehip a patrician could look forward to the consulship 
at 31 or a little after. In such (%aaeo they were virtually excluded from 
any of the Intervening appointments which were reserved for ex-praetors# 
These were:
(A) At ïTom; 2 praefecti frumenti dandl,
3 praefecti aorsrii militaris,
2 praefcctl aerarll Gatumi
(B) In Italy; 9 cumtores viarum
pracfecti alimentorum; number uncertain, and soisetimes 
held with the above# Trajan created the post.
4-5 iuridici
(C) In the provinces; (i) Imperialt 24 logsti legionum*
5, then S, then 12 then I4 
legati August! pro praetore;
2 iuridici (Britain & Tarraconcnsis)
& a 3rd. c.70-114 In Galatia- 
Oappadocia#
(il) Senatorial: 14 Icgatl pro praetor©,
8 proconsuls#
(D) In Italy and the provinoes: on unknown number of curatpres civitatlim: 
the nurabcrs wr© also variable#
(S) General: a variety of special posts created on on pd hoc basis#
In practice obout half of oil ex-praetors were required to commnd 0 legion, 
Gome moved to the command imsodiateiy after holding the magistracy; but 
some held another appointment first# The post was almost inesoapoblo 
whoa patricians wore excluded, and account mde for death and iHness#
The appointmnts do not seem to have been controlled by the provincial 
governors#
A number of mn, hoifovor, moved to the consulship by what might ho termed 
"the rapid path"# This was the holding of on]y two significant posts 
after tho praetorshdp and beforo the conmilshbp# These were, normally, 
a legionary command and tlic governorship of an imperial province, or its 
equivalent# Both oppolntmnts might bo of throe years duration or slightly 
loss, so that G man rslght gain the poscGC within alx)ut 8 years# If 
through the lus libcrorum he Iisd gained a year two'o advantage he might 
bo consul at 36 - 5 years earlier tîian tho prescribed 42# On the whole 
these men worn a minority# Ik)st senators lield well over two posts#
45#
The praetorian provinces grew under the prlncipate, as a result of 
additions to the empire, cbanges of statue in provinces and the sub- 
division of territories* Other praetorian poeta varied* The cura 
viarum varied in atatuo; Thuo senior praetoril were given the vlae, 
Aemilia, Appia and rlaminia # Other roads were given to those %bo bad 
been praetorians not long before# The duration of the post is not 
known. The iuridici were, on the whole, relatively junior. The 
praefectura frumenti dandi seems to have lacked status and to have 
been held by men without prospects in the imperial service* The 
treasury appointments differed in status. The three prefects of the 
military treasury cere junior to the two men in that of Saturn, as far 
as status was concerned, even though a minority went on straight to the 
consulship without any other intervening office. The prefects of the 
treasury of Saturn seems to have been assured of direct passage to the 
consulship. Both prefectures seemi to have been held for three years. 
There were two consuls each year# Augustus created the suffeot consul- 
ship, as an institution, practising regularly what bad been casual end 
occasional before. Throughout this period their number increased, thus 
making it possible for more men to hold the fasces# Hnder the Flavians 
there may have been as many as 7 or 8 and later on it went higher still* 
normally, however, about half of the expraetors could expect to become 
consulI though they would hove to compete with those who had been 
adlected. Patricians would succeed sooner than others who might have 
to wait 10 years or more for the honour. Only two could hold the post 
of consul ordinarius which was therefor more restricted and made worse 
by the occasions on which the emperor or bis kinsman held the magistracy 
together with some who held it more than once# Most of these men were 
the sons of consuls#
The posts available for consulars were:
(A) At Rome: 1 curator alvei Tiberis;
2 curstores operum publicorum;
1 curator equarum;
1 praefectuQ urbi#
(B) In Italy; 1 praefectws oilmentorurn
CC) In the provinces:
I Imperial; 7 legatl Augusti pro praetore;
gradually rising to 10, to 13, to 14*
II Senatorial; 2 proconsuls (Africa, Asia)
The curator aqusrum wos very senior and so was the prefect of the city * 
The curators of the Tiber, of the public buildings and of the temples
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took their appointants soon after the conmilshlp* Tho latter, however, 
irorc men In favour and seem to have prooeeded to mjor imperial provinces 
Qftorwardo* Tlie curators of tho aqueducts and tho prefects of the city 
soem to have hold office IndefinitGly; perhaps even for llfo.
In theory it was the size of the legionary garrison that determined 
whether a provinco was praetorian or consular# Those which had more than 
one legion roqulred a consular as commander and govornor. In practice, 
of course, there were exooptions* Again, though all consular provinces 
could bo held by men who had just taken their consulship there was in 
fact something of a hierarchy among them; Rispanla citerior, j3ritàln, 
3}Tia and later the III Daciae-wero generally reserved for men who had 
governed one of the other consular provinces first* The two Gormnies, 
Hpper Pannonie, the two lioesias, Gappadooia, Syria Balaestina were 
generally governed by men straight from their consulships* On the whole 
tlicy were less exposed to war than were Britain and %rln even though 
thoir garrieon strengths wore often t^ie samo# Tliese two areas 
requlrod indepondent action, whereas the others could often call up 
help froi.1 thoir neighbours. ik>st consular governors seem to lisve 
coL'sranded a legion earlier in their careers* But very few governors can 
be found who had served either as tribu c or legionary legate in an arsy 
wlilch they later oomanded as governor, Agrioola again is an exception*
A number of British governors came to Britain after a spell in charge of 
Germnis Inferior. Governors of Byrla had often held another eastern 
province.
Few men spent inuch more than throe years in such eommands and few 
senators hold more than two consular provinces* hhat they looked forward 
to, instead, ms the proconsulsbip of either Africa or Asia, which was 
hold only for a year* Occasionally some served as general staff officors 
in campaigns when the emperor took the field. They were then known as 
comités Aucuoti. llore commonly tho)'" received some priesthood and the 
patriciate* Finally there ms tho unusual honour of a second consulship 
8S ordinarius. That camo the my of very few#
We can s:e that there wo:c several groups amour the senators, Thero were 
those who had tho emperor's favour and confidence* Then thoi'e were 
patricians who wore content with republican magistraolos and a consular- 
sliip proconsulship. They did not hold posts in iimorial provinces.
The majority fell into on intermediate group* may never reached the 
consulship and those who did might have had to ^ke a numbar of
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appointment® first. Some of them, one way or anotbcr, acquired 
considerable military experience, even though a modern student might 
be inclined to classify them as amateurs. But the fact was that 
until the days of Constantine the provincial governors had to com­
bine civil and military functions in the arced provinces. This we 
shall see featured in the career of Agricola, which is both typical 
and odd at its various points.
2.6. TE6 0ARV.Ï1R OF AGRICOLA.
This generalised senatorial career pattern will serve as a means of 
measuring that of Agricola and of asse£»sing its normality.
1. No mention is made of an appointment to the vigintivirate. It may 
have been regarded as too junior a post to warrant a mention unless 
the candidate had the personal patronage of the emperor himself*
2. The appointment as military tribune is listed, together with a 
posting to the staff of the governor, Suetonius Paullinua, who was in 
charge of Britain. Probably these two posts occupied a period of time 
greater than one year, as had been suggested above. 3« There is no 
mention of any intermediate work before Agricole became a quaestor of 
the senatorial province of Asia in 63-4, 4. Be was tribune of the 
people in 66 and 5. praetor in 68. Thereafter he was legatus legionis, 
in Britain, enrolled as a patrician, then governor in Aquitaine. 6,
The consulship followed in 77 and he was immediately sent out as gover­
nor of Britain. This proved to be his final office. After it he 
retired into private life. Tacitus reports that some thought that he 
would go on to be governor of Syria, since it was a senior command re­
served for men of eminence# (Agri. 40) They were to be not merely 
consular® but distinguished, outstanding men. After the battle of Mons 
Graupiufi Agricole had achieved that status, at least in the eyes of bis 
son in law; but whether he had done so in the view of Imperial adminis­
tration may be considered more doubtful, le shall see better ourselves
when we have examined the contents of the governorship of Agricola in 
detail: see below pp. 140-1?4# On the other hand Agricola - for
whatever reason - declined an appointment as either governor of Africa 
or Asia,
Tacitus states that Agricole did not go forward to the appointment 
because of pressure from Domitian. (Agri. 42) But he does not make 
it clear whether he declined to join in the lottery or asked to be 
excused when he had drawn a province of senatorial rank. The 
implication seems to be that he asked to be excused before
the lots were drawn. If this is so,
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then the loss of salary froia the governorship can hardly have been 
unexpected, though Tecltne explains It once noi-e a a imperial meannsas 
of spirit# )W6ver, the refusal of a governorship mo neither unuoual 
nor even unprecedented# I-len of senatorial rank did so# Thozc seeim to 
have been an established procedure for the securing of tho o^ ccunatio#
(Cg, )# There was no need for Doisltian to hlusii with enbarrassiaent*
Re might !mve been irritated, howovor, by the refusal of Agricole to ask 
for tho salnpium which deprived him of the opportunity of a greolotm 
response# Tacitus conjures up at this point a picture of an intimidated 
somewîmt confused retired public servant, which is at variance with the 
whole tenor of the biography, in #ich Agricole is shoim to be in control 
of events, moving graciously and casii^ ' from one situation to another#
It seems inconceivable that ho should have wished to give this impression. 
The spirit of the man hors is shown to be quite overwhelrssd.
Perhaps there is another interpretation, which might even hint at a 
division of opinion boti:oen Agrlcola ahd Tacitus# Agricola had been 
an early adherent to the Flavian cause# Ho was a supporter in the West 
when most of Vespasian's strengtli lay in the East# Appointments followed 
quickly, partly as tho payment of a debt of loyalty and partly out of 
tho shortage of suitable men after the year of four emperors# There 
Boems to have been a f&irly close relationship botween Agricole and Titus. 
During those years Domitlan ifas an insignificant political figure, who 
com3 to power unexpootodly and, in many ways, ill-equipped, /qp?icola 
stood in a quite different relationship to liim, tbati he had done with 
Domitian's father and brother# ). As he commanded four legions
and a large force of auxiliaries, ell of which wore bottle-lmrdenod, 
and governed an island provinoe. Agricole was not om of tho vany loading 
men who were summarily removed from ixwor cither by banishmont or death.
In fact he stayed on for a longer period than ony other known governor 
but tho decision that he should do so could bo intoi'preted as icuoh as an 
informai banishment as an act of confidenco in his provincial rule# 
Agricola could bo left to oporate in hortbem Scotland in campaigns that 
might be of benefit to the empire but which were uot decisive for 
Domltian's own fflori^ , The brother in arms of Titus was better iJortb of 
the Clyde tMn on the banks of the Tiber, If tliat is what the emperor 
thought about tho governor, what did Agricole think about Domitian? He 
could not fail to notice that ho reooived lose tlien his predecessors, even 
though he might hevc done RX)re, Eolanus and Frontimis botji boccune
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proconsuls of Asia and Oerialls rooolvod a second, perhaps evon a third, 
consulship, Agrlcola was ordered omamnta triumohalia: but even that 
could have been accorded ty Titus, (ARrl.AO) Agricole could never hope 
to stand in relation to Domitian as he had to Titus. He imst have known 
of tho fate of mary loading men and as his troops had been partly drafted 
away he mat have perceived tlie re-dlroction of Imperial policy. In short, 
Agricola could have disliked the new regline. Had he then decided that he 
would never again serve under Domitlan? And, thus, could it be timt he 
would not allow his name to go forward for the proconsulsliip of the province 
which two of his predecessors had received? (Nor for m%r other.) The 
Interview with Domitlan might Indeed have secRned to bo rich in hypocrisy 
with an omperor who ms suspicious of a oolloague of his hated elder 
brother and an ex-governor who would neither let his nane go forward nor 
ask for the mlariim of the office from which exousatlq was sought. Agrlcola 
came out of the interview unbeholden to Domltian. Tacitus referred to 
Agricola's interest in plïllosophy In early life. (Agri#4,). He emphasised 
the sequestered llfe-st^ 'le adopted by Iiio father in law. It was indeed that 
of a contemplative philosopher. Had Agricola, in fact, joined the Stoic 
opposition? They could not alter the course of events but they could strive 
to be uncontaininated by them, Tacitus could not. He continued in public 
life, working for a govemmnt whose acts he was to condemn in later life.
The force of his invective against those dark years might be seen, in i^ rt, 
as a veiled impersonal criticism of those lAio decided to register what they 
felt about tho quality of public life rathor than energetically pursue 
virtus. somewhat naively, In a society that had become corrupted by tho 
political system of tho prlnccps.
Tlie same willing retirement might, however, have come about from sheer anger 
because what he had acquired in Britain was let go so easily. Agricola Imd 
fought a long campaign and soon It compLoted successfully, Oould lie truly 
be regarded as a general? Or ms he really a civilian who had some militaiy 
experiences? It has teen argued that within the senatorial order of governors 
there were those who might rightly be called viri militeras. (H. ), These
men passed to the consulship after only two proetorian appointments: a 
legionary command and a praetorian govomorsbip, Tliis was tho case with 
Agricola, who would thus qualify for this group. The argument asserts that 
such nx)n were nurtured during their career for appropriate military appoint­
ments. At the same time they were brought forward somewhat earlier than 
others, to roach the consulship between the ages of 37 and 38, instead of tte)
50
more usual 42, so that they wero available for senior provincial appoint- 
monta ai;d military high commzid at the peak of their phyaical and mental 
powers,
Rovmver, it baa been disputed whether such a group ever e%lated.{
AgrlcolQ is odd not typical, liaiQr mon had three praetorian postings and e 
good many also received some civilian appointmsnt, within the Game grade. 
Progress depended not so much upon a military bias as upon patronage, social 
statua and the mmbor of posts available to W  filled. The divorsily 
displayed in tho career of the consuls suggests tliat there was neitlier much 
specialisation nor a planned career pattern, A groat deal depended upon 
what Q m n xmde of the posts he got# (&grl.5.) Militarily it must also 
have depended upon t!ie frequency of wars! Thus the critics of the idea 
would not moke a sharp distinction between civilian and military skills and 
tasks in provincial administration. Warfare and justice, administration 
and the leadership of troops wont together managed effeotlvoly by lower 
order full-time professionals. The average consular governor was thus an 
all round amateur who achieved his status by a mixture of patronage, trust, 
and luck.
When the. statistical samples on which this case is argued are so small it 
would be imprudent to clsGslfy tW senators in the service of the emporor 
too sharply or, on the other hand, to account for all that happened as the 
result of chance, and favour, A Wtter understanding of the role of the 
in the provinces laight help to clear up the position. 1, It was the 
principal institution into which Roman citlzens were gathered. Though without 
ary recognised political statuo its da facto position could not be ignored.
The officers needed a certain political awareness in addition to the enforce­
ment of military discipline, A bluff military manner was hardly sufficient,
2, The activities of the amy in the provinces should not be dofined in too 
combative a manner. The arny was more than a fighting force. Soldiers 
provided a good deal of the provincial infm-structure. The Xega,tus leglonis 
îiad administrative responsibilitlco in his command area* Fhn were detached 
for staff duties in the office of the governor either at General Headquarters 
or on detached postings. Specialists of various kinds ware seconded for 
duties which we would regard as civilian; like surveying, town planning, end 
revenue collection. Thus experience of various kinds of bureaucracy, 
administration of justice, together with military arts would not come amiss 
among those who ware to administer provinces.
If the role of the aricy is defined In too narrow a fashion the viri mllitares 
might seem^ doubtful quantity and the mgistracles and appointments on the 
sénatorial cursus inadequate for producing the kind of full-time officials
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hitherto envlsagod. But If attention la given to the iflder role then the 
various appolntmnta heVe a certain relevance, Thus, within the career 
structure it does appear as though there were those with a military bias 
and those with a olvilian one. Pliiy the Younger aM Tacitus htmelf 8ee%; 
to be illustrations of the latter trend. If the reader remins sceptical, it 
is worth asking one more question^  Izidcpendently of the statistics* Is it 
possible to conceive that appointments to governorships of imperial provinces 
wore mde at random? Hardly; the goverzmnce of the frontier areas warranted 
more concern than that# %c empsror did recruit for his service and there 
is no evidence to suggest that he appointed ly lot# Gould be sent out 
without the govenm^nt considering either the needs of tho province or of the 
aniy? There must surely have been some appreciation of the position by at 
least one person in the office of ab eolstulls. to whom the regular despatches 
were sent. These reports tmist have built up a picture of some kind; that 
Britain required a governor who ms militarily competent, that Judaea required 
a man who could handle the Jem, Mistakes were made, no doubt. It would 
have been very remarkable if they had not! Tlicre is little evidence, 
however, during this period to nhow that military novices were sent out to 
govern Britain, Bcapula, Frontlnus, I^ u3Ilnus, even Bolnnus and Agricole 
3ilmself do not have a predominantly civilian aura about them. They seemed 
to Imow what to do in the field ard in the camp. If results isean anything 
they wore soldiers. Thus, while it Is oiesr that thero ms not a slmrp 
distinction between the civilian and military careers In the Roman world, it 
is also clear that tîiere are emphases wMch point to a degree of specialis­
ation, without tW loss of all round ability. Thus the governorship of 
Aquitaine by Agricola is more tMn a civilian idyll In a military oarecr.
It is the acquisition of valuable administrative end judicial experience,
Tho officer class of the arBy could not hope to be the effective defenders 
of the empire if it were composed mrely of young men aged about 20 serving 
as staff officers, for about a year et a time, plus legates aged about 30 
possessed of no special military experience who held the post for about three 
years, crowned by governors who had loajor military operations to conauct as 
well as adnlnistratlvo services to supervise for neither of which were they 
particularly prepared, Bupplomontatlon by a certain professionalism was 
needed, Tliis is implied in the /viricolar where Tacitus makes clear the 
Gsriousness with wiiich Agricola applied hlffisolf to his ci^ ft# )
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It inet with an appropriate roaponDe from the governor# He invited him onto 
bis ntaff# Agricola got training on the job. As legate he was given 
further training when OerialiG by degreea gave him larger foroea to command#
Thus he gradually moved from ataff to executive duties and from the command 
on a single unit to tho imiltiple forcoa that mdo up an arqy, The empire, 
one way or anotlier, possessod a oorpo of con^tont soldlero who could not 
only f j^ ht but adminiater. They oould both conquer and consolidato#
In many ways, therefore, the career of Agricole ia not untypical of maiy 
j.er^ ti aumieti nro nraetore# There are threepoints which might be regarded 
as abnorml: 1, He belonged to the small group of mon who were brought on 
aa mgistrateo with military akill, so that they could be used on the 
frontiers of tho eispire, 2# I3is governorship of Britain was about double 
the length of the normal tenure of authority, Ibis may be explained by the 
conditions of the time, 3* He spent moi'C time in attain tlian mi^t have 
been expected# Indeed be saw no military service elsewhere,
Perhaps he ms regarded as an expert on the provinoe# At any rate there 
were probably few who could rival his local knowledgo* IWferenca has been 
iGudo already to the shortage of suitable men on hand for tho Flavian dynasty 
after tho civil wars and the policy of Domltian soon after his accession has 
also been described# These two facts my be sufficient to explain the 
length of Agricola's posting: in Britain# If tliis is so then iiie emporor 
might be thought to have acted shrewdly to make the best of iimt ho had.
On the other hand, tlie fact that Agricole did not go on to bo Governor of 
^ i a  my be related as imoh to this specialisation as inporial pique#
Effective as he was in Britain, Syria my have been thought to require a ksn 
whose background, experience and skills were rather dtffereht from tliose of 
Agricola, For example, it is not immediately clear that a capacity for 
dealing with the Briganten is necessarily the best training for mnaging the 
Jews,
Tills is but seoondaiy to our main purpose# For the historian of Roman Britain 
it is important to note that Agricole came to the province as governor well 
inforraed about it and trained in the normal pattern of the senatorial cursus, 
Hcnwrcr, effectiveness in tho role depended not only upon previous training 
and experience but also upon tho resources that were to Mnd, offichl policies 
and personal attributes# Success dei)onded upon a mi}:ture of personal and 
iiïstitutional factors# If Agrioola is tho ideal governor in tho stops of hie 
career, W  is also tho model for the characteristics necessary for tho discharge 
of his duties# The Agrlcolai, describes them at each stare# To these we now 
turn#
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2.7. THE ATTRIBUTES FOR 8UC0ES8
The GuooGssful governor mst have military skill. (I2). He ought to possese
olnee thero would nearly always be troops to command and 
warfare to oonduot, Britain was an outstanding example of the situation to 
be dealt ifith* Agricole wan predominantly a fighting governor; more a 
General Officer Gommnding in Chief than a Resident Gommiseionor, His 
predecessors had all been militaiy men, as we chall see when the histoiy of 
the province is examined# Those who aspired to serve the state, display 
yirW establish their must take seriously tlie profeosion of arms. 
%us, os a military tribune and as an officer on the general staff Tacitus 
draws attention tg the necessary attitudes and practices to bo adopted.
Tho young officer must take hio militaiy life seriously. There should be 
no casualness nor life of ease# He has not joined the anqy to go on leave.
On the contrary he must apply himelf. He should know the province in vfhich 
ho served. An officer can hardly be effective if ho is ignorant of native 
tonkin and tomperamnt, I^ or can he lead troops properly unless he is known 
to them, and them to him. Only when both uWerstand each other can there be 
the mutual confidence that breeds suocess. In the absence of a staff collego 
the junior officer zsust have tho perception to see what the most skilful 
seniors do and follw their example. The object of tho art was to produce 
actions that wore not precipitate, to endeavour to face difficulties rather 
than avoid them, aM while acting with a certain caution to have a positive 
approach to military problems# (Afrrl.S.)
At this stago an officer should leam ty watching. An executive commnd 
couM not be expected* That would com later as a legionary legate# The 
intervening years would have been spent, as we Mve soon, in civil admin­
istration# The XX legion ms a good example of what needed to bo done by 
the Commanding Officer. The civil imrs had added a fresh task to the legate's 
role; now ho imist establish himself as the commander, at a tim of divided 
loyalties# Tho political unreliability of this legion made the commandant's 
role even more difficult. Ran3c and status were not enough to ensure success. 
The troops bad broken their provious commanders. How could a new man be 
tough towards them? Upon whom could he roly? A softer lino was essential. 
Agricola demonstrated both flexibility and an effective approach# He 
QSGumsd their loyalty# (Aeri#7). Hence the aspirant to office ma taught tho 
political virtues inherent in leadership of the best kind.
On the other hand, there were problems with the higher comand to be 
considered. %© legato, as a powerful suWrdinate, might find himsdlf in a
54
position where hic milltaiy inotinote ohaehed with général ordors. here the 
nan who denired to rise to the top ehould remmbor that ohedj^ noe was 
necessary* If he wished to be obeyed, be must respect the nutliority of 
his superiors# Vettius Bolsims, for a variety of reasons, pursued a more 
peaceful policy than his predecessors# The legionary comanders jshould 
follow the policy of the provincial G(X>#in 0# When the stance clmnged so 
should tMt of the legates# Petillius Ocrialis developed Agricoin's skills 
and enriched his experience# That was one reward of trusttforthiness# First 
of all, Agricole was given work to do# It ms a chance to prove himself and 
also the opportunity for the governor to make a personal assessment of the 
rising general# Satisfied with him, to next increased the forces under liis 
commnd, gradually adding to them as results justified it*. Thus, Agrioola 
acquired experionce of commanding units larger tlmn that of a legion# When 
he came to senior oomnnd himself, he had already got the appropriate 
oaqierience, and as his subséquent campaign showed could direct the whole of 
his forces effoctively# Thus, the ideal governor was not only well trained 
by Ids own powers of application, but was himself trcimd during his career 
by his seniors# The good governor atter%led to the training of hie subordin­
ates# By this means they are onabled to grow into the higher appointments.
The control of subordinates is something of a problem# Tacitus was quite 
clear about the cttiti^ e to be adopted by the subordimtes. To be success­
ful in a lower position one sliould be self-effacing; modest about one's own 
successes and ascribe overall results to the senior officer comanding#
Jealousy at all levels has to be faced# The envy of superiors was particularly 
dangerous for it oould lead to the destruction of one's career#
What applied to the legate of a legion in relation to the governtnr could 
also apply to tho governor in relation to the emperor, Even the Gomander 
in Ghief m y  feel threatened# If he does, tWn this will threaten a man's 
career#
Tacitus illustrates this by Mo description of Domitien's treatment of 
Agrioola# In the end, modosty is not enough# The governor my not wreath 
his deopatchoo in laurel, and the irose of his reports my be restrained but 
in tho end the deeds lAiich establish do speak to the world# Nobody 
could stop the emperor from comparing Ms own German campaigns with Agricole's 
in Britain cm thiifding that ho cam off second best. Bomiticn s e ^  to have 
been oasily threatened, psychologically. If he thought that Mans Gran plus 
reflected badl^ ' on Germany then this miild have implications in policy# If 
he thought that a sucoossful governor was c threat to the cA^ror, then it
de facto4 a threat and the man concerned would be dealt with on that basis#
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We Gbùuld bear in mind that military skill was an impérial quality. I^ ny of 
the Gi#3ror0 had been sucoessful generals. An ability to control troops and 
provinces was a pre-requisite for ruling the empire# Tacitus makes two 
points: first that the governor must face tho vagaries of Imperial pleasure 
and second# on esparor could# in fact# rely upon the loyalty of sonior 
servants# Agricole illustratés both points# %ereas in the lower magistracies 
the movement from post to post was almost automatic# once the higher comizands 
are reached acceptability to su%]reme powers is paramount. Ability is not 
enough# Thus# there is more to be consldeWhhan capacity and previous career 
when a %mn is reviewed for the governorship of Syria# There were political 
questions in relation to security ard loyalty# together with such tilings as 
personal skills for dealing wii^ the problems which happened to bë doMi^ ant 
at this time# (Different sorts of men might bo needed from tiriXi to time#) 
Tacitus warns the aspiring entrant to face ihc possibility of disappointment 
at the highest level# (Anri. 39 & 40), A good reputation might, tborofcre# 
be no more a roooiimendation than a lad one# (Agrl.5. ) On the other hand# 
tW good man might also wish to consider the possibility of refusing to 
serve# if ho thought that the political order was evil. This is lively 
hinted at# since Tacitus himself continued in active Gorvice during the bad 
times#
In some ways the eam^lgn to recapture Anglesey displays what might be called 
the "field virtues" of a governor# First of all Agrioola seised the initiat­
ive straightaway# thus# not only imposing his will upon the Ordoviccs but 
his leadership over his own men# end staff# Those who tmnted to see how the 
governor could act foand out soon enough# Generalship# is hoifever# more than 
mn management. Engineering qiialitlco# for example# arc also needed# if a 
position is to be socured and ground conquered to be consolidated* {A^ ri*20.) 
The some also aptilies to the role an fur us tasks of provisioning and of 
securing coiamunications arc concerned# The general must be a competent all 
rounder*
If then mllitaiy skills could be acquired in actual practice by those who 
would apply thomselvcs# thero were parsoml attributes necessary by means of 
which the Gkillo could be translated into effective results# Fqrt%<^ was 
one such skill. After the mssacre of the cavalry regiment stationed among 
t!*e OrdoviccG Agricole decided to face tho (problem straightaway. He deals 
with it immedlatoly# Tliere was no prevarication# (Agr^ .lG). Ho Itud learned 
such n response as a tribune. (MM.5.) He got together a field army from 
tho units that were scattered in their Mnter quarters# thus showing tlmt ho
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could both imprmrloe and commid a force of disparate units. be did by
loading "from tho front". The posoibllity of tMo remrlt being a literary 
commonplace does not remove its importance within this particular context. 
Arzg}' leadership needs to be visible* From #%e A^loolO' to Roskill's 
Art of lAQdershin almost every handbook on leadership will rightly say tho 
same*
Fortitndo mat be lihked %;ith ^ igdaetria. Tho pron^ t responco to the tlircat 
posed by the Ordovices shcrifod that quality. Bolamo# bam strung by the civil 
wars, miffared because be could not be aotivo in tho field: thero was in­
discipline in the camp.
However, courage aM energy must not be alloifod to run riot. n^d
constantia mwt be allied to them in order to produce good results. Again 
at tho î^ml Straits there was an illustration of this attribute. When boats 
and landing craft were found to be wanting, the ideal governor overcame the 
obstacle by his resourcefulness and determination. Agricola would not call 
off the assault. He sent in a body of specially trained auxiliary cavalry 
that ho had prudently brought with him who Swum the Straits fully armed with 
their horses and they established a bridgehead. These attributes were as 
noccssaiy in defence as in attack. When the picket lines of the 1% legion 
were breached Agricola's counter-thrust tms again immediate. First he sent 
up the fastest cavalry and infantry, os immediate relief, so that the 
position could be held and the situation contained, and then followed it up 
Mth a more general mobilisation. The good general attacks the attackers. 
Furthermore, the prosecutioh of a war is a demanding pursuit for which full 
concentration is required. There is no place for either casualness or 
self-indulgence, labor and dlsoiolina are both z«;cessary. Rence Agrioola 
had no time for e$^ ty etiquotte and the niceties of protocol when there was 
work to do. While son^  might spend their early days in ceremonial sM tho 
courting of compliments, the ideal governor sees whst work thoro is to be 
done and does it. (Afrri.18) Solf-advertisen^ nt is not o desirable 
attribute. It does not produce f g ^  but only gossip. An official should 
be mor3cBt and apply himself to his tasks. When he does tMs he displays 
vlrtutes and fame follows. It is a by-product of effootivenesB. %c glory 
of Mono Graupius vms the rcoult of seven years hard worlc and it spoke for 
itself. (A/gri.26)
Tlio Arricoln' draws attention not only to the military side of the governor's 
role, together Mth the supporting attributes, but also deals with the work 
of civil administration and the personal qualities required for that aspect 
of tho work. Attention to duties and incorruptibility are the two key
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concepts hero. Asia ma ridi; the adroinistratlon mlloable. It ironic have 
boon esoy to nco tho quaoGtorsbip to groat porsonal advantage, Tho good 
public ofricial does not fall into such temptation. A compact of mutual 
ailcncc is irrelevant# (ARri.6.)
Aiquitalno rather than Britain illnstratcB the ncceseazy taoke within the 
civilian role# Iu8tit% hero hao prido of place. The ideal governor should 
be ready and able to give justice, Tacltue had to draw attention to this 
activity in Aquitaine rather W n  Britain bemuse conditions in the latter 
province were unuaual in this area# (see below p#l43 ), The role of a good 
judge mist embrace the capacity to combine justice with mercy# This, too, 
is a commonplace hit nonetheless important in provincial administration,
Tacitus points out that strictness in the dispensation of justice need not 
impair affection# It is corruption and the lack of self-control that destroy 
relationships. Once probity (mctcrit^s) is clear, auüiorlty can be allied 
to amiability# Severity of itself is not justice. Pomposity of style is an 
offence against both mdestia and moderatlo and loads a governor to confuse 
his public with his private nersona. (ARri.9. )
Tlierc were, in Britain, certain questions of policy and stylo for which a 
governor %mst be prepared, cvon if he had not had previous o^ ierienoe of them. 
The new man must grow into his work and tW first step saist be to deal with 
the extant position raider than that which is assumed# Britain was ferox 
mipylncia. That is fundamental to any analysis of the province, in the 
eyes of Tacitus# Bolanus is used to liint at the poasibilily of a poli<^ 
being implemnted which is at variance with the properties of the situation 
with which it is supposed to deal. If the area of rule is mr-like then 
what is the place of plementia? It mist be determined more by policy than 
by teii^ rament. Thus the revolt of the Ordovices hod to bo supgwesscd and 
tho task ought to bo dom* in such a way that they never raised thoir head 
again# Tho tribe would than serve as a warning to others. Agricole 
virtually exterminated them. Terror was used as a deliberate act of policy#
He is shown in public action practising that which hio whole biography 
suggests is foreign to him as a private person. However, terror is not 
sufficient of itself# Here lies the difference between Agricola and 
Suetonius Faulinuo* Tlio latter found that after ho had crushed the rebellion 
■of Boudiooa he could not pacify the province# He seemed to have no policy 
beyond punishments. As a result the Britons did not surrender# Thoy m y  
have boon broken in a battle but surrender was as terrible in its 
conséquences as a continued, even if hopeless, guerilla warfare# (Anmls 14.38.
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& Agrl, 19)# After the war there mui^ t be a eeoond pliaGe# Appropriate 
pacification mist be thought about# Governorc who cannot the 
transition will oftmi find themelvee replaced# Fine officer ae he wee 
PaulllDun had to go# Agricola attacked the enesy by meano of oudden raids 
end when he had caticfied Idjaself tliat enough force hàd been used he offered 
conditions which mde peace attractive# His was a warfare timt was effective 
both militarily and psychologically#
In addition to those tactics a oei taln policy emphaoia was needed# Agrioola 
saw that continued peace depended upon the removal of grlevancoa# It was 
these tamt mde people rcbelllouc# There mot be an equitable admihiatratlon 
whether in demande for tazoe or in public administration ac a whole# (AKri.19) 
A "romanisation" programme could be a policy of pacification# Itabould be 
promoted by the good governor# There would bo en eager rcaponso# The tools 
of civilisation became the instrumnts of subjection# The warmth of 
response from the mtives made tlBm their own warders# Tlzereafter they were 
free to turn their energies to fresh activities# Oulturo increased the 
security of the state. (Aprri#21 # )
î c^h depended upon the resources eimüable to a governor# Home of these 
wore dctonained by his own choice; others were allcwated to him. The 
selection of liis staff was a mtter of some importance# Substantially this 
lay within the discretion of the governor, What, then, should be the basis 
for appointments?
The slaves and freedmn who octM as stenographers and copyists, for example, 
my well have been part of tho permnent bureaucracy and thus have been 
passed on from one governor to another. If they %^ ore part of the official 
housohold, there mist have boon some who ware drawn from the governor rs 
private bousohold who came across wibh bl%&# The good governor should bowaro. 
Whether public or prii^ te such people wore unsuitable for the transaction of 
public business, They should never be executive agents, (A(?ri.19), Ho doubt 
they Imd a plabo behind the scone - Roman life would have been impossible 
without them but that ims where they should remain.
Those who performd higher grade work either in the headquarters or on 
detached duties might well be soldiers and non-commissioned officers who wore 
seconded from tlielr units# lliese officials needed more careful selection, 
if only beoauGO the element of discretion in their work was greater, with 
its Gonaequonoes for the security of the province, if they used thoir 
initiative Inapproprlatoly, They zsight bo noting as couriers or local 
officers say in charge of a pollorpoot. The way in wMoh grain levies bad
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boon mmged under pravlom administrations ohowed the possible dangers#
An Insenoitivo, heavy—lianded official was like flint zn o tinder box# mere 
would always be the threat of violence or of a general uprising. The 
governor should beimre of indulging his personal preferences, of obliging 
the mny people who solicited tho favour of an appointment from him. TWre 
should be only one rule: to choose the bast# Tacitus is silent about the 
selection of the governor's iiamediate p,ptmp%m# This was a matter of 
personal invitation and no doubt there was a good deal of canvassing, so that 
somebody's career couM be advanced# Such appointees could not be discarded 
without offence to a patron# Hero tho rule mot be* to go for the men of 
integrity ratlier than to mmgo ruthlessly by dimissing tho imdequate# 
(Agrj.,19) Hmall errors were of little mment; but major mistakes were 
dangerous# They could not only cause trouble but affect the staining of tho 
governor# %sr6 is a senso in which a leader cannot bo better than fdB 
subordinates. The good governor need not Involve bimnolf in everything that 
is going on but he should know what is happening. If he possessed %e 
informtion he can form a judgment aWut i&other to act himself»
The ohrewl young m n  situated on tho lower rungs of the curpm might also 
pick u:) valuable insights from the AgricoM about dealing with the 
parallel administrations* First of aH he should realise that civilians 
are not always complimentary about the viri mliltajP0Æ# '^ hey tend to think 
that administration is easier for soldiers to handle because srry law and 
discipline Blmplify actions! The military mind m 3' therefore lock the sublety 
which civilians prise# Hence the soldier may he thought to lack the 
soncitivity that delicate situations require, Tho soldier should be aware 
of this condescension. If the civilian can be won over it is a great 
advantage, %us the soldier must show his ability, i^ ot least, he must 
cultivate his own Personal attributes. Nowhere is this more important than 
in the dispensation of justice# (Mri,9,) Tholtus is quite ozpliclt about 
this# The other point he mokes hero is couched more obliquely.
Ho writes that the goveiuior neodc to get on with tho iii^ rial agents. Hero 
\to meet the f irgt of tho parallel a d miu%o tra 11 eus # iho pr o curs tors anci. thoir 
staff wore in tho provinco but not subject to the governor's control# In any 
dispute appeal to Rom was necessary. The emporor had more tMn one paif of 
eyes in a province. The effect of such a powerful parallel administration 
should not bo under-estimated# Oi'ganisationally euch systems can easily be 
in each other's way, %ls ores tes additional work locally but is often 
comforting to the central authorities who can play off one against the other,
60,
If It suits their purpose. Divide and rule# The procurators were in charge 
of fimnce; and that involved the oollootion of taxes and all othm^  troasury 
business. The ^ ciol status of these officials iTss different from the 
lofiati oumsti pro. Txmetorp. They ifere cither freedmon from the lisperial 
liousehold or écrites: with the latter in the mjorily. The)- mnaged the 
Imperial estates directly and oan%t mre iismediately into contact with governor 
as psymster to tho amy. The^ ' also dealt with indirect tazoss*
Tliat the relationship oould and did go ihrong is seen Mfore and after 
Boudiooa's rebellion. The imedlate cause of the uprising seemed to be the 
way in which procuretorial staff called in loans among the Iceni and acquired 
royal property, Suetonius Paugnus was not foolish in S8)vlng the amy to 
North Wales for the final conquest of that country# There were sufficient 
troops availablG to the procurators for their ordinal^ ' duties# Thoir Ineptnesa 
sparked off the conflagration for which EaulZims had to come hastening back#
Ho was after aH accountable for security but oould not detormino the moans 
by which security could be attained! The next procurator Glnssicianus 
disagreed profoundly with the governor's policy after the final victory and 
carried his opinion successfully to Rome* The governor was replaced, Tlie 
norm for tho good governor is clearly stated at the end of Agricola's 
governorship of Aquitaine; do not be com involved in wrangling with imperial 
agents# (Agg^ .,9,) Though expressed as a negative, Tacitus would have tlic 
reader take the point positively: there should be no rivalry between public 
servants. The insight Is most important but is ozpressod tactfully.
The governor probably did #t clash with tim other parallel administration: 
that of the iuridicus. Where the governor was obliged to spend much of his 
time in the field# the administration of justice became difficult. It ims 
either done badly or erratically# Military operations could suffer or even# 
perhaps# the governor became overwworked# If any of these things Mppened 
the state suffered. In a province like Britain a aeparatc legal departmont 
was established tlnrough wliich ordinar^ r justice could be given and the tribal 
court system kept under review, TMs took some of the biurdcn of administi'ation 
aifsy from the governor and for the most part they might Ix; glad of it; and 
furthermore the work of the luridIcus night well not be tho irritant that the 
procurator was*
Tho other area for consideration lies in tho area of indirect rule* During 
the first century#whon there were leaders of proved loyalty to Rone^  the 
govornmont was prepared to leave them in office. Korod of Judaea is perhaps 
the best knoim example of this device, Use was also radc of it in Britain 
for tho tcrrito3:y of the Regnonsos and Iceni. The governor would retain
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overall rooponolbllity for oeourlty# since the carrying of arm ard the 
raloing of private armieo ms forbidden; but within those general limite tlio 
client IdLng mo left to manage hie own ihterml affaire. The reliability of 
Gogidubmm in Britain was well-known and Tacitus paya a particular tribute 
to him. (Aftrl,. 14) %ooo kings had no right to bequeath thoir lands to "Wieir 
next of kin, Ocoaaionally they paooed to their eons# as in Judaea# but ao we 
find there tho monarch me replaced if there wan any Mnt of trouble# By 
degrees they were ghaaed out az^ow. The Iceni were absorbed after the death 
of the king Braoutagus# whose izife was Boudioca, Oogidubnua does not appear 
to have passed on hie lands to any hair that he m y  have had* The device of 
a client-kingdom mxloubtedly useful during the early etagee of annexation 
ninco it was eeonomioal in the use of Roman personnel. But os the Iceni and 
the Jews showed# it did not always mke for permnent security. The governor 
who bad such enclavGS within his province Md to get along with such momrchs 
as best he could. They might not cause problem Wt in any dispute they 
might appeal to Rome*
Tho provincial council was not exactly a parallel administration since it 
did not have executive functions; but n governor was# nonetheless# well 
advised to keep an eye on it, vfhile it had minly a cerem>nisl function 
Gxprossing the allegiance of the province to the emperor# it could did 
pass a vote of thanks to a retiring governor# and it could also pass a vote 
of censure, Eiidier act was of som eignificance for a legate who would 
therefore wish to keep up a good relationship wibb it# if be had any political 
sense at all, Furthermore# the council could as3: a prominent l^ oaan to act aa 
the provincial patron in home, He was expected to keep under review 
interests of the province and give legal advice and counsel as neccssazy#
This "lobby** needed to be watched by a governor as w H *  ^nJbotP a governor 
might fcol that tliough he were far from Rom the emperor did not lack for 
inform tion about the my  in whlcl: the life of the province progressed, His 
o:m despatches wore only one element in the informtion service available to 
the central government# and a legate could he forgiven if# from time to time# 
ho felt oomcudiGt insecure# especially if the emperor ware on unstable 
character or easily Influonced ky sectional interests.
Overall tho governor was not n free agent, Tacitus is silent about the most 
significant item that restricted tho discretionary povkirs of the governor: the 
randota. These wore his policy instructions with which he loft for bis 
province, Tlioy were drawn up by the om%)oror and his advisers. From thorn ho 
could not depart and about then and other affairs ho must report to 
ab eoistulis, %is ifao a yoixturo of the Department of Btate and the
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Ministry of Defenco* The governor oould never forget whoa ho served end he 
icust have elimys liad in mind that he had no fixed tenure of office# He was 
appointed et tlio in^riâl pleasure.
On tho whole# en average ;x)8ting lasted between three or foiir years# Agrioola 
was exceptional# His tenure of office was about double the normal length of 
time. There m y  be reasons for that connected with the policy of the 
government either in relation to Britain as e whole or old colleagues of 
Titos in particular. The student of Roman provincial administration needs to 
keep in mind that tho personal preferences of those in charge count as mich 
Ù8 other factors when officials are being selected and imnaged at tliis level. 
We can now perceive that the career of Agricole is both t^ p^ical of the cursuo 
and odd idLthin it# 1* Evidence from epigm-g&iy and other sources enables us 
to fill in the probable junior appointments to which Tacitus mkes no  ^
reference, 2, Agrioola proceeds through the normal sequence of Mddle rank 
and senior appointments, 3* His arrival at the consulate is# perhazis# rather 
early. Horn deslgmition of him for high command may be the reason, TMs 
would bo assumed more strongly by those who accept the argument about the 
viri militnres. Those idio believe tMt Vespasian was short of suitablo men 
for major appointmnts will thiWc that it was more a matter of time and clmnoe, 
4# Agricola spends mo27e tiiae in Britain tlmn might be thought normal# though 
the sam my be said of Csrialis# to some extent# Once again either of the 
previous arguments can be applied, Britain was a mjor theatre of war and 
during times of civil stress could not he allowed to continue in an unstable 
position# 5, This# too# m y  account for the abnormal length of Agricole's 
governorship of the province# 6. The overall zailitCTy position my also 
expljcin why he hold only two praetorian appointments. There were pressing 
problems of security to be dealt with and those who displayed any capacity 
for generalship were needed imosdiately for then# rather than being hold 
back by acquiring further administrative oxpen^uce, 7. There was no reason 
wly he should have gone on to be governor of Syria# though Tacitus# no doubt# 
would have liked that, %ere were doubtless a immbor of men who could have 
filled tlio role# but only one could talx; it. The unsucoeaaful officials 
might have stood a chance next time round# but by that ti«3 it was also 
iWGsible that they might le thought too old, Tlie consulship was the crown 
for a senator: a consular provincial governorship was the suiMt for some# 
and for many more# perhaps# appointmonts of the praetorian! There never 
was roo% at the top for eveiyono.
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It l8 just ooaceimble that Agricole was glad enough to take the hint about 
remaihlng in retirement# He my have wiehed thinga to he tWt way# Perhaps 
he had resolved not to work further for the last of the Flnvianc# whom he bad 
served 80 well# becauee now he fmnd that the days were evil# It io wort^ 
romemhering that his father met an untimely death an a remit of iiaperial 
ill-will and hie mother had died during the civil izar of 69# et the hands of 
undleoiplined troops. Such a memory cannot have been without its effect# 
even if it cannot find a place in the biograpliy, written by hia son in law# 
of an idcol public servant. Ho my  have retired so much from public view 
that gossips# Indeed# did wonder how he ever can^  to have a reputation at 
all, (ki the otWr hand# perhaps Ms achievements were more limited than 
Tacitus suggests. We shell be able to form a judgment about that when wo 
Mvc studied the governorship of Agricole in détail, (see below:p.i4o )*
In this section wo have bsen studying the career of Agricole and the 
senatorial cursus honomm as well as evaluating tho %x}ssible natwe of 
the AFricolùj in order to discover whether they throw light upon the history 
of Roman Britain, laiercas in the first section we saw hoi; the historical 
work of Tacitus iKis metropolitan centred# now in the second we see how the 
AGTlcola is what might be called an institutionalised biography. The 
histoiy of Britannia contaizied in his writings is seen# therefore# to lie 
below a number of levels to which wc have not; drawn attention. If there is 
a certain loss of immdiaoy# there are compensations because a framework of 
policy# action end perception has been established ifhioh my yet assist rather 
than binder us in using Tacitus to help us unfold better W  mturo of the 
Eomn presence in these islands.
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TEE PROVINCE AS DESCRIBED BY TACITUS 
3. 1. GRKBAPKY
Tacitus does not describe either the geography or the ethnography of 
Britain until Agricole becomes the governor# For our purposes, hot;evcr, 
it is convenient to commence irlth this part of the text, because it 
enables us to set the background for the earlier history of the province#
In c«10 of the Agricole Tacitus asserts that the geography and description 
of the peoples of Britain have been undertaken by numerous earlier uriters. 
These he does not name but ue may take him to be referring to Caesar, 
Strabo, Pomponius Mela and the elder Plin^ ', in addition to Livy and 
Fabius Husticus, whom he does mention when the shape of the island is
discussed# He claims to Improve upon them merely because, with the
total conquest of Britain under Agricoin, what they guessed at can now 
be confirmed as fact. Perhaps we may regard these remarks as cast in a 
conventional literary form, since in fundamentals they were all agreed.
Of all the islands known to the Homans, Britain is the largest, Tacitus 
correctly asserts# He then goes on to give its conventional locations 
eastward it looks towards Germany; westward to Spain; southward to Gaul 
and northward to no land mass at all, but only to open see# The shape of
the island is that of an elongated shoulder-blade or double headed are -
or so previous writers had described it. This is only partly true, 
however, since it takes no account of Caledonia. Once that is added, the 
description will not serve because this large, formless landmass, running 
into the shape of a wedge, distorts the image fundamentally. The fact 
that Britain was an island was only established after Agricole ordered 
the fleet to sail along the coast. During that voyage the Orcades were 
found end annexed. Thule was seen but not invested. The sailors found 
sailing in those waters heavy work for the sea seemed sluggish; heavy 
to the oar end torpid even in the wind# The region was truly one where 
the sea held sway# Not only do the tides ebb and flow but the sea waters 
wend their way deep inland among the hills.
VIç must now examine the information given by Tacitus in detail# Until 
the time of Julius Caesar Britain had lain beyond the mental horizon of 
the Roman Republic, though not that of Greek travellers. To the former it 
was at the world's edge. The inhabitants, in the words of Catullus, were 
"the remotest Britons". Even the existence of the island might be doubted 
by the ignorant and superstitious. Both;the Invasions of Caesar end 
Claudius were the occasion of restlessness among the troops of the 
expeditionary force, who were reluctant to commit themselves to the 
enterprise. These difficulties might well have stemmed from ignorance
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of this kind, with the fears that it produced. However, it also seems 
clear that there were more immediate obstacles. In Caesar's first 
expedition the hesitation also arose from an appreciation of the dangers 
of beach head landings on unsuitable shores, ( 1 ) The resistance to 
the Cl&udian invasion showed Itself at the base camp rather than at the 
point of action. This was clearly a problem of military morale, since it 
was restored by the troops themselves when they appreciated the humour of 
a situation in which they as citizens were addressed by a freedman. 
Nonetheless, Dio Cassius, to whom we owe the information goes on to 
state that the men were indignant at the "thought of carrying on a 
campaign outside the limits of the known world". ( 2) We must remember, 
however, that Tacitus showed in the Annals how, during the German wars, 
the army had operated in unknown places without the same kind of 
difficulties. Here the elements had been both unkind and unfavourable. 
Perhaps the memorj^  of them affected the troops. More to the point may 
have been the sea crossing. Officers who had read Caesar's Gallic War 
might well have recollected how quickly storms could blow up and endanger 
the expedition. It is one thing to assume that ordinary people were 
ignorant of Britain and another to believe that educated Romans were. 
Caesar had put Britain on the mental map of the metropolitan citizen, 
Tacitus is catering for this more sophisticated public in the Agrlcolar <. 
The works of Livy and Fablus Rusticus dealing with Britain are now lost. 
Caesar is referred to in c.l$. The others were also fairly well-known 
amongst the reading public. The oldest source was probably fytheas, a 
Greek from kassllla, who was alive c. l^O BC. He may be the source cf 
much of the information used by later writers. Perhaps only he and 
Caesar had ever visited the island.
That Britain was an island had never been doubted by any of Tacitus's 
forerunners. They all assert its insularity. There may be some Tacltean 
hyperbole here for the sake of emphasizing the voyage authorised by 
Agricola. The circumnavigation verified the received opinion. The 
student from Hassilia confirmed the statements #&vellor
from that same colony. Tacitus was correct in declaring that Britain was 
the largest island known to Home. Only Sicily could compare with it and 
both Strabo end Mela had made the comparison.
There are some inaccuracies in the description of the location of Britain. 
If it is accepted that Germania was the Roman name for the lendmass 
between the mouths of the Rhine and the ice-fields of Scandinavia then 
it is true that Britain in the East faces Germany. Part of the %uth 
coast faces Gaul end there is open sea to the tiorth and North-west.
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Ireland is not mentioned here. It occurs later (c.24) as a possible 
object of conquest lying between Britain and Spsin because the Vest coast 
of Britain is said to face Spain, (c.ll) Tacitus was not alone in his 
error. Caesar took the same view ( $ ). The origin of the mistake is 
not clear. It may lie, partly, in the fact that there had been some 
commercial contacts between Spain end South West Britain, as well as 
Ireland. The main cause must lie, however, in faulty map making 
techniques which were themselves associated with inadequate surveying.
The Gallic coast, for example, was thought to lie parallel to the South 
coast of Britain. The I^^ees were imagined to run from Horth to South, 
with western Britain opposite to them. The existence of the Bay of Biscay 
does not seem to have been recognised. Failure to observe this dramatic 
and significant geographical feature is odd. So too is the erroneous 
view that the British and Gallic coasts run parallel to each other. The 
two are visible from each other in the South East but their divergence is 
obvious to anyone who has ever walked along them with our perception of 
reality. But that is what the Romans did not have. It Is one thing to 
know the world is a sphere and another to apply it to distance and 
perspective. The Romans saw things differently. What we now know to be 
the more accurate ideas of Eratosthenes (c.2$0 BC) based upon the reports 
of Fytheas were but one view among the many held without verification by 
those who had never seen for themselves. They lacked the means of estab­
lishing the truth they asserted. That is why Tacitus underlines the 
importance of Agricola's feat; even though he himself still does not 
correct the details of Britain's geography, for his information was 
second-hand, like nearly everyone else's. Truth could be disbelieved 
as easily as falsehood. Most Roman authors were in this position.
Tacitus was no exception.
The configuration of Britain presented problems which were not dissimilar. 
To them Tacitus addressed himself with a view to correcting the errors of 
his predecessors. Hitherto it had been maintained that the main island 
resembled on elongated shoulder-blade or double-headed axe, A scutula 
had been defined as heteromeros ousdrangulum. nec latera habet paria.. 
nec angulos rectos, simile scutellae; a trapezium. (4) Caesar, however, 
had asserted that the island was triangular. There was some force in 
this image since knowledge of the island gradually reduced as vision 
extended northwards. Finally it disappeared completely into ignorance 
or fable. The Romans knew something of southern Britain from political 
end economic relationships; but of the north they were largely ignorant. 
Tacitus may have preferred the triangular description to the shoulder-
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blade imagery of Livy and Fsbitio Rusticus on the grounds that it was, in 
feet, more accurate, but only so far as the borders of Caledonia. When 
that region was included then no suitable imagery could be found, except 
that the final promontory was not unlike a wedge, /uialogies and images 
are useful to a writer especially when the reader is bound to bo generally 
ignorant of the subject under discussion. Posidonius had described Spain, 
for example, as being shaped like an out-stretched ox-hide. The limita­
tions of the imagery were clearly perceived by the writers themselves.
The ox-hide has to be out-stretched and the shoulder-blade elongated.
The qualifications offered make the approximations of the imagery clear. 
Their value does not lie in their accuracy so much as in establishing a 
concept or picture in the mind of the reader, which serves to give & 
sense of place for the subsequent information. The similes and metaphors 
can sometimes be a snare and thus of doubtful value. The Informed reader 
asks himself whether an elongated shoulder-blade is an approximation to a 
rhombus or trapezium? If Britain is like a double headed axe, which pert 
of the axe represents the narrow part .of Britain? To such questions the 
modern reader is not always able to givq an answer, nor is it to be 
supposed, necessarily, that the writer who used the imagery, in the first 
place, envisaged a literal application of the literary device which he 
employed.
The reference of Tacitus to a vast Irregular tract of land can be taken 
as descriptive of Caledonia, where among tribes, hitherto unknown, 
dwelling in terra incognita, the hero of the Agricole' _ was to venture 
and win a notable victory. Rome had, indeed, planted her standards at 
one of the world's imagined corners. This is a subtle tribute to the 
magnitude of Agricole*s achievement, placed earlier in the book. The 
information which Tacitus gives about the northland and the influence 
of the sea could rest upon the direct statement of Agricole himself to 
his son-in-law. More likely, perhaps, as a source were the accounts of 
the officers of the fleet which had carried out the expedition. But none 
of them had much time for surveying. An impression was surely all that 
they could gain and communicate. Nevertheless, that is enough for the 
purposes of Tacitus. Ho one in fact could be accurate. The technology 
of the times did not permit it. Finally wo must remember that, on 
principle it often seems, Tacitus eschews details which ho regards as 
mundane or prosaic - but which we should find illuminating for his times. 
We may accept, therefore, that Roman metropolitan society accepted that 
the voyage of the fleet round Britain established the veracity of the 
travellers' tales that had hitherto held the field. The sense of awe. 
Isolation and/or risk that Britain had engendered was being gradually
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broken down. Thereafter there is no talk of mystery.
There were, however, aspects of the iinlmown which might be gazed upon 
from afar. The Orkneys, the centre of a vigorous human settlement, were 
formally invested. Had they been annexed during the Claudian invasion, 
as is sometimes asserted, it would, indeed, have been an outpost of empire. 
( 5 ) Certainly it was one that could not have been followed up; wnatever 
token surrender might have been offered by a chieftain visiting in the 
south. Thule was neither occupied nor had it surrendered. It, was, in 
fact, an imprecise location. By it fytheas may have meant either Iceland 
or Norway, perhaps the Faroes and even Hook&ll might be suggested. On the 
whole we might consider it unlikely that a Romsn fleet, ordered to sail 
round the coast of Britain, would have ventured out into the open sea, at 
the end of a long campaigning season, and sailed so far into the unknown. 
Ingenuity of solution must give place to moderation. Instead of these 
distant places we miglit ourselves hazard one or other of the Shetland 
Isles or a more distant island off the Vest coast of Scotland that was 
seen and not occupied. The verb dlsnlcl used by Tacitus here is generally 
employed when writing of anything that cannot be distinguished without 
difficulty. Whatever was seen was not perceived very distinctly.
Seamanship was difficult in those waters, Tacitus continues. Rowing was 
Incredibly heavy work. The wind was also lacking. The description given 
by Tacitus of the latter accords more with the convention of the time than 
the climatic realities that we know. It was commonly thought that there 
was little or no wind on the edge of the world. Of course the fleet may 
have enjoyed the calm days of an Indian summer during their voyage. They 
could have got the wrong impression! The difficulties of rowing can be 
more easily explained. The description given by Tacitus would fit the 
progress of ships near the Orkneys. Here vessels move out of the short 
waves of the North Sea into the long rolling waves of the North Atlantic 
Drift Current, with Its accompanying head winds. The current alone is 
capable of carrying a ship backwards, even when it is under sail and 
moving with the tide against a light wind. It has also been suggested 
by earlier scholars that the conditions were the result of profuse sea- 
weed, which (it is said) is still found along the Norwegian coast; but 
that suggests a voyage further than seems to have been likely in the 
circumstances. ( 6 ) This description should be set alongside a not 
dissimilar account in Germania* o.45* Altogether the conditions believed 
to exist in distant places end those actually experienced to the north 
of Scotland approximated sufficiently to give verisimilitude to mythology.
Tacitus was bettor informed about the sea lochs; and right to draw
70.
attention to the influence of tidal waters around the coast, particularly 
in the West. It has always been a potent force in the history of these 
islands. The character of the sea lochs is striking to an observer," 
especially along the heavily indented coast-line, where both the tides and 
the currents call for highly skilled navigation. This section of the 
Agricole’^ at least, possesses the 'feel* of a first-hand witness. In so 
short a work the reader may bo surprised that so much maritime information 
is given. However, there are literary reasons for this. First, the 
details show that Agricola both marched end sailed to the very edge of the 
island, thereby placing the frontiers of Rose at the ocean's edge. Thus 
his victory was not only complete but compzrehensive. Second, the descrip- 
tion hints at the effective use which Agricola made of the fleet: a some­
what unusual feature in Roman military history. Third, it can be suggested 
that the distinguished product of Hassilia's schools and colleges estab­
lished the veracity of the stories told by the city's most intrepid 
explorer. Agricole had, at any rate, shown Pytheas to be right. That 
could at least have given Agricole pleasure!
3. 2. THE ANTmOPOLOGY AMD ETEROIAGY OF miTAIN
Tiie salient geogrnphlcai facts about Britain having been given, with a 
few brief, confident strokes, Tacitus turns to the inhabitants themselves.
The reader is asked to remember (c.ll) that we are dealing with a province
which is inhabited by barbarians, who have no certain history. Hence no 
one can be sure whether the population is Indigenous or migrant. There 
seen to bo regional types. This may be an argument in favour of a 
population derived from places overseas. Thus the Caledonians, with their 
large frames and hair varying from red to golden yellow, seem to have 
some affinity with the Germans, The Silures, by contrast, have dork 
complexions and curly hair, with which Tacitus connects the Iberian peoples. 
The people of the south have a clear affinity with the Gauls. This is 
supported with better evidence: they have common characteristics, and 
their language is virtually the same. Tacitus argues that this must
indicate a migration across the Channel. True the Britons seem to possess
more spirit than the Gauls, but as those ^ o  have been under Roman rule 
longest show, by degrees they too will become softened by conquest.
If tlie literary models for this Icind of writing had been closely r.aiered 
to, the reader might well have expected something about the physical 
features of Britain. ( 7 ) ^^ Gse are, however, passed over; but al­
together the main items ore covered in chapters 11 and 12. Passing 
reference is made, during the campaigns of Agricola, to the crossing of 
the rivers. Mountains were less of an obstacle. Vdien natural difficulties
occur they ore used to demonstrate the capacity of the governor to 
overcome them. The crossing of the Menai Straits is the principal case 
in point.
All of these factors, no doubt, made the prosecution of the war more 
difficult but they ore treated incidentally, along with other information, 
which critics, in general, have considered TOgue, Fumcaui: and Anderson 
complain of the "scantiness and vagueness" of both the geographical and 
topographical details. Ogi]:;^ le and Richmond deplore the fact that 
Tacitus employs "geographical terms only when the narrative demands 
them, and so names no more than five tribes, three rivers, two islands, 
one hill and one harbour." ( 6 )
There is a certain oddity about this kind of criticism. Scholars try to 
decide whether the Africola' should be regarded as a biography or some 
other literary form. Having concluded that it is more akin to biography, 
than, perhaps, anything else, they then criticise Tacitus for not including 
material, which they have previously demonstrated does not belong to 
biography, as such. The geographical and anthropological material is 
taken as a case in point. However, when these sections are studied they 
are then dismissed as being quite inadequate. The writer thus loses on 
both counts. Yet no one seems to consider whether just enough material 
of this kind Is included so that sufficient background information is 
provided to enable the reader to understand the context in which the main 
character acts. Second-, Tacitus was a literary rather than a scientific 
historian. Furneaux and Anderson recognise this when they write that he 
used "easily apprehended generalities". So one cannot be surprised that 
in a work of this kind geographical terms are only used when the narrative 
requires them. Peculiarity would have existed in the reverse position! 
Finally, we should do well to consider how much detailed knowledge the 
first readers of the Aaricolm could have. Very little, must be the 
answer to that question. "He wrote for men who knew nothing of Britain 
and had no proper maps to consult, if confronted with strange place names". 
( 9 ).
Thus, if it is assumed that Tacitus could assume very little about Britain 
in the mind of his readers, we must consider what there was within the 
province to which he could molce reference as a means of enabling them to 
give them meaning? What were the definite, precise locations, to which 
modern scholars arc so attached, that he could use? Tliero was little 
even in the south of the province. Perhaps, London, on the banks of the 
Thames, could be referred to. Colchester might well have been well-lmown. 
Their geographical location in relation to each other might have been 
vaguely known. However, we must remind ourselves that Agricole was to
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spend little time in the South* The North was to occupy him. %at was 
there in the North to which the Roman reader could relate? Were there 
special ph^ rsical features, important settlements, tribes or activities 
of any kind which the readers would recognise? There were neither tribes 
nor towns with whom Homan merchants had traded directly. Not every river 
crossing in the highland zone could be mentioned. That would, indeed, be 
boring. They are subsumed in a general comment about the exploration of 
estuaries. Where it matters, they are identified in both the Annals and 
the Agricola : the Menai Straits, the rivers Severn, Trent, Forth and 
Clj’de and finally the Tay. The former rivers as frontier lines, the 
latter as the borderland of Caledonia itself. Clearly after the last 
subjugation of the Qrdovices Agricola and his army, having formally 
annexed Brigantia, marched out into the great unknown. That added to 
the brilliance of his fama.
Tacitus stood in relation to North Britain as early writers did to the 
Amazonian jungle, with one significant disadvantages he could give no 
reference points, based on longitude and latitude. There were no 
generally knownlocations to which reference could be made and Tacitus 
should not be blamed for failing to do what it did not lie within the 
power of anyone to do. Tacitus took the right course. He built up a 
generalised picture, giving it detail by dealing with particular factors, 
when they had significance for the invading force and gave identity to 
opponents.
Archaeology has not enabled us to confirm the description of the various 
physical types which Tacitus identified in Britain. Here he is unchallenged. 
Furneaux and Anderson declare, "His ethnological statements are naturally 
defective". ( 10 ) Is the ancient historian predestined to be wrong?
We must turn to the criticism in detail.
Tacitus clearly recognises the variety of human types to be found in the 
islands. He is not defective about that.* We may be somewhat sceptical 
about some of the explanations offered about their origins. Modern 
archaeology has shown that wave upon wave of migrants swept across, at 
least part, of these islands.
Y.hereas modern scholars have preferred to start in the South and work 
north, Tacitus starts with the North and moves South. There does not 
appear to be any evidence to contradict Tacitus when he writes that the 
Caledonians did have large limbs and reddish hair. However, we should 
bear in mind that if the description comes from the governor himself, 
he could only have been speaking of the peoplesof the lowlands and 
north east Scotland. The broch builders of the Y/estern Isles were
73.
beyond his compass. Even though the fleet sailed among them there is no 
suggestion that they had made any human contact. Archaeology suggests 
however that these peoples might well have come affinity with the peoples 
of south west Britain. ( 11 ) Furthermore there doss not appear to be 
any evidence to suggest that there were ever migrations from Germany to 
Caledonia.
In fact a movement of peoples may be traced in a quite different direction. 
The fundamental migration seems to have been from the south and east to 
the North. It has been considered possible that the people who constructed 
the brochs (built as massive dry stone towers) between Sîcye end Shetland 
were escaping from ports of South Vest Britain which in their turn were 
being occupied by the invading Belgao, in the period Immediately'' before the 
Roman conquest, These peoples were the last of a number who had crossed 
the channel at various points and then either fought or infiltrated their 
way inland. No doubt in some places the former inhabitants fled and in 
others they were massacred but we must also make allowance for the possibil­
ity that the natives were merely submerged by the dominant minority. At 
the some time some groups may well have been able to continue living as 
they did before, untouched by these migrations, on account of their 
physical isolation, so that ancient and modern cultures could continue 
to subsist side by side in one region during the same period of time.
Some Mesolltliic settlements of the so-called Peterborough People contln- 
ued during Keo-lithic times in, at least, some of the inaccessible, 
heavily forested and water logged parts of the English mldlr.nd8. However, 
some such people also appear to have moved northwards into Northumbria 
and southern Scotland, as well as westwards into Wales. From these 
migrants the settlements at Skara 33rae and Rinyo in the Orloieys appear 
to have originated. To the very end of its existence the former Icnew 
nothing of either the working of metals or the cultivation of grain.
Tkoir isolation encapsulated them in their own culture and kept them 
from the impact of fresh peoples bearing a different way of life*
T!)is latter movement was but one of a whole series. From about 750 BC 
the Celts began to arrive in Britain. (Gradually they established them- 
selvGs over the lowlands from Cornwall to Lincolnshire, bringing with 
them their plough, which gave them greater potential as agriculturalists. 
Tlie 'Urn FoB:* (so-called from the large urns in which they buried their 
dead) whom the Celts displaced moved on, in a mainly northerly direction. 
Thus their pastoral way of life survived, even though Celtic agriculture 
became established in their old homelands. Thereafter a series of Celtic 
migrations followed, traces of which can be discerned over much of low­
land Britain; but this is beyond the scope of our present study.
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HoTfever, there are oerteln dovelopmentG with which we must be concerned.
About 75 BC there was some population movement across the channel, where 
the people possessed more noticeable Germanic elements in their culture. 
They were known as the Belgae and it was with then that the Roman govern- 
ment was predominantly concerned in its relations with Britain. Tacitus 
does not identify them as Belgae. Ho doubt to him they were all Gauls.
He was right, however, to draw attention to the features which wore common 
to the settlements on either side of the water. Common climate was not 
without its effect; but some kind of common ancestry must also be surmised 
as he rightly supposed.
The complexities of the relation between Rome and these migrants may be 
deferred until the conquest of the island is studied in more detail. 
tl?anwhile we turn to the last of the racial groups mentioned by Tacitus; 
the Silures. If the Gauls north and south of the English Channel seemed 
inter-connected through language, then the peoples of the west seemed to 
have some relationship with those of the Iberian peninsula, if the common 
physical characteristics of curly hair and s^ Tartliy skins had any meaning. 
There certainly seems to have been some connection by way of trade between 
Spain and St. 'Michael's Mount in Com'Lmll as well as between Spain and 
Wales during Iron Age Periods B and C. ( 12 ) %ether there was any 
significant migration to Britain, however, is more doubtful. Given the 
state of shipping at the time, the vojage would have been regarded as 
hazardous. Rod a whole tribe sailed, few, perhaps, would have survived 
the journey to conquer native peoples. Until there is more definite 
evidence we may suspend judgement upon the statement of Tacitus, though 
we may accept the grounds on which be made it. Meanwhilo it be more 
prudent to accept the view that in the Silures we see among the Celts 
living in south Wales a ''strong infusion of native British blood resulting 
from fusion with the descendants of older stock". The term Iberian is thus 
used to describe the non-Aryan peoples who spread through the Mediterranean 
basin and beyond during the Neo-lithic period. (15 )
These sections of the Amricolac have certain inaccuracies in them, which 
neither Tacitus nor any other author of the time had the means of correct­
ing. Nor are we very much better informed about the details of the origin 
of riT;n in these Islands. However, the errors of Tacitus lie in his theory 
of origins rather than in his actual description of the state of affairs 
timt was contemporary with him. Ho doubt the observations are generalised; 
but when the reader learns, later on, of battles with the Silures and the 
Caledonians he can visualise the physical appearance of the opponents of 
Rome and thus ho may understand the book more vividly.
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3. 3. W/aiYJRB AiU) CLD ATE
In C.12 Tacitus turns his attention to British methods of warfare and to 
the climate of the islands. It soems entirely appropriate that having 
described the physique of those who fought against Rome ho sliould mention 
their strategy, tactics and armaments. Once again a picture le built up 
wliich will enable the reader to visualise better the nature of the battles 
to be described later on. T)ie double purpose of these sections Is now 
becoming clearer. They not only give details which were thought to bo 
do rlAur in works of this kind but they also provide relevant information
enabling the later narrative sections to move along without interruptions 
for the purpose of description which, though necessary, would impede the 
flow of events, if given at each particular point.
Overall the natives were strongest in their infantry. However, some tribes 
iisod war clioriots. The social structure of these fighting units was odd. 
The drivers had the higher status and the combatants the lower. It seems 
clear that this style of warfare was not general. In earlier times it had 
been common in Gaul, but there it hod died out, as it was dying in Britain. 
TI:e clioriots were, however, to reappear at the battle of I\!ons Graupius.
Even when driverlcss the panic-stricken horses galloped into the Roman 
rc.nlcs dragging their chariot with them and spreading confusion among the
formations of the army. ( 14 )
]%r the first century whatever unity the peoples Imd ever enjoyed was 
seriously broken up. They were now located in small states whose princes 
warred with each other. Indeed, the disunity of the tribes had been one 
of the most important and helpful factors in the invasion# The chieftains 
could not even combine before a common danger# They fought individually 
and fell one by one.
There was heavy rainfall in Britain and there were terrible mists; but 
at least the climate was not very cold# Moist and temperate would be the 
boot description. The length of the # y  was longer than in Rome. Even 
the night was bright and in the extreme north it was short as well. There
T.'G.s but a brief spell between the twilight of one day and the dawn of 
another. Indeed, if there is no cloud, he wrote, the mm can be seen 
tîïToughout the night. It seems to travel along the norizon raxhcr rhan 
din beneath it. The reason for this oddity, he argues, lies in the fact 
that because the ends of the earth are flat they cast only low shadows. 
Darkness cannot rise to any height. It reaches neither ohe st-y nox uhe
stars.
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The soil will produce all manner of crops except those dependent upon 
a warm climate. The crops grow quickly but the moistness of the land and 
air prevents them from ripening rapidly. There are also considerable 
mineral deposits. Those of silver, gold and precious metals are 
justification alone for the worthwhileness of the conquest. Pearls were 
also to be found but they were inferior to those of the Bed Sea. The 
cause may lie in the pearls themselves or it could be the way they have 
been harvested. Tacitus would like to believe that the former was the 
case.
We turn now to comment upon some of the important details Tacitus has 
laid before the reader. Archaeology has shown that the war chariots in
use were lightly constructed of wood and wickerwork and generally drawn by
a pair of ponies. The charioteers did not fight nor did the warriors 
fight from the chariots. They ware small troop -carrying vehicles that 
introduced a high degree of mobility into Celtic warfare. Some authors 
had suggested that the warriors ran out along the central shaft, as the 
chariot was in full charge and so struck out at the enemy. ( 15 )
can only be considered e remarkable feat when the ponies were even
trotting over open ground. It would be interesting to find out whether 
in fact it is possible to balance oneself between the galloping horses 
and then stike at an enemy beyond either of them. We should relate 
certain details of battle preparations to the British methods of warfare.
Tlxese occur at different points in the text. To some extent they are 
overshadowed by the convention of ancient historians who constructed 
battle speeches, for both sides, as a way of setting the scene for the 
conflict to follow. It seems as though there was a good deal of talking 
by the Celts before battle. There were "pep-telks" which aimed to 
encourage them and demoralise their enemies. There was also a good deal 
of braggadocio both in word and deed. The elaborately worked equipment 
may have one of its roles in such preparations. By means of a display of 
armed might they hoped to overwhelm their opponents psychologically before 
physical attack; and at the same time they worked themselves up into a 
pitch of fervour out of which military success might come. Something of 
this comes across in the final battle of Boudicca*o revolt. Then the 
Britons brought their families to witness the final downfall of the 
Romans. Instead their wagons became the obstacle from which they them­
selves could not escape death as they were rolled up against them.
Nothing is said by Tacitus about the British hill forts and dyked 
enclosures. These were important items of defence, where the emphasis 
was upon a more static form of warfare than that envisaged by the use of 
chariots. The presence of such defences can be inferred from the text
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of Tacitus when he describes the battles which took place. Here the 
Annals are more illuminating than the AgricolaC'. ( 16 ) The frequency 
with which such fortifications occur when correlated with the statement 
in the Agricola that "originally people were subject to kings; now the 
quarrels and ambitions of petty chieftains divide them" (c.l2) has led to 
the common assumption that there was political anarchy in Britain. However, 
the evidence may also be taken to point in a different direction. The 
hill forts could have been bases for a large chariot army (or armies).
Thus the reason for their intermittent occupation could have been that 
they were only required in time of war; in between they were kept on a ' 
'care and maintenance' basis. At the same time such sites could also 
be used as places of refuge for the surrounding population during times 
of trouble®
In the epoch preceding the Roman invasion the Belgic tribes tended to
settle in lower lying areas. This led to the gradual abandonment of hill 
forts, in their zones of primary settlement. Political changes also 
increased the size of the political units and this too tended to reduce 
their numbers. They seemed to prefer route centres and lines of 
communication, which may well indicate a desire to exercise control over 
economically strategic points. Among these newer fortifications we must 
rank the great oppidum at Côlchester together with Sllchester and Stanwix. 
The fact that none of these is expxtly like those on the continent need 
not drive the scholar to thin!: that the British were insular, with all 
the connotations of baclaTardnese, but can lead to the conclusion that 
human inventiveness altered inherited designs to suit the needs of the 
times. (17)
Nonetlieless there was disunity in Britain., About this subject the 
educated Roman was, perhaps, best informed. From the time of Julius 
Caesar the government had been aware of cross-channel sympathy for anti- 
Roman causes together with tribal conflicts. %Rien the actual invasion 
is studied we shall see this truth in more detail.
Tacitus introduces a short section on the climate of Britain, The recent 
changes in our own climate must incline us to accept his description of it 
during his own times. Uhen we also consider how much time Agi'icola spent 
in the highland zone of Britain, where there is rarely an annual rainfall 
of less than 56", the force of his son-in-law's observation is apparent.
Tl-;c climato of Brita.in did not impede Agricole's progress anymore than 
the opposition of the native tribes. We should note, however, that modern 
studies have indicated that from c.lOO BC to C.5OO AD Britain experienced 
a warmer and drier spell of weather than preceded or followed it. ( 18 )
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We should therefore bear in mind that a changed distribution of rainfall 
might well have affected the pattern of population density. This would in 
turn affect the choice of areas worth occupying next and also, perhaps, 
the princip^ centres of opposition. For example, if the West coast of 
Scotland were drier than now and supporting a greater population, who used 
the- seaways a great deal, these factors might be given greater importance 
in deciding why Agricola stayed clear of the western highlands. It was not 
the mountains alone that kept him out but their combination with other 
factors. . Romans had fought in other mountains successfully, after all.
Like Caesar, Tacitus notes the increased length of day in the summer time, 
especially in the north of the island. Ee is silent about the shortness 
of the day during the winter and this might indicate that the winter 
quarters of the army tended to be further south during the years of 
campaigning. However, there can be no doubt that when the forts were 
built, this fact would be borne home to the Homan troops. Unlike Caesar, 
Tacitus offers an explanation of the difference in the length of day. 
Perhaps we are not obliged to accept that Tacitus thought the world was 
flat? for, in common with many of his contemporaries, he may well not 
have held this view. Nonetheless he needed some means whereby his southern 
based renders could visualise a land of midnight sun « a contradiction 
in terms - where there were long hours of twilight - unknown in the south - 
and when on clear nights It seemed as though the sun never went down.
¥h.en he uses the odd phrase that nightfall never reached the stars he may 
have been trying to convey vividly the phenomenon of extensive twilight.
The phrase about the flat extremities of the earth has been dealt with by 
A.H. Burn, who writes picturesquely that the Ar^ic does not cast its 
shadow high in the land of the mid-night sun. ( 19 ) Anyone^  however, 
who has stayed In Scotland will know that in clear weather there appears 
to be darkness at the rim of the îiorlzon but not overhead, at the close 
of the day. It is this kind of thing that Tacitus is trying to describe 
and explain,
Despite these long northern summer days there was a lack of sunshine, 
which prevented the cultivation of olives, vines and other Mediterranean 
fruits. Tacitus writes correctly that germination was easy but that 
harvesting became a problem because the ripening process was so slow, 
bet weather was then, and is still, a problem in all but the most 
exceptional of years. Some people have thought that viticulture was 
carried on In Britain, at least in the southern part of the island.
Recently doubt has been cast upon this tradition. The remains found 
could be those of imported fruit. ( 20 )
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Tacitus seems to have been right in drawing attention to . the number of 
cattle in the island. This appears to have been true particularly in the 
: prth, where ranching may well have been the dominant economic activity. 
Caesar drew attention to the dependence of people there upon livestock 
for their diet and clothing. They seem to have been rather like the 
Masai of East Africa. It is also arguable that it was this region that 
reared the horses which were necessary for drawing the war chariots, to 
which reference has alreadj’ been made. Animals were also as important 
for their hides as on the hoof and the former constituted a significant 
commodity for export. The same is also true of silver, gold and other 
metals. The Romans were to be disappointed of their hope that Britain 
would prove to be a fabulous land of metals. There were, in fact, but 
few in the South. More were to be found in the hills of the N-wth and 
West. These areas the Romans did not acquire until the days of the 
Flavians. Enough was already being produced at a fairly early stage of 
the occupation to seem to make the invasion worth-while. Derbyshire 
lead seemed to be on the market at a relatively early stage. Perhaps 
that was the first fruit of the relationship between Rome and thé i 
Brigantian queen Csrtimandua, if here we may assume that her territories 
reached so far to the south. ( 21 )
3. 4. THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE
In 0.15 of the Agricolat Tacitus devotes a short section to a description 
of the attitude of the people themselves. Ee cannot be gainsaid for there 
is no other direct evidence. National and racial characteristics of this 
kind are most difficult to assess and accept but the indirect evidence of 
the troubles which befell Rome during the first fifty years of occupation 
tend to confirm Tacitus's description of the people. They would discharge 
their obligations if there were no manifest injustice. Though they 
tended to accept foreign rule, abject slavery was intolerable. One must 
be careful here not to receive this opinion too readily, since Tacitus 
is somewhat addicted to the idea of the "noble savage" held in contrast 
with the decadent Roman. We should also note that Agricole dealt with 
abuses both in the levying of tribute and collection of dues. (c.l9)
The reader is thus enabled to see why it was that Agricole v;as well 
regarded by his subjects. He was uncorrupt; which was more then could 
be said of some of his predecessors. In suck circumstances the arts of 
peace had chance to flourish. Under the previous administrations with 
endemic wars and revolts such development had hardly been possible.
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3. 5. TBE m i m  OF TEE GmaUiP2iIC/iL Aim ETENOGEAPHICAL mTZRIàl
Eow does Tacitus compare with other writers on Britain? î<i>st of them 
were in no better position than Tacitus himself. They were taking* their 
material second-hand® î^ytheas was perhaps the most important# since he 
seems to have visited the island himself. Much of the later material is 
derived substantially from him® Strabo (c®64 BC- 21 AD) has little to 
contribute about Britain® Mela who was writing during the reign of 
Caligula (37 - 41 AD) gives a popular summary of Strabo® The Elder 
Pliny has some valuable facts in his Natural History which Tacitus may 
have read, when it appeared in 77 AD. Ptolemy# who generally commands 
great respect# was# perhaps# a younger contemporary of Tacitus himself.
As he was writing between c,127 and 148 AD his information could have 
been derived from a time later than the point at which the Africolat - was 
iTrltten® Diodorus Siculus wrote during the time of Julius Caesar end 
brought together geographical information that was available at that time®
prom the Roman point of view Caesar himself was# perhaps, the most 
Important writer. It was after all some centuries since lytheas had 
composed his account® Caesar's were at least nearer to the time of the 
empire as well as based upon observation and questioning by the writer 
himself® Ee had declared that Inland Britain was occupied by tribes who 
claimed to be Indigenous® The maritime zones had been peopled by migrants 
from various parts of Gaul® Archaeological studies have largely verified 
this opinion and Tacitus does not contradict It. Els explanations, as 
we have seen, are another matter®
It was Caesar who drew attention to the importance of cattle ranching in
b.ÛI the areas beyond those over which he marched® But both writers refer to
il
the presence of metals, the nature of the climate and to the shape of the
'j island# even though they use different images to express it® Unlike
4 Tacitus# Caesar gives approximate measurements for the size of the island.
j This was perhaps something that Tacitus would never do with his disdain
I of mundane details. In the end# however, Tacitus gives almost as much
information as Caesar but the latter presents it in a more factual manner.
I Given the amount of space which he felt he could give to these subjects
-j we may think that Tacitus gave bis readers sufficient background
I information so that they could understand the subseouent action* It is
I '
I necessary for us to keep in mind that he did not Intend the material to
! provide a picture of the province but the context In which Agricole had
to work. For that purpose there is light enough.
Modern scholars, however, find a vagueness In Tacitus which makes the
task of reconstruction of the past more difficult* While we appreciate
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the reasons for this# there is a certain disappointment. Though he 
mentions some locations they cannot be located now with any accuracy.
Mons Graupius end Fortus Trucculensis end the tribe of the Foresti may 
exercise the ingenuity of the scholars but in the end they remain elusive.
The map opposite will convey what Tacitus actually wrote dorm about 
Britain. Though it would not satisfy a modern cartographer it might be 
thoughUsufficient for its purpose. But let us ask for example# how could 
Tacitus give a precise reference for the battle of Mons Grauplus? Ke had 
shown clearly enough that Agricola was advancing North and at the end of 
his campaigning fought a victorious battle. But did Agricole himself know 
precisely where he was? Ee must have known his location in relation to 
the ground he had covered but what sort of absolute reference could Tacitus 
have given that would have enabled later generations to find the site with 
ease? Mons Grauplus# then as now, was a famous victory won "somewhere up 
north". Furthermore# we might think that Tacitus was not the first 
historian to think that by giving the geographical name during his own 
times he had thereby identified a place clearly enough. Syme is right 
when he comments that in the operations against Caratacus the campaign 
took place in country "wholly refractory to geographical te rm in o lo g y "  
where no names could be given to the rivers and fortresses in the land 
of the Qrdovices, where the British leader was encountered and defeated ( 22 )
Furneaux and Anderson are, no doubt, right to assert that Tacitus 
"attached little value to proper names as giving weight dignity and colour 
to a picturesque narrative". ( 25 ) Yet even they may not have weighed
sufficiently the problem of making a presentation in the circumstances 
with which Tacitus was confronted. A carefully constructed roll of names 
may not contribute dignity to a narrative so much as boredom and confusion. 
Colour is not given merely by the use of proper nouns J It is the overall 
evocation of a scene that gives e sense of the picturesque. This we have 
already seen In our discussion of Tacitus as a mllitery historian. The 
need to give weight to an account has to be Interpreted in the sense 
of the accuracy which can be conveyed within the limits of the knowledge 
available at the time of writing. Nothing Tacitus could do would make 
British names any less strange nor sites more precise in the reader*8 
mind.
fJince Agricole spent most of his governorship in the North there was no 
point in describing conditions in the South. But when attention was \ 
turned to the North# what was there to describe which could have had 
significance for Tacitus' readers?
Again, the ethnography may be regarded as defective from the point of 
Yiew of a modern anthropologist; but could it really be anything else?
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Burn is more understanding than Furneaux and Anderson. He writes that 
the ethnography is excellent# even though he allows that there Is no
}3101.emigration from Germany. Ke rightly points cut that there must have 
heen pre-Golcrc groups in the islands# subjected to the rule of the Celts. 
Xhcj' would be unîtnov/n to Tacitus# almost inevitably. Traces of them have 
been found in the pre-Celtic, prc Indo-European language of the Piets# 
v.iituon as Ogam script. This may be a partial explanation of the physical
c.,ppcaratîico of tne Caledonians. But this is the guess of g modern historian# 
placed alongside the guess of an ancient one: Bum# however# would allow
for a migration up the Atlantic coast. These people he would call the 
Iberians# from their country of origin. They left their mesolithic 
monuments behind them and constitute the "dork western element in our 
population". ( 24 )
However# the relevance of this material does not lie so much with 
anthropology as with the literary purpose of the AgricoleThe silence 
about religion and social organization is itself instructive. Military 
affairs were what occupied his attention. Thus the ethnography enables 
Tacitus to draw out the martial spirit of the Britons# whose opposition 
to Home was to take up so large a place in the ensuing narrative. V/hat 
appears at first sight to be an imbalance is directly related to the 
hero's military purpose.
It is in scientific explanations that Tacitus is most vulnerable to 
criticism. His coraments about the flat extremities of the earth and the 
sluggish northern seas are often thought jo June l "It is difficult to 
suppose Tacitus ignorant of the spherical form of the earth# known to 
scientific Greeks from the fourth century BC and such Romans as Cicero# 
Seneca end Pliny# but his language can hardly be explained es merely 
rhetorical and popular". ( 25 ) Tacitus was not to be the last historien
to get into difficulties over scientific matters : It does seem as though 
his Imowledge# in some ways, was behind the best standards of the day: 
a small weakness in a work which did not aim to be an account of natural 
phenomena but a laudatory biography of a governor, general, and ideal 
public servant.
A modern writer may believe that when he criticisos the vagueness of 
Tacitus he intends no adverse judgement; but merely wishes to draw 
attention to what is omitted or dealt with unsatisfactorily. Nonetheless 
the implication can hardly be.avoided that Tacitus should have known and 
should have included the material which was lacking. Otherwise the 
criticism is not worth making. The obvious course then would be to write 
up whet modern scholarship has found out without any innuendoes against
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the ancient historian. Once it is seen to he unreasonable to expect a 
full treatment of these subjects in the Agricole'!, the reader can grasp 
more easily that the presentation in this work is controlled by the 
author's literary purpose rather than by carelessness,
Now tiiat the earlier career of Agricole has been described, together with 
the geographical and anthropological background, it only remained for 
Tacitus to ensure that the reader understood how Home cane to invade the 
island so that the position inherited by Agricole on his appointment is 
understood. Since this section is placed at the point of his entry into 
the province, the reader has to recollect Agricole's earlier period of 
service in Britain; but this is more directly related to his subject's 
rise to success than to the history of the province, m  c.14» Tacitus 
proceeds to a lightening sketch of the previous history of the province 
and to this we ourselves must now turn. (26)
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army worked through it but rather in its affect upon vegetation 
and terrain, with the consequent result upon centres of habitation 
and agriculture, e.g. South Lancashire was covered by an extensive 
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( 21 ) If it is accepted that the fort at Tenpleborough could well have 
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stand right on the border of the tribal area but rather In relation 
to some significant site. The fort at Brough in Derbyshire is not 
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( 22 ) Syme Jp pp. 594-5*
( 25 ) Furneaux & Anderson, p. joarix.
( 24 ) Bum in Dorey. ôp^ .cit,
( 25 ) Furneaux & Anderson p.74.
( 26 ) It might he thought that there has been either some dislocation
of the text or an insertion by another hand between c.12 of the
4|^colajX at the words caelum crebris and the end. There seems 
to be an obvious ]bgW. connexion between ito, singull nusnant. 
univers! viquntiir and lusi Eritanni dilectum. However, the prose 
style of the "economic section" does not vary from the rest.
C. 12 is made up of a number of short points, that could be made 
in almost any order. The opening section of c.l5 is another series 
of short presentations. There might have been some dislocation 
of words in the text as a result of scribal error but there are 
no sufficient manuscripts surviving to enable us to be sure.
For the historian of Roman Britain this is not a point of substance.
SECTION 4
THE PROVINCE BEFORE THE FLAVIANS
4,1# Clauâian Invasion,
4*2# CoBsolidatlOD*
4*3* Criais ±n Britais
4*4* Pacification#
Footnotes.
4.1. THE CLAUDIAN INVASION
Having sketched in both the geographical and anthropological background, 
Tacitus turns at c.13 section 2 in the Agricola^ , to the Claudian invasion.
He introduces this by starting with the invasion of Julius Caesar. The 
beginning of Roman contact is located firmly with him. He informs us that 
Caesar waged war successfully in the island, making himself master of the 
coastline. However, it may be said that he showed Britain to Rome rather 
than handed it over. Soon after these expeditions the advent of the civil 
wars put the island out of mind for a considerable period. Even when the 
principate was established Augustus did not resume his uncle's policy.
On the contrary he continued the act of forgetting, which Tiberius then 
took as a prescription. Praeceptum is the word used. Gaius Caligula 
meditated an invasion, but his unstable mind soon turned to other things, 
before the idea could be translated into a result. It was Claudius who 
carried off the great enterprise. Legions and auxiliaries were<#Ea#ëported 
across the Channel, without mishap. Vespasian emerged as an important 
military figure, which foreshadowed his future greatness. Tribes were 
conquered and kings surrendered. The description is brief, no doubt 
because this too falls under the heading of "The Prelude to Agricola".
Tacitus has thus embarked upon a description in parvo of the extant 
situation inherited by Agricola when he entered upon his governship^
In analysing this passage we may begin by noticing that most scholars place 
Roman interest in Britain no earlièr.than Caesar. Even then they assume 
that the concern arose out of his campaigns in Gaul. His opponents 
apparently received help from the inhabitants of the'island. The degree 
of success achieved by Caesar is less important for Tacitus and for us than 
the establishment of Britain upon the Roman political map. Tacitus pays 
tribute to the success of the raids. The inhabitants were defeated. The 
coastline was held, in part; but there was no continuing milikry presence. 
Caesar settled for payments and hostages. The phrase "may be said to have 
shown the island rather than have handed it over" is a graceful Tacitean 
way of reminding the reader that the Roman army withdrew.
The author of the Ajficola : could not be expected, in so brief a work, which 
was devoted to the memory of his father in law, to have explained the 
intricacies of Roman-British relations during the period between 34bC and 
43 AD. The evidence is not easily put together, nor is it strictly relevant 
to our purpose, but its general purport is not without importance for this 
study. We must retrace our steps a little. Reference has already been 
made to migrations across the Channel. %  Caesar's time the Belgae had 
established themselves, in a pincer shaped area between the Essex coast on 
the North and the East coast of Kent to the South, with the two lines meeting
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in the middle Thames. This was the principal region but there was a 
secondary area along the Sussex coast, which was to be important later.
In the midst of this primary area la.j the Catuvellauni. For long it has 
been the received view that they were a Belgic tribe of aggressive intent, 
who, by degrees, sought to absorb their neighbours. More recently this 
view has been questioned. A careful study of the coinage suggests that
this people was ruled over by Cassivellaunus, who confronted Caesar with war
chariots. These had ceased to be used on the mainland and may therefore 
indicate the arrival of these people in the island at a rather earlier time 
than has hitherto been proposed. If the Catuvellauni were part of the 
Marnian migration, then it would not be surprising if they were hostile to 
incoming Belgae, like the Trinovantes, who might well have occupied their
lands in North Essex. %  degrees they found themselves surrounded by
newcomers. While they made an alliance to face Caesar, it soon fell apart 
again when the Trinovantes made a separate peace with Rome. Perhaps the 
latter thought this was one way of turning the tables upon the Catuvellauni 
(1). At all events it gave them some measure of protection and seems to 
have led to increased trade with Gaul.
Some years after Caesar's departure there were important developments along 
the Sussex coast. During the failure of the great rebellion of $2BG,
Commius, who had throivn in his lot with Vercingetorix, was forced to flee.
He crossed the Channel with a considerable following and from the distribution 
of his coins seems to have established a kingdom in West Sussex and East 
Hampshire. From this area he appears to have thrust forward into the 
region of the middle Thames. When he and Cassivellaunus died; the nature 
of political events in the subsequent years becomes difficult to follow. 
Tasciovanus, who seems to have succeeded Cassivellaunus, as being either 
his son or grandson, moved his capital to Verulamium and brought pressure 
to bear upon the Trinovantes. He may even have occupied their capital 
at Camulodunum. This was risky since the Trinovantes had a treaty with 
Rome. When Augustus visited Gaul, he may have withdrawn from it as an 
act of prudence. Tincommius, who succeeded Commius, struck up a better 
relationship with Rome and it may well have been formalized in a treaty. 
However, the change of stance may not have met with general approval.
Part of the tribe may have moved off into the reaches of the upper Thames 
and Gloucestershire to form the tribe known to us as the Dobunni. If 
Rome's memory of the treàty with the Trinovantes had grown dim, this 
relationship v/as fresh and bright. The emergence of coin types as 
closely resembling those of Rome may even indicate the presence of Roman 
craftsmen among these people. Assuming that there was, indeed, a treaty, 
then Augustus had not only a foothold in Britain at the point of the
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short sea crossing but had no need of military intervention. (The 
Trinovantes obviously still stood in some reasonable relationship 
with Rome and the Catuvellauni seemed to be a clear threat to them 
and the heirs of Commius*) Here was now a balance of power in which 
Roman interests were served. IVhen Tacitus wrote "Britain was lost in 
deep oblivion and also in peace: Augustus called that policy", he did 
not mean tiere was a refusal to p ^  attention to Britain but rather a 
specific decision not to invade it. For a variety of reasons Augustus 
had decided upon this course but nonetheless it lay within the Roman 
sphere of interest. Treaty relationships would serve Rome well enough, 
as long as the balance held. (The inland areas were of quite secondary 
importance). Over a period of time this balance was radically disturbed. 
Tincommius suffered at the hands of his brothers %pillus and Verica.
He fled to Rome but no aid was forthcoming to restore him to his throne. 
Augustus recognised each of his supplanters in turn and since he may 
have accorded them the title rex they may have had the status of client 
kings. (A fact which will be important during the first decades of the 
Roman occupation). Verica ousted %)pillus, who in his turn overthrew 
Dubnovellaunos, who ruled in Kent. He managed to establish himself on 
the North bank of the Thames estuary as king of the Trinovantes, in 
succession to Addemaros where the throne vjsls perhaps vacant after his 
death.
Meanwhile Tasciovanus led the Catuvellauni northwards into the English 
midlands and perhaps even into West Kent. Cunobelih, who styled himself 
son of Tasciovanus, appeared at Camulo dunum, the capital of the Trinovantes. 
His declaration that he was the son of Tasciovanus has generally been 
accepted at face value. If so, then his anti-Roman spirit was quite 
outstanding. His predecessors had avoided conflict with the Trinovantes 
and extended their rule in other regions. He seems to have advanced 
into the most sensitive area. .It has eren been thought that he attempted 
this successful coup while his father was still alive. More recently an 
alternative explanation has been offered. Here Cunobelin is a 
Trinovantian nobleman who overthrew Dubnovellaunos and then conquered 
the Catuvellauni r In order to establish the right credentials for this 
coup de main he declared himself the son of Tasciovanus. If this were 
the case it would represent both an amazing about face among the 
Trinovantes and a great reversal of the strength between the two tribes. 
Fbrthermore, we should recollect that the Roman advance in 4-3 AD was 
clearly against the Catuvellauni. It would have been odd if, then, 
Éunobelin as a Trinovantian had abandoned that name in favour of the 
tribe he had conquered. (2) However, those who seek power and achieve 
it often do quite unpredictable things in order to establish their
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legitimacy and consolidate their position. At all events the tribal 
areas of the Catuvellauni and Trinovantes had a common ruler soon 
after Varus and his legions were destroyed in Germany. Imperial 
preoccupation with this disaster afforded Cunobelin favourable 
circumstances, since it left him free to strengthen his position and 
able to disregard the technical relationship with which the Trinovantes 
were connected to Rome. In the aftermath of these troubles, Cunobelin 
may even have found a certain degree of de facto acceptance with the 
emperor* It might well be that he was one of the British rulers who 
sent embassies to Rome and made offering at the Capitol. As he styles 
himself rex on some coins the word might indicate a certain degree of 
imperial acceptance. Certainly trade relations seem to have been 
actively encouraged. However, the Catuvellaunian policy of expansion 
continued unabated. The brother of Cunobelin, Epaticcus, cut into the 
northern part of the Atrebatic kingdom and into eastern Kent. Rome did 
not stir to supporti:her client king. Tiberius, perhaps, would not 
rouse himself for the sake of such internal border changes. As long 
as Verica ruled over the main part of the Atrebates and Cunobelin 
encouraged trade with Rome the balance of power still seemed to hold.
As the latter became older the anti-Itoraan spirit became more obvious 
again. Togodumnus and Caratacus were active during their father's 
declining years. By about 40 AD, Verica's realm was much reduced in 
size. Perhaps it was no more than an area round Chichester and Selsey 
Bill. îürther advances were made up the Thames by them, into the lands 
of the Dobunni and a petty kingdom was established there. Nor were the 
Iceni of East Anglia free from pressure, even though they managed to 
fend off the main thrust, aided by the nature of the terrain, perhaps.
3h 40 AD these two brothers ejected their other brother, Adminius, from 
the kingdom. He fled to Rome. Caligula was petitioned for aid to 
recover his kingdom, which lay msdnly in Kent. The emperor marshalled 
an army at Boulogne but soon removed it to become preoccupied with other 
things. Soon afterwards Cunobelin died and the energy of the bellig­
erent brothers was unbridled. The surviving fragment of the Atrebatic 
kingdom was quickly annexed. Verica fled to Rome. It was the final 
insult. In addition, an anti-Roman state now controlled muchhof the 
south east of England. The balance of power was completely upset.
When the extradition of Verica was demanded the affront was compounded. 
The brothers commissioned disturbances either along the (Mulish coast or 
against Roman merchants. These were provocative acts. The latter 
were probably more numerous. Certainly the trade appears to have been 
lucrative and the market valuable, so that commerce and prestige combined
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to make action necessary. "There existed in Britain throughout this 
period a strong anti-Roman force which had been obliged to bow before 
the power and political realism of Cunobelin but found ready ears and 
hearts in the young princes especially Caratacus. Such a force implies 
an organization to ensure continuity and direction and the obvious 
candidate is the Druidic priesthood." (3)
Tacitus is silent about the ideological or religious forces behind the 
anti-Roman attitude of the Catuvellauni. Nor does he have much to 
say about the Druids. They feature most in his account of Suetonius 
Paulinus*s assault on Anglesey. (Annals.14.30) On the whole we shall 
do well to note the force of Tacitus's silence on this point. To have 
a Druidic priesthood inspiring and directing opposition to Rome from 
the time Caesar crôssed into Gaul, and which still continued in that 
role after Claudius invaded Britain is to imply a degree of coordinated 
organization and inflexibility of purpose which appears to run counter 
to the evident disunity that^fzth^j&ltiGh btribes "ÆWëd -
by the imperial forces. Far from being united, Tacitus emphasizes 
their disunity. He allows it to be one of the most helpful factors 
working for Roman success. During the Gallic wars the Druids nevei*
actually appeared during any of the campaigns. Nor do they feature in
■ b,
the works of Tacitus except during the invasion of an island where an 
important sanctuary was housed. Their appearance and imprecations 
added to the drama of the occasion. We have no direct evidence to 
suggest that they were a potent force in either Gaulish or British 
politics.(4)
So much for the British side. What of the Roman? The actual motivation 
of Claudius eludes us. In general, Tacitus treats the emperor as little 
more than a puppet figure, except for the work he did as Censor. The 
lost books of the Annals may have contained material which displayed him 
as a more independent figure. The general traditionj however, has been 
to portray Claudius as the prisoner of his entourage. It has been 
well-argued that he wished to emulate Caesar.(3) l^any leaders have 
dreamed such dreams but usually there has had to be some occasion of 
policy requiring action along those desirable lines. Here it is 
commonly thought that one who became emperor in so improbable a fashion 
after a life-time spent on the fringe of the imperial house needed to 
carry off some dramatic deed in order to bolster his prestige at Rome.
Thus to take Caesar as the model for the preparation to invade was one 
thing; to use him as a casus belli was quite another^ There may well 
have been quite prosaic reasons. Britain could have been valuable as 
a source of manpower for the auxilia. I4r Charlesworth has indicated
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the extent to which the authorities drew upon British manpower.(6)
ItLneral wealth may also have been important. If so, some decades 
passed before the rewards were fully reaped but Tacitus specifically 
noted the presence of gold, silver and other metals in the Agricola 
C.12. But since trading relations had built up in the previous 
decades, even with the potentially hostile Catuvellauni and had not 
been interrupted, there seems to be no commercial reason for the 
conquest. Treaties had already secured what was necessary. We must 
look elsewhere to discover the circumstances that produced the invasion.
For these we are bound to consider politics in the island and particularly 
the expulsion of Verica with the following aggressive events. The 
Roman character did not take slights easily. There was enough here to 
provoke an imperial power into making an over-whelming response to 
petty insults.
Perhaps, in some ways, Tacitus regarded these events as peripheral to 
his purpose but he may have wished to allude to them by means of a brief 
phrase so that his readers could recall what had happened. As Syme has 
pointed out, we may sometimes take it that Tacitus is silent because he 
could assume that his readers already had the knowledge.(7) VJhen 
necessary, Tacitus could expand his material. Caratacus is afforded 
lengthy treatment in the Annals. This must demonstrate his status as
a significant figure in Rome's relationship.with the island. But
within the Agricola" the perspective is different. The invasion is not 
only important in itself but also for the way it brought Vespasian for­
ward, who was himself to be the means of advancing not only Agricola but 
Tacitus himself.
By singling out Vespasian, Tacitus associates him not only with Britain 
but also with an expansionist policy towards iti Agricola is the con­
clusion of what Vespasian began. However, he gives a misleading 
impression about the status of Vespasian in the expeditionary force.
The Latin reads "adsumpto in partem rerum Vespasiano". This seems to 
require translation as "Vespasian obtained a share in the undertaking".
This could be taken to mean that Vespasian himself was in command of the 
expedition. We know that this was not the case. Aulus ELautius was 
the commander. (8) Vespasian commanded the Ilnd Legion. A few brief 
strokes describe the campaign. It is Suetonius who supples a helpful
detail, in informing us of the sort of war Vespasian had. Tacitus
merely comments that "people were conquered, kings captured" : the same 
information without any of the detail.
No description of the Claudian invasion from the pen of Tacitus (9) has 
survived. For that we are dependent upon Dio Cassius, supplemented a
'11.0/
T H lî pi4^A5SS o'r TUE.
CLC\ODiP<N
Ll3vijU^rt.iTi %ONC..
c i\~ro\i ût-ùftoiNit'
KTR. g F?,f\ '*>6
^  J^ JgoTgtQf^
WiVt»)vÎ'6 M" Tf2.tBi55 C KiG,3t2i.i fü
Q t'iVrvsre. i
1) 3
114 b- Pf^DV IM C l£
Tine. FUP.\'fiVNS
lC>w(>rMr:i
U.CV1N
I’dtl-f,
#» *& # w  »**
e-
I  ^ (1 »\ I U V13 U.U (Vo Ni 1f
TR.
4^
C. u ( \3^xi T R.ÇC.-P
% % % % »
U»4r> IV»qu
Ilittle by some other authors* Erom Dio we conclude that there was but 
one major battle before Claudius entered the Catuvellaunian capital of 
Camulodunum* BLautius sent in Vespasian to capture the critical 
crossing point, probably on the Medway and then join issue with the 
Britons* Vespasian carried off a victory; but other generals, like 
Geta, also played an important part in the enterprise. Tlie rest of that 
stage consisted mainly of skirmishes* %e features of phase two are less 
clearly marked. There has been some speculation about a northern expedi­
tion led by Vespasian based on these lines from Silius Italiens :
Hinc pater ignotam donabit vine ere Thulen
Inqhe Caledonios primus trahet agmina lucos;
Compescet ripisk6enum, reget inpiger Afros,
Ealmiferamque senex bello domitabit Idumen**.
Beth Professors A. Momigliano and E.B* Birley have taken these lines 
seriously enough to entertain a northern mission by Vespasian, carried out 
during the period of the Claudian invasion.(10) No doubt, theoretically, 
it could have taken place but physically it could have worn out both the 
troops and their commander* The distances involved were at least double 
those covered by King Harold of the Saxons against Tostig and Dulæ V/illiam, 
since Vespasian, as we know, has to be placed far into the West Country 
towards the end of the campaigning* Had such a strike into lands unknown 
been brought off it would have been as reu^kable a feat as that executed by 
Suetonius Baullinus, when he crossed the Atlas b^untains. The silence of 
other sources, therefore, about the supposed endeavour must count against 
it ever happening. Finally, if it ever did occur there were no percep­
tible results* VJhen Agricola pushed into the North neither he nor 
Tacitus imply that he was venturing into territory over which Rome had some 
kind of suzerainty* . Vihat is more feasible, even though unsubstantiated, 
is some kind of token submission by a northern tribe. If Cartimandua 
were on the throne at that time, it is just conceivable that Vespasian was 
sent to negotiate a client-kingdom relationship after overtues had been 
made to ELautius. Most scholars are inclined to treat the Brigantes in 
such a fashion even though the necessary passages from the Annals are 
missing. Those which remain seem to imply a long-standing relationship 
between Cartimandua and the ibman government*(11)
The surviving accounts of phase one of the invasion suggest that at the end 
of it the northern front ley quiet. Tacitus informs us that the Iceni 
were given client-kingdom status. This may suggest that no battles were 
fought over their territory. Indeed they may have given a qualified 
welcome to the troops since they themselves had been under pressure from 
the Catuvellauni. There is silence about the North-West, which also may 
have been quiet and where, too, pressure upon the tribes may have been
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exercised by the expansionist C atu ve llau n i. The general tenor of the 
evidence is, therefore, to show that the Catuvellauni were the primary 
targets of the Roman invasion. Those like the Iceni and the Atrebates, 
and perhaps others who had suffered at their hands, were brought under 
indirect rule, no doubt on the grounds that Roman sovereignty .was needed, 
in  the last resort to protect them.
The conquest of the Catuvellauni, symbolised by the entrance of Claudius 
into Camulodunum, brought the first p|iase to a close. On his departure,
Dio t e l ls  us, the emperor ordered ELautius to subdue the "rem aining  
d is tr ic ts " . This phrase suggests that e ith e r  the government or Dio 
himself was ignorant of what lay beyond the conquered area. Riase two 
of the invasion was the implementation of this imperial order. The centre 
of attention seems to have been along the south coast. Here there v/as 
hard fighting. The remains at Maiden Castle (Dorchester) are an eloquent 
testimony to the sharpness of the can^ aign. The army had now gone beyond 
the te r r ito r y  of the Atrebates to areas which may have p rize d  their 
independence. On the o ther hand, Caratacus, or another member o f the 
royal house, may have sought to establish a centre of opposition in the 
region. He certainly seems to have retreated westwards and this area 
was one from which aid had been sent to the rebels in Armorica, so there 
may have been a history o f hostility to Rome there.
With these speculations we need not be concerned. Vihat is important is 
that we should note the Tacitean clue which denotes Vespasian as the 
fighting general o f the invasion. He warranted special and honourable 
m ention. If the first tra n s la tio n  of "adsumpto in partem rerum" was too 
strong, it may at least be taken as an indication of his crucial role in  
the campaign, even if he were not the supreme commander. The point is 
that when Vespasian became emperor all this came to have another k ind  of 
significance. Vespasian v/as the emperor who had forwarded the career of 
Agricola. Above all he had appointed him Governor of Britain. Having 
campaigned him self in the is la n d  he knew a t firèt hand what sort of legate 
was required, in order to complete the undértaking which he had helped to 
start in so distingu ished  a fash ion . The policy of Agricole can thus be 
interpreted as a Flavian policy, enshrined, we may assume, in his mandata. 
Agricola fin ish e d  what Vespasian began and for his pains was dishonoured 
by Dom itian. So on the grounds of military capacity, imperial future and 
patronage of Agricola Vespasian warranted specific mention in this brief 
description of the invasion.
Tacitus now turns at c.l4 of the Agricola to give a b r ie f  history of 
Agricola»s predecessors^  He mentions Aulus ELautius as the f i r s t  governor 
and OstoriuB Scapula as the second. With the latter we reach material that 
has survived in the manuscripts of the Annals. Of ELautius, v/hose time is
94
missing from the Annals, nothing is said in the Agricola except that he 
and Scapula were both distinguished soldiers. We are left to infer that 
ELautius himself was the commander of the expeditionary force. But of 
Scapula, Tacitus tells us a good deal in the Annals. To a consideration 
of this we iDw turn.
4.2. CONSOLIDATION 
31—40
In Book 12/of the Annals we are told that Scapula inherited a chaotic 
situation. The surrender of the Catuvellauni and the triumphal entry 
into Camulodunum may have had some symbolical value but the war was not 
over. The original intention may have been to "protect" the subjects of 
the dispossessed Verica, perhaps even the pro-Roman Trinovantes, as well as 
to subjugate the Catuvellauni, but military developments did not allow 
matters to rest there. If there ever were a limited objective, it became 
impossible to sustain it. During the interregnum the military position 
had deteriorated. Tacitus states that the British had decided to use this
period because they thought there would be some ineffectiveness in the
Roman command during the period of changeover, which also took place during 
the winter, out of the campaigning season. The troops might well have 
been "stood down". The Britons launched a combined attack into the lands 
of the allies of Rome. The phrase "effusis in agrum sociorum" is sometimes 
translated loosely as 'broke violently into the province* but the word 
sociorum can properly be taken to indicate the territory of client states or 
allies of Rome and not that of direct Roman rule. No doubt Rome held the 
ultimate authority but the word provincia is not used. There is no evi­
dence to suggest that the action was directed against the Brigantes 
(assuming that they were a client state by this stage). Perhaps a foray
by the Coritani into the south and east cannot be ruled out, as at least
part of the combined operation. If an area has to be found between the 
Britons who were independent and the zone occupied and ruled directly by 
Rome, then that must probably be the area of the liver Severn and the tribe 
would then be the Dobunni. They may well have taken the main weight of 
the attack. Scholars incline to think that this was the case.(12)
The narrative of Tacitus draws attention, throughout this episode, to the 
role of Caratacus. He seems to have managed to construct a grand 
alliance from among the tribes of the western mountains including the 
Silures, the Ordovices and the Deceangli. Together they made a formidable 
fighting force. He chose the right tactics for men confronted by an army 
of professionals. At first, there could be no question of a military set- 
piece. They split, instead, into a number of groups; ranging over the 
land, liberating and looting. Scapula had to react in the same fashion, 
by ordering a series of search and destroy operations to be carried out by 
the light auxilia. With energy he gradually drove back the enemy. Thus
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Tacitus is able to observe, as he does with Agricola's entry into the 
province: it is first impressions that count.
Having stabilised the position Scapula took two critical decisions;
1. he decided to disarm the provincials, and 2. to annexe additional 
territory. ®ie first decision provoked a rebellion among the Iceni.
This connexion between decision and result we infer, although as Syme 
points out, Tacitus himself does not actually make the connexion ex* .j 
plicit^ y#(13) He argues that the Roman historian did not have to do so. 
However, it is dangerous to assume that either Tacitus knew the reasons 
or that he could assume his readers knew it. We could argue, with some 
plausibility, that Scapula's alteration of the provincial boundaries 
deprived the Iceni of easy access to the free or client tribes to the 
North. The revolt, such as it was, ended in a decisive battle in which 
the Romans were victorious. The location of the conflict is not given 
but the drama of the occasion is vividly described, since it produced an 
act of outstanding heroism on the part of the governor's son. The revolt 
may not have been total or widespread since it did not warrant the termin­
ation of client-kingdom status, which continued until the death of the king. 
Having demolished the Iceni Scapula turned the North W3st, to launch an 
offensive against the Deceangli. Their lands were ravaged rather than 
annexed but at that point the Brigantes rose. Scapula turned aside to 
deal with them. The operation was successful and the tribe settled down 
again. Tie few who had taken part were put to death. Tie perfunctory 
treatment accorded to the incident inclines one to think that it was not 
regally led and that it lacked dramatic incident. We may regard it as a 
diversionary tactic designed to reduce pressure on the Deceangli* îfe.d 
Scapula succeeded in consolidating his position, once the Celtic sea was 
reached, the tribes of Wales would have been cut off from receiving assis­
tance from those of the North. Tie diversion succeeded. Scapula with­
drew from the territory of the Deceangli but brought the frontier of the 
province forward to two major rivers and then marched against the Silures. 
This entailed a radical realignment of forces. The legion stationed at 
Colchester was brought across country to face the Silures. Syme remarks, 
rather oddly, that "at first sight the Silures far to the West would seem 
wholly out of relation to anything that might happen at Camulodunum".(14)
The logistics of redeployment seem fairly clear. Scapula needed reinforced 
ments. The legion at Colchester was called forward to provide them. 
Veterans provided a reserve presence in the old base. In accordance with 
his practice of not providing petty detail, Tacitus gives us neither the 
name of the legion which was moved nor of the name of the new depot. 
Archaaology, however, makes clear that it was XX Legion end the site ms 
Gloucester. He does refer however to the establishment of a Roman colony 
of veterans at Colchester. Something that would be significant later.
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The change could have had a profoudd effect upon the Trinovantes. Up till 
then they had looked to Rome for support. Perhaps they had been pro-Roman 
to the extent of supporting the invasion. But if they looked to their 
liberation from the Catuvellauni they exchanged it for direct Roman rule. 
Their capital was the Catuvellaunian capital as well. That annexation 
was never undone. The establishment of a colony must have brought home 
to them that they had exchanged one form of servitude for another.
Webster considers that Scapula's response to the threat posed by Caratacus 
was inept. "At a stroke much of the careful diplomacy the Romans and 
their allies had developed over the previous years" was destroyed.(15)
The exsoldiers were disastrous as colonists. Tiis point he argues 
retrospectively from the history of &)udicca*s rebellion. Camulodunum 
was not the first military colony to be established. Such outposts of 
empire were not necessarily causes of rebellion. Scapula can hardly be 
blamed for not knowing at the time .he made the change-that the new residents 
would prove to be unsatisfactory. If the Trinovantes regardedgthemselves 
as the friends of Rome - as well they might - then a legionary base of 
soldiers on the active list might have been less offensive than demobilised 
men. Webster at least recognises that in malting this decision Scapula was 
facing up to another problem. Did he need more tropps for the campaign 
into the mountains? Yes. Then from where did he get them? Was it 
likely that Rome would give him a fifth legion? It was probably highly 
unlikely, since the war was supposed to have been wonj In that case, the 
troops had to be found from within the province. He therefore assumed 
that the East ms pacified and moved the only highly trained reserve he had:
XX Legion. Tiere was no choice. Significantly, Tacitus reports the 
redisposition without adverse comment either at this point or when the 
rebellion occurs later. He does criticize Roman behaviour but he does not 
attack the policy decision of Scapula.
The actual disarming of the province can hardly be considered a thoughtless 
act. Roman law was quite clear about the bearing of arms : none were 
allowed to carry any except weapons for the hunt. It may have irritated 
the Britons but on the other hand it was the first stage of any pacification, 
that must have follov/ed the conquest. Militarily it was, no doubt, an 
advantage to have a quiet hinterland before taking the offensive. If 
disarmament at this time was a cuase of rebellion later then one may argue 
that such an act could always be considered provocative and productive of 
unrest at the first opportunity.
Scapula was now ready to move out from his forward positions. Tacitus 
has told us that the governor had established a frontier of sorts in this 
act of disarmament; "Detrahere arma suspectis cunctaque castris Antonam et 
Sabrinam fluvi® s cohibere parat" or cunctaque cis Trisantonam. There is a
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difficult reading of the text here. Rirneaux prints the former because 
he thinks that it is best to print the corrupt Med.text. He appeals to 
earlier editors and this comes to mean that the river is the Avon in 
Worcestershire. However, as he states, no camp has been found - certainly 
not at the confluence of the two rivers. Nor is it immediately apparent 
that taking the Avon with the Severn makes much military sense. If there 
were a line of forts along the rivers and Cotswold hills then the word 
castellis might have been expected rather than castris. One reading 
that has been suggested is castris ad Trisantonam and to infer from this 
that the river Tern was meant. This would give a site near Wroxeter. 
However, this might be thought to place the line too far to the North West. 
Had the Ordovices been engaged at this time there might be more force in 
the suggestion. On the whole modem scholars have abandoned this search 
for a convenient river and amended the manuscript after comparison with 
other geographers. If the a of castris is replaced by ^  and the rest of 
the word and the following word taken as one proper noun then we are 
liberated from finding forts on smaller tributaries of the Severn and mark 
out a fundamental north east-south west barrier line. Ptolemy mentions 
a river trisantov.(2.3*4) This is perhaps the old name for the Trent. 
Nennius refers to it as such or Trannonus. If this be the case then 
Scapula had drawn a line along two of the most significant physical 
features of southern Britain. The Fosse Way, soon to be built, would run 
almost in parallel behind it. Militarily Scapula then had two fronts; 
the Severn on which he attacked and the Trent which he held quiescent near 
the Coritani.
The incoming governor had thus established the military position, disarmed 
the peoples of the areas of Britain so far occupied, and redeployed his 
troops. He was now ready to "occupy the remaining districts"4T6) with 
the urgency that a punitive expedition against the Silures required.
Tacitus tells us that Caratacus did not risk an engagement. He retreated 
into the mountains of the territory of the Ordovices, (North West Wales ; 
Modern Snowdonia). Here the terrain was quite different from anything 
which had faced, the Roman army before in Britain. It was more vulnerable 
to surprise attack and the lines of supply and communication were more 
tenuous. The Britons knew their ground. Tie Silures were naturally 
ferocious. They were supported by all those who feared the imperium of 
Rome, and all of them possessed a strong belief in Caratacus personally. 
Only in numbers were they inferior to their opponents. In these brief 
lines Tacitus sets the scene for a fine dramatic piece of writing that 
follows.
In the first scene Tacitus conjures with the sense of fate overhanging the 
drama when Caratacus decides to stand and fight. Me are told the way in
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which he selected ground unfavourable to the advancing Roman troops, then 
follow the exhortations to the British troops to acquit themselves well, 
while the figure of Caratacus stands pre-eminent over them all. Scapula 
is thus placed on the psychological defensive and this is confirmed by his 
appreciation of the military position. All this is off-set, however, by 
the eagerness of the Roman army to which the senior officers themselves 
respond.
We now move to the battle itself in the second scene. A reconnaissance 
is made. A general advance is ordered but the troops are repulsed and 
have to regroup. The third scene portrays the success of the second Roman 
thrust in which the British line is rolled up by the sheer weight of 
numbers moving in close fo rm ation . A great victory ensued which was 
crowned eventually by the captdre of Caratacus.
In the next "act” the scene changes to Rome, prefaced by a notice of the 
reputation of Caratacus. He personified the years of unrelenting
opposition to Roman rule. "Even at Rome his name meant something". An
oblique cut at the narrow preoccupations of a society tottering on the 
verge of decadence lÀen compared >/ith the energy of the army and the vigour 
of the native populations. Caratacus becomes the dominant figure of the 
triumphal parade. He is the man of heroic stature, rather than the 
emperor. The scene culminates in a superbly constructed speech about the 
uncertainties of fate. It is a cry for freedom in the face of Rome's 
remorseless imperialism. If any enemy deserved to die it was Caratacus; 
but his speech is brought round to an appeal for mercy; which is granted* 
There is nobility on one side and graciousness on the other.
Released by Claudius, Caratacus does homage not only to the emperor but to 
Agrippina: a shocking act which brings the reader back to the problems 
still present in the capital of the empire. Dramatically it is a most 
effective anti-climax with the pure and noble savage standing over against 
the personification of a corrupt society.
For the next "act" the scene reverts to B r ita in . We are made mare that 
resistance to aggressive forces is not determined by the spirit of one man 
alone but by the will of a whole nation. The Silures and Ordovices had 
lost a general and a battle but they had not lost the war. Mow they were 
given additional strength of will by Roman propaganda; the army would 
exterminate the Silures to a man. Their guerilla attacks were successful; 
assisted, it would seem by some carelessness within the army, which thought 
the war was over, but made worse by the dispersal of troops who were sent 
on building parties for the necessary construction of forts. Scapula 
returned once more to a deteriorating position and died in office.
Finally Didius Callus arrives at high speed only to find that the Ordovices 
and Silures had gone over to a general attack. Once more there were
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plundering raids and again the uneasy Brigantes stirred* Callus was 
occupied on both fronts* Tie initiative passed from Rome# Nonetheless, 
Callus was effective, even oh the defensive* Through his subordinates he 
stabilised positions once more and held them.
Perhaps a Roman historian was unlikely to emphasize the precariousness of 
the imperial position in Britain* If he thought and Imev; from subsequent 
events that this was a phase of the conflict and not the totality then the 
full nature of the crisis might not be draim out. Nonetheless, there was 
something of a crisis on the resolution of which the future of Rome in 
Britain depended. Webster draws attention to what is implied in the
Tacitean account. We should note that though Callus is dismissed by
Tacitus for his defensive policy, there is no account of further trouble 
in Britain for some years. Had there been serious fighting it would have 
surely found a place in the Annals. On the other hand there seems to have 
been positive policy towards the tribes beyond the frontier. Annexation 
does not appear to have been sought. The matter rested there; "a problem, 
with only part of the island securely held, and a very difficult frontier 
for the army to contain".(17)
These issues do not shine through the text clearly. Militarily Tacitus 
seems to have possessed an almost Churchillian aggressiveness. Not only 
did he believe in the expansion of the empire but in the necessity for 
offensive tactics. Tiis preoccupation disguises the actual effectiveness 
of Callus as governor* The dismissive phrase, "content to act through 
subordinates and on the defensive" actually demonstrates an effective 
method of working. The "impressive seniority" of Callus, to which 
Tacitus refers, had taught him something about handling a difficult 
position. The Agricola , for all its brevity, puts the point better. 
Callus, we are told, maintained what had been won by his predecessors and 
pushed forward a few forts into remoter areas. In view of what we are 
told in the Annals one may assume that these forts were set among or near 
the Silures. Some may have been placed in Brigantia, however, as a 
protection for Cartimandua, who may well have been in danger from internal 
opponents at this time and also needed a personal escort of Roman cohorts. 
If the governors of Britain faced intractable military problems and the 
resentments that followed from disarmament, there was, at least, one area 
to which they could look with satisfaction. Tacitus draws attention to 
it with the special and honourable mention he gives to Cogidubnus. 
Archaeology has confirmed the aptness of the reference. (I8) lAiring the 
difficulties of the first years and of those which were to come the 
Regnenses remained loyal and the route to the continent stayed secure.
The extent of the lands of the Regnenses is not entirely clear. Tie 
tribal name is not given in the text of the Agricola but is e s ta b lis h e d
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from ancient geographers. It is possible that they were a composite 
people made up of the Atrebates and other tribes of the South and East who 
were wholly or partly made over to à client king. The conduct of the 
king seems to have struck Tacitus for he draws attention to the unfailing 
loyalty of King Cogidubnus.
We have already seen the changes that had taken place in that part of 
Britain before the invasion of Claudius. The arrangements made for the 
governance, of this area of the province may well unite both a desire to 
pay a tribute to loyalty and a need to bind together groups which had long 
lived in tensions, which if they were to continue could affect Roman 
communications with the mainland. Given the dimenscns of the Agricola 
it is remarkable that Cogidubnus gets a specific mention at all. VJhat 
is, perhaps, even more noteworthy is that the reference is complimentary ; 
only at the end does a general and sardonic political comment creep in. 
Certain states, Tacitus writes (c.l4) were handed over to Cognidubnus as 
king who remained constantly loyal right down to our own times. It was 
an example of the old-established Roman practice whereby kings were used 
as tools for the enslavement of people, i.e. to Rome.
Once again the style of Tacitus does not permit precise dating. What 
constitutes "our own times"? It could be a period of twenty to thirty 
years;. The context of the Agricola suggests that the civitates were 
handed to him at a relatively early stage; perhaps once Scapula had got 
South East Britain into some kind of provincial order. But it might 
indicate that the hand-over was made by Didius Gallus. We might get some 
indication by asking when his loyalty might have been needed? One 
possibility is during the interregnum between ELautius and Scapula. We 
might think that was a very early stage during the occupation to hand over 
civitates through which ran the principal supply route to the continent. 
Furthermore, since the enemy broke into the province and into the part held 
by allies of Rome we must presuppose a high state of military disorder 
which permitted tribesmen probably from Wales to reach the South East coast 
of Britain. There is nothing to suggest such a breakdown by the Roman 
forces. The second possibility is during the revolt of Boudicca. Here 
the steady support of ad.ient king would be important. There is no word 
in either Tacitus or any other source to indicate that Cogidubnus and his 
peoples joined in the great revolt. The third possibility is that 
Cogidubnus steadily supported Vespasian during 69. This pre-supposes, in 
a general way, that the two had struck up some kind of relationship during 
the Claudian invasion when Vespasian was operating over this territory.
The interpretation of the text cannot be divorced from the inscriptbn found 
during the early l8th century. (RIB 9I) It seems to be agreed that one may 
rightly infer from the praenomen and nomengentilicium that Cogidubnus was
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from ancient geographers. It is possible that they were a composite 
people made up of the Atrebates and other tribes of the South and East who 
were wholly or partly made over to à client king. The conduct of the 
king seems to have struck Tacitus for he draws attention to the unfailing 
loyalty of King Cogidubnus.
We have already seen the changes that had taken place in that part of 
Britain before the invasion of Claudius. The arrangements made for the 
governance of this area of the province may well unite both a desire to 
pay a tribute to loyalty and a need to bind together groups which had long 
lived in tensions, which if they were to continue could affect Roman 
communications with the mainland. Given the dimensbns of the Agricole 
it is remarkable that Cogidubnus gets a specific mention at all. IJhat 
is, perhaps, even more noteworthy is that the reference is complimentary; 
only at the end does a general and sardonic political comment creep in. 
Certain states, Tacitus writes (c#l4) were handed over to Cognidubnus as 
king who remained constantly loyal right dovm to our own times. It was 
an example of the old-established Roman practice whereby kings were used 
as tools for the enslavement of people, i.e. to Rome,
Once again the style of Tacitus does not permit precise dating. What
constitutes "our own times"? It could be a period of twenty to thirty 
years. The context of the Agricola suggests that the civitates were 
handed to him at a relatively early stage; perhaps once Scapula had got 
South East Britain into some kind of provincial order. But it might 
indicate that the hand-over was made by Didius Gallus. We might get some 
indication by asking when his loyalty might have been needed? One 
possibility is during the interregnum between ELautius and Scapula. We 
might think that was a very early stage during the occupation to hand over 
civitates through which ran the principal supply route to the continent. 
Furthermore, since the enemy broke into the province and into the part held 
by allies of Rome we must presuppose a high state of military disorder 
which permitted tribesmen probably from Wales to reach the South East coast 
of Britain. There is nothing to suggest such a breakdown by the Roman 
forces. The second possibility is during the revolt of Boudicca. Here 
the steady support of a&ient king would be important. There is no word
in either Tacitus or any other source to indicate that Cogidubnus and his
peoples joined in the great revolt. The third possibility is that 
Cogidubnus steadily supported Vespasian during 69* This pre-supposes, in 
a general way, that the two had struck up some kind of relationship during 
the Claudian invasion when Vespasian was operating over this territory.
The interpretation of the text cannot be divorced from the inscription found 
during the early l8th century. (RIB 91) It seems to be agreed that one may 
rightly infer from the praenomen and nomengentilicium that Cogidubnus was
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a Roman citizen and that he received the grant from Claudius. Fhrther it 
seems to be implied that he was given senatorial ranli and in that position 
was made legatus Augusti. There is, however, no precedent whatsoever for 
such an appointment. Indeed it seems almost inconceivable that Claudius 
should Imve conferred such a status upon a British king, however loyal and 
cooperative he had been. An examination cf the inscription shows it to be 
damaged at this critical point and there is a good deal of restored wording 
required in order to produce the necessary formula together with the 
unknown abbreviation of rex to E. There is no precedent therefore to 
suggest that this restored reading is correct. Ibr example, not even 
Herod the Great for all the service he gave to Rome ever became a legatus 
Augusti.
There is a somewhat better case for getting the damaged section to read 
rex magnus. Tiis is both a Greek and a Latin title; though the latter 
seems to be far less generally knovm. The Greek usage indicated a 
monarch who ruled over more than one kingdom. This would agree with the 
statement of Tacitus and perhaps might be preferred to the more received 
tradition. But when.Tacitus writes Cogidubno regi does he mean to 
Cogidubnus the LCing, or to Cogidubnus to be king over, or to Cogidubnus 
in his capacity as king? Preference must be given to the second possibil­
ity. The fact is that all authority was dependent authority as far as 
client kings were concerned (and indeed as far as legati were concerned as 
well). If Cogidubnus were a king before the invasion he was only one after 
it because Rome confirmed the status. If he were a member of a royal 
house that had no significance for any right of succession. Were he to 
succeed to the family's domain it could only be because Rome appointed him, 
or allowed that form of succession. There was no hereditary divine right 
of kings here.. It seems inconceivable that he was chosen at random to 
rule not over one state but many. If he were ruling as king he might have 
been confirmed in his own realm like the king of the Iceni but to add to it 
must have been an act of government policy. There is precedent for scions 
of royal houses being given asylum at Rome as there are also precedents for 
them to be educated there. If then, for one reason or another, Cogidubnus 
had lived in Rome and been educated tie re as an exile from the Atrebatic king­
dom and royal house he might well have been well-equipped to be the instru­
ment of Roman indirect rule.
Thus, though many details and dates are hidden from us, the inscription 
BIB 91 confirms the words of Tacitus. Cogidubnus was accorded special 
honours and recognition in the Roman empire of the first century. What he 
actually did to deserve them we cannot know; but he was clearly well-known 
for his unshakable loyalty to the imperium and the ruling houses; for this 
he was thought to warrant special mention in the Agricola %, which allows for
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only one hero. Since there is no reason to date the inscription RIB 91 
before the rule of Vespasian and as he did not spring from a line of 
deified emperors, the inscription might be datable to the reign of Titus 
and therefore the governorship of Agricola. 3h view of all this one might 
conclude that there was some special bond between Cogidubnus and the 
Flavians, which had been forged, perhaps during the invasion itself, but 
within the context of a devoted loyalty to Borne which Claudius saw fit to 
recognize, in a way which might appeal to one who was both a scholarly 
student of the constitution and occasionally eccentric. The date of his 
death is also unknown; but it might be that the appointment of a legatus 
luridicus about the time of the governorship of Agricola might be connected 
with it. Clearly the client kingship did not continue. The territories 
were divided up into civitates, on the customary Roman model. This work 
combined with the administrative and judicial work which was necessary 
while the governor was campaigning in the North might seem a reasonable 
justification for the appointment, together with the stated policy of 
Agricola to "civilianize” and "Romanize” the province. But this is to 
anticipate events. Gallus was succeeded by Veranius who is mentioned in 
the Agricole merely as a name of the governor who succeeded Gallus and 
thus Tacitus proceeds to Suetonius Pauliinus who was to use the talents 
of young Agricola. The Annals contain little more about Veranius, since 
he died in office within a year. Tacitus seems to have underestimated the 
role of flattery in seeking to preserve the family fortune from the 
grasping hands of Nero. However, there is some significance in another 
part of his will, in which he stated that had he been spared for another 
two years he would have presented the emperor with the province. The 
phrase 'two years' was to be taken up later in the governorship of 
I^ ullinus, but when added to the one year during which Veranius was in 
office it means that during the normal period of a governorship he expected 
to carry out his assignment.
Tacitus comments that during that short tenure of office he merely harried 
the Silures with a few raids of no great significance. Perhaps when a man 
brings no results to fruition there is a tendency to underestimate him, 
especially if history is conceived of as consisting of innumerable bio­
graphies. Nevertheless,^ little investigation will show that neither
Veranius nor the statement made in his will were without importance for 
the province.
First of all he \^ as a man of capacity who had behind him a distinguished 
career. (19) Tiberius had selected him for responsible work at the first 
opportunity and Claudius had accepted this estimate of his abilities.
There is part of an inscription surviving in Rome on which it is stated 
that Veranius did not seek the post of governor of Britain (as Gallus had
sought for a province). Thus we may assume that Nero and his ministers 
had selected Veranius. This decision could well be associated with the 
policy decisions about the province which the unsatisfactory position in 
the island had made necessary. To this time may be placed the obser­
vation of Suetonius that Nero had once considered abandoning the province 
but then thou^t better of it. If the Romans were to stay in Britain, 
under what conditions were they to remain? What was the policy to be 
written into the mandata of the new governor, vih^ the government thought 
was the right man to carry them out? Britain was to be held, not 
evacuated; and not merely held, but brought more completely under Roman 
control; and the first step required was the elimination of the running 
sore on the western frontier* If Veranius was campaigning against the 
rilures within a year of his appointment, we need not doubt that he was 
putting his instructions into effect. In his will he told the emperor 
that he could haVe done it within the normal time span of a governorship 
if only he could have lived. We should be wary of thinking that the 
phrase about handing over the province meant the conquest of the whole 
island. At first slgÿht it seems to indicate that the province was in 
revolt and needed subjugation; but this, as we know, was not the case. 
Gallus had been dealing with the Silures, Veranips followed him but 
Paullinue proceeded against the Ordovices. The aim seems to be clear: 
the conquest and occupation of the western highlands (modern Wales).
Tlie revolt of Boudicca forced its suspension a little later but not its 
abandonment. It was, however, to be JJa close run thing”.
4.3. CRISIS IN BRITAIN
Veranius was replaced by Suetonius Paullinus. The treatment of his
/
governorship in the Agricola" (c.l6.) is somewhat longer than that which is 
usually accorded to one of the predecessors of Agricole; possibly because, 
under him, the hero of the book commenced his military apprenticeship.
As the Annals make clear (14.29.), Pauliinus was a general of considerable 
military distinction; one who had marched his troops across the Atlas 
Mountains of North Africa, in Mauretania, to seize his enemy's area of corn 
supplies, A tactic which he was to employ in Britain against the Bilures 
and the Ordovices.
The Annals might be read in such a way 6s to conclude that Paullinus made 
an immediate attack upon Anglesey. The Agricola*., however, clearly 
implies that he did so only after t\/o good years of campaigning. Here 
Tacitus has picked up the lament of Veranius in Annals 14.29. that had he 
been spared for two years more he would have settled the province.
Paullinus got these two years and after them faced not peace but an 
unprecedented rebellion. The dating of events in the Roman world is not 
without difficulty and the actual chronology of Boudicca's rebellion is one
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of them* Tacitus does not give enough information to be precise.
Scholars can make an intelligent guess. The generally agreed date is 
60.(20) Hov/ever, it is more important for our purpose to grasp the 
sequence of events, rather than their chronology. Tiie distinction 
between chronos and Icairos made by theologians is a useful one, of
service in such matters for it points to the significance of events in
other
relation to each /rather than to the supposed significance of them located 
precisely in clock time.(21)
There is some evidence available which can make us consider afresh the 
balance of the story presented by Tacitus. Our previous interpretation 
of the governorship of Veranius was held to indicate that a clear decision 
had been made by the central government to settle the problems posed by 
the tribes of western hills once and for all by a policy of annexation.
This meant the final subjugation of the Silures and Ordovices. The 
culmination of the thrust, which this entailed, was the assault upon 
Anglesey. Tacitus states that this was a centre of refuge for all those 
who had taken refuge from Rome. Webster argues a strong case for regard­
ing the island as the ideological base of anti-lOmanism.(22) He sees 
behind the resistance of Caratacîus and the various tribes associated with 
him a concerted and consistent opposition to the Romans. VJhile we are 
unable to accept this argument in full ^ archaeology has clearly shovm 
that extensive offerings were ruade at shrines and sacred places on the 
island which appear to have come from various parts of the mainland.
From this we mi^t infer that it v;as an area of cultic importance. (23)
Again the description of the reception given to the Romans when they made 
their assault upon Anglesey draws attention to the place of the Druids on 
it. Whether the black-robed women had any place in the cult is, perhaps, 
doubtful but the next phrase is emphatic : "Close by stood Druids, raising 
their hands to heaven and screaming dreadful woes".(Annals 14.30.) There 
is no reason to doubt this particular role; but defending a sacred area 
was quite different from the overall direction of an anti-Roman pplicy, 
sustained over two decades through a coordinated command structure. 
Certainly it seems to be at variance with Roman perceptions of the nature 
of British opposition. Vihat struck them was the piecemeal nature of 
resistance. For lack of unity they were picked off one by one.
A rather different argument has been adduced by Richmond, who having 
drawn attention to the tactics of Eaul/inus in î^ auretania suggested that 
fee planned an operation of the same kind in North West Wales. (24) The 
enemy was to be subjugated by a long march at the end of which his source 
of food and reinforcements was to be destroyed* Anglesey was the base for 
the Ordovices. Bauliinus marched on it. However, milifery historians
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might ask whether any one campaign can be taken as the replica of another, 
ïhrthermore, does an army march through miles of hostile territory and 
ignore the enemy? Unfortunately we cannot reconstruct the military 
appreciation, which Paul^ inus made, of the position. Nor can we re-enact 
his tactics; but his overall strategy seems clear enough. The Ordovices 
were to be conquered once and for all and that meant marching to the very 
limits of their domain.
Tlie Anna!n describe the preparation for the attack, the actual assault 
and its success. Attention is drawn to the destruction of the Druidic 
sacred groves. The rebellion of Eoudicca follows on immediately, being 
explained directly as the result of plundering by Roman officials carrying 
out the will of the dead king of the Iceni. Their client status came to 
an end. With them rose the Trinovantes, who , though they may once have 
looked upon the Romans as their friends, now bitterly resented the 
presence of a Roman colony in their midst. The presentation in the 
Agricola is rather different. The attitude of the Britons is conveyed 
by means of a soliloquy. But both presentations emphasise that there had 
been bad conduct by the Roman officials. They draw attention to a history 
of exploitation. %e Agricola", however, specifies the general motives 
which the Britons had for fighting, even harking back to the days of Julius 
Caesar. We should be prudent if we were to take this as a rhetorical 
construct from the pen of Tacitus who imagines how he would have felt had 
he been British. The Agricola and the Annals both assert that Britain 
as a whole rose in rebellion and not just the two tribes upon whom interest 
was focus, ed.(25) %e offence offered by the presence of the Roman colony 
is mentioned as well as■ the bad behaviour of the colonists themselves.
Both accounts draw attention to the brutality of the British towards their 
prisoners, though it is to Dio Cassius that we must look for the gruesome 
details. Tacitus, with his customary disdain of the sordid, eschews them.
As one might expect, the account in the Agricola is more generalised than 
in the Anna! «1 but it contains the valuable statement that unless Eau^inus 
had acted speedily the whole province would have been lost. The gravity 
of the position is explicitly referred to, whereas in the Annals, with its 
concentration upon particulars, the readér is left to infer the precarious­
ness of the position. In neither account is there any reference to the role
of Agricola himself. This is not surprising. He was far too junior to
exercise any independent command. Everything is concentrated upon the 
generalship of Paullinus himself. However, Tacitus does draw attention to 
the general lessons which accrued to Agricola from this experience.(c.5» 
Agricoles.)
The general pattern of the Roman reaction seems clear. Dio Cassius tells 
us that Paul/inus set sail from Anglesey. Webster infers from this that
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he proceeded to Chester and galloped post-haste to the south East. "He 
would have felt the urgent need to see for himself the extent and nature of 
the revolt." "He would have alerted all the units he passed along the road 
and arranged for supplies for his army which was following on foot at a 
steady twenty miles a day slog."(26) He reached London before the Britons. 
Because he suffered from an inferiority of numbers he evacuated it. Shis 
is taken to mean that he did not yet have the army with him and thus a 
speedy and courageous action was required. It is then assumed that he 
retreated north westwards presumably because it is inferred that he was now 
moving back to meet his oncoming army and because the Annals in a single 
sentence tells us that Veralamium suffered the same fate as London. This 
is written after the withdrawal from London has been described. The 
argument then continues by stating that the critical battle which sub­
sequently took place was located in the midlands because this was the 
direction in which both general and army were moving. A rendez-vous some­
where in that region would be the most convenient place to meet and also 
receive reinforcements from the Ilnd Legion based on Exeter. This plan 
was marred by the refusal of the officer in command to move. Since he was 
praefectus castrorum, the number three in the legionary command structure, 
it can be argued that the legate and his deputy must have been with 
Paulllnus and therefore commanding vexallations of Ilhd Legion^  in the 
Anglesey campaign.(27)
Erere deals with the rebellion in shorter compass than Webster but has 
Eaul/inus speeding south with his cavalry, while the infantry follow.
The praefectus castrorum of Ilnd Legion is said to have found the responsi­
bility of obeying the governor’s orders too much for him. Richmond summar­
ises the literary evidence ,fn much the same way. E.G. Cbllingwood does not 
commit himself, in any way, about the site of the last battle.(28)
Within the compass of this account we meet again the old problems of dealing 
with the Tacitean text; the absence of any definite time scale within the 
annalistic presentation and the absence of any locality that can be identi­
fied with certainty. At the same time it would appear that modern writers, 
seeking to make vivid this episode for which - at last - there is literary 
evidence, easily fall into the temptation of fine writing. This is a com-, 
bination of Dio Cassius with Tacitus married to their general knowledge of 
Roman history and archaeology. Since the latter must concentrate upon 
states rather than events, literary sources give the historian the opportunity 
to enliven the account with both movement and character. There is no other 
way to proceed. The result is plausible but is it history? The dictum of 
Mandell Creighton about the picturesque must apply here: "Where ae do not 
know we cannot safely invent."(29) The modern historian cannot go beyond 
the literary and archaeological evidence. If he does then the imagination
107
of the ancient historian is as good as any other*
Therefore we shall do well to note what Tacitus writes and what he has 
omitted* In the Agricolar he informs us that Eauliinus came hastily to 
the rescue of the province. In the Annals he writes that Paulllnus 
marched undismayed through dsaffected territory to london. But Dio 
Cassius tells us that PaulAnus having heard of the rebellion sailed from 
Anglesey.(LXII.7.) Some historians have preferred Dio to Tacitus here for 
the drama of this departure. It has conjured up the image of the hero 
reacting decisively and moving quickly to retrieve the position. After 
this his cavalry are placed alongside him, since it seems obvious that he 
would not travel without adequate safeguards. But this is an inference, 
as is the statement that he would want to see what had happened»^  No 
source states that he did go ahead with his cavalry or that he reconnoitred.
(30)
We may try another approach. VJhat was the first information that came to 
Pauliinus about the rebellion? He was told that there was trouble but he 
did not know how serious it was. While that may have been true of the 
first despatch, may we not assume that there was further military intelli­
gence? As it came in would it not have been possible to build up a picture 
of the actual situation in the province? If he learned that IX Legion had 
suffered serious casualties, he could hardly assume that he was being 
summoned to deal with a "little local difficulty". Surely he did get to 
knov; about the legion’s defeat? VIhen Ilnd Legion never responded to his 
orders, the position was critical. Did the praefectus castrorum acknow- 
ledge his orders and refuse to move? Or did he sit still in silence 
throughout the war? We must also consider the intelligence that might well 
have come in from other sources, which indicated that there was unrest of 
some kind, whether passive or active. The supply of military intelligence 
is as plausible a hypothesis as any of the others. We m^ assume that the 
governor was provided with despatches at various intervals. Would this not 
qUickly disabuse him of any idea that this was a small scale problem?
Tacitus indicates that ï^ ulifinus knew that he was marching through hostile
/
territory: i.e. that the rebellion was taking place where he was and not in
some other part of the island. There is enough material here to agree with 
Dio’s observation that Paullinus would have preferred not to fight. î'îay 
not his food shortages be related to this general hostility with which he 
was surrounded. (LXII.8) One may start to understand at this point why the 
governor’s vengeance was to be so severe. He had inadequate forces, he 
stood on the defensive, his supplies were doubtful and he was surrounded by 
a disaffected countryside.
If, then, one can assume despatches being sent to the governor, they should 
have built up a picture of the rebellion for him and thus we can now ask
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whether the general officer in charge would detach himself from the only
significant force he had at his disposal (the troops he had marched to
Anglesey) by riding many miles ahead of them in order that he might see
for himself? He might well have proceeded more circumspectly* But, on
the other hand, he might have dashed ahead in a manner worthy of Cerialis
himself! We might then think that this kind of action was premature;
even rash. Because he galloped off gouth the additional intelligence that
came in may have been slow to find him* If he were located, on the dramatic
dash theory, he could have been travelling as fast as the despatch riders.
At this point, perhaps enough has been set down to indicate that the move- 
/
ment of Baullinus to the South could have been more deliberate than a good 
story would like to assume.
Next, the fall of Verulamium could have taken place either before dr aftgr 
the fall of london. Tacitus merely wrote that it suffered the same fate 
as london. Having described the pitiful evacuation of London, perhaps the 
one centre that his readers would recognize, he did not wish to repeat him­
self. The position of london in the sentence may well be related to know­
ledge of its location, rather than to the status of Verulamium of which 
readers might well have been ignorant. Here perhaps is some geographical 
precision that those who think Tacitus vague might appreciate. The 
sentence structure is related to that rather than to chronology. But if 
Verulamium did not fall after london that might weaken the argument for 
considering that Pai^inus was moving North %st to meet his infantry. 
Ihrthermore this argument assumes that the rebels were acting substantially 
as one army, and not as a number of marauding bands. The Annglb explicitly 
draws attention to the general plundering and looting that took place in a 
great many places. Perhaps it is not out of order to say that rebellions 
often have a chaotic nature in which at least initially guerilla warfare 
takes precedence over set-piece confrontations, until the government can 
bring the insurrectionists into an organized conflict. Here PaulXinus was 
able to do what the British found difficult with the Americans in the war 
of independence; and which the Americans could not do with the Vietcong.
In order to do this Paullinus had to retreat from London.
Perhaps we may attempt not to put together an alternative to the generally 
received tradition found in the current books on Boudicca’s rebellion. It 
may be as plausible; it is certainly as picturesque in Creighton’s defini­
tion of the term. The alternative picture is that having heard of the 
rebellion Paullinus moved off to deal with it. The fact that he alone is
mentioned by Cassius need be takdn as no more than a personification of the
/
response. Pauyinus and his army moved off from Anglesey, by degrees, to 
respond to the rebellion. To sail from Anglesey is merely to cross the 
Menai Straits. The despatches coming in made it increasingly clear that
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there was a general uprising as well as a particular one among the Iceni 
and Trinovantes. Paullinus may not have understood why this should have 
been so, but Tacitus writing after the event makes it clear that there was 
general resentment over Roman rule. The Iceni were badly handled by the 
procurator’s officers and the Trinovantes deeply resented the colony and 
the colonists in their midst. !-toving forward into the south East, but 
not necessarily out of reach of his main army, Paullinus not only received 
further intelligenbe about the extent of the rebellion but also saw vîith 
hiw own eyes the state of affairs in the territories through which he 
passed. If the Iceni and Trinovantes were the main dissidents, he might 
naturally have thought that he should move towards East Anglia. On the 
other hand London was the administrative and commercial centre - possibly 
the wealthiest place in the province - and to it the erratic movement of 
the rebels might have been expected to tend. If London were lost then 
ï^ uljfinus’s conmunications to the continent and Rome itself might well be 
threatened. South of the river he had the Eegnenses led by the totally 
loyal Cogidubnus. They were, however, no fighting force equal to contain­
ing the onslaught of the rebels. He could always retreat into their 
territory until he could regroup or summon up reinforcements. On the other 
hand he could regard the area Svouth of the Thames as safe enough so as not 
to require his presence in order to preserve them within the province.
For the Ilnd Legion to join him in the South E/ast was perhaps no more 
difficult than to join up with them in the midlands. The DC Legion could 
be ignored on either count, since until reinforcements were drafted to it 
the survivors had little military significance.
Thus where there ##>literary sources available one must beware first of 
conflation and then of imaginative exegesis. If we seem rather critical 
and indeed cautious about this it is because there is so much to learn from 
Biblical criticism in examining texts. We dare not be naive with the 
sources. Tacitus clearly wishes to convey to the reader the severity and 
suddenness of the rebellion. The explanation of it in the Agricoles is 
rhetorical and must be treated as such. The explanation in the Annals is 
much more matter of fact. The latter is preferable to the former from the 
point of view of a historian and on that basis the whole episode must be so 
treated.
Webster maintains that Cerialis may have been authorized to act at discre­
tion since "the probability is that his responsibility was to protect the 
rearviard areas while the bulk of the arcty was in a forward position".
That is not unreasonable but it is not immediately apparent how DC Legion 
scattered in camps in the Peterborough area (assuming that it was not 
stationed together in Lincoln) was protecting the rear of an army in the 
extreme North west of Wales. Yet, if we remember that there had been a
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revolt among the Iceni some years before, we may not think it implausible 
that the troops were stationed nearby in case they were needed to maintain 
the position of the King Prasutagus. After his death, quite fortuitously, 
they were on hand to attempt the rescue of their beleagusred colleagues.(3?)
The whole of DC Legion was not mauled, Webster continues for "It was not 
usual in Britain at this time to have complete legions in their fortresses; 
the headquarters and first cohort occupied forts of 20-25 acres, with other 
cohorts or auxiliary units." Assuming this to be the case with IX Legion 
Webster also assumes that Cerialis *s well-known dash applied here. "Had 
he been more cautious, he would have collected together a reasonable force 
to deal with the insurgents. Instead of this he took the men he had, some 
2,000 legionaries and auxiliary cavalry and rushed down to Colchester. He 
probably had the first cohort and possibly t\‘/o others from the Ninth Legion 
and a unit of 500 horsemen." The Britons had foreseen such a move and 
ambushed him. "One could guess it was twenty to thirty miles from 
Caraulodunum in wooded country suitable for a surprise attack."(32) Once 
again this is plausible but it goes some way beyond Tacitus, as the 
principal literary source. One need not doubt the archaeological evidence 
which indicates that Roman troops were stationed in a number of camps but 
it does not follow that Cerialis failed to gather appropriate forces before 
he marched on Colchester. Tacitus does not write that part of IX Legion 
was sent but that the IX Legion was despatched led by the Legate. The 
Britons could have achieved total victory over the whole legion. "Such 
infantry as it possessed were massacred, while the commander escaped to the 
camp with his cavalry and sheltered behind its defences.(33) If it is 
argued that the size of the reinforcements sent later is related to the size 
of the force despatched to Caniulodunum, we may also plausibly argue that 
the number of reinforcements required was related to the casualties sustained, 
which is not necessarily the same thing. To have troops massacred can be a 
dramatic way of referring to heavy casualties, without actually meaning total 
anihilation.
The marriage of Tacitus, knowledge of the army, and archaeological evidence 
can bring the rebellion vididly to mind. Tne whole story moves towards its 
climax and within a definite location both in time and space. However, the 
narrative of Tacitus moves in the same fashion but without the same kind of 
detail and chronology. We must move back once more to a consideration of 
what Tacitus wished to convey to us. There are different strands. First 
there is the iiony. Veranius had asked for two more years to succeed and 
it was denied him. Paul^nus got two years and was faced with an unpreced­
ented rebellion. Second', though the portrait of him is somewhat different 
in the Histories(3^ ), here he is presented as the rival of Corbulo in 
military skill, even if the comparison might have existed only in popular
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talk. He was caught in a difficult position from which he extricated 
himself with great skill after one legion was defeated with a heavy loss 
of life, and the other refused to move to his assistance. He had no 
reserves left on which he could fall hack. There was only the force he 
had used for the conquest of Anglesey. There is hardly any legitimate 
comparison between the reduction of Armenia and Anglesey, in geographical 
terms. If, however, the conquest of Anglesey is seen as the summation of 
two years hard campaigning among the tribes of North Wales, the comparison
seems more credible. Third, the gravity of the insurrection is impressed
/
upon us. "Had not Baullinus learned of the disturbance in the province 
and come quickly to the rescue Britain m|ght well have been lost."
(Agricola. 16.2.) The extent of the destruction, the loss of human life: 
and the barbarities of treatment are presented to the reader. î&anwhile 
we see his plans. The seriousness of the decision to evacuate London is 
described but in terms of a military appreciation of the position, such as 
one might have expected one of the viri militares to malce. His numbers 
were too small to risk a conflict. He would move out. He had been able 
shortly after this to increase his strength to about 10,000 men and decided 
to attack. That again showed military judgement under pressure. , His 
ability to choose his ovm battle field displayed skill (at least in the mind 
of the reader). He won a great victory. We are left to infer that 
generalship of a high order had saved the day.
Tacitus then moves on to the difficulties that followed the collapse of 
British military opposition. Though the Ilnd Legion appears to have 
joined the main field force it appears as though the army was dispersed once 
more, once the reinforcements from Germany had arrived, in a series of 
’search and destroy operations’. Famine was endemic both from these 
ravages and from the Britons’ neglect of agriculture. Tacitus states that 
because of the war they had omitted to sow their crops. "This", writes 
Webster, "sOems unlilcely for any people so dependent on agriculture, whether 
they won or lost". (35) It might have been argued that the plundering, final 
battle and subsequent military repression in fact prevented them from harvest­
ing the crops, but when the seeds should have been sown it can be argued 
the rebellion load not started.
The Agricolar makes no reference to the difference over policy that marked 
the end of the rebellion. Tacitus merely writes that the defeated Britons 
feared the governor on the grounds that he took the rebellion as a personal 
affront which he was not prepared to forgive. He terrified them in defeat.
As a result, they would not surrender but maintained such hostility as they 
could. The war was over but they would not cease from resistance. The
Annals reveals that the policy of the governor was total vengeance. But it
is set alongside another perception of the requirements of the province.
lid
which originated with the Procurator, Catus Decianus, who had been in office 
at the time of the rebellion and who was, at least, in some measure respon­
sible for it, had fled. He was replaced by Gaius Julius dassicianus. 
Tacitus gives the impression that he was on bad terms with I^ ulllnus before 
this and worked against him and the "national interests". We are told 
what he is reported to have said but it is not clear to whom. It might 
have been hard for him to speak freely to the Britons. What we may have 
here is the kind of policy that he advocated amongst the Roman officials: 
conciliation and if that seemed difficult to implement then wait until 
there was a change of governor. He reported to Rome that the war would 
never end unless there was a change of policy. How one may readily believe 
that relations between the two men were strained on that account, even if 
there was no personal animosity before they were yoked together in Britain., 
Paullinus, no doubt, sent his reports to Rome. dassicianus we are told 
posted his, in which he advocated a policy of conciliation. The result 
was as might have been expected, when two parallel jurisdictions have 
different aims: an emissary was sent by the central government to malce an 
independent assessment, reconcile the two officials and pacify the province 
which had caused Hero so much trouble. Tacitus’s gorge rose at the pros­
pect of an imperial freedman, once more, in a position superior to senators 
and equestrians, but we cannot help but note the effectiveness of the work 
of Polycf4tus. In effect he found for the Procurator. Tlie army was stood 
doim and after a suitable interval the governor brought back to Rome.
Nothing is said of any rewards that were given to him for the success of his 
campaign, though there are some grounds for thinicing that Pau^ finus returned 
to honours. It is often assumed that he left under a cloud but this in 
fact may be both true and untrue. His policy may have been rejected but 
the r^ ilitary success he had achieved could not be denied.
It is at least arguable that the position had developed beyond military 
,considerations* Tacitus was to make much of Agricola’s appreciation of 
the need for conciliation and pacification, on his entry into the province, 
and, further, of the need for terror followed by the offer of peace in the 
course of his campaigns. Iii fact Agrida carried on the policy advocated 
by dassicianus. However, these considerations seem to be subordinated, 
once more, to the more typical Tacitean pre-occupation with the ungenerous 
attitude of the princeps towards, at least, his senior servants.
An attempt has been made to show that Hero was in fact appreciative of the 
work of Pad4inus. (57) The argument hinges primarily on the manner in 
which Hero reckoned his tribunician power. There is a choice between 15 
October and 4 December 54. lUrtl^ r, account has to be taken of salutations 
’awarded’ to the emperor. Tliere were two of these between 2 July 61 (dat­
able from a diploma) and October/December 62, when the eighth period of
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tribunician power came to an end. Ih addition, a lead tessera shows that 
Nero distributed a congiaa.‘um o r donative in the name of Suetonius Paullinus. 
Therefore, the argument continues, one of the salutations must refer to the 
victories of Paullinus in Britain.
The drift of the argument affects the dating of the revolt of Boudicca. 
Granting that the diploma, already referred to, is datable to 61, one 
should also note th a t there were suffect consuls in 61. This is signifi­
cant when related to the phrase of TUcitus referring to Petronius coming 
as governor to Britain and "qui iam consulatu abierat". The matter was 
noteworthy because there was something unusual about it. Tlie colleague 
of Petronius as ordinarius consul d id  not arrive in Armenia until 62.
Why should the nature of this departure from the consulate be mentioned? 
had Petronius followed the same course as his colleague there would have 
been no point in mentioning the subject. The problem of getting a solu­
tion in Britain exp lains the phrase. He was sent there quickly. There­
fore the re b e llio n  took place va. 60, and Petronius arrived in Britain some 
time in 61. There are almost too many events to fit into 61 unless the 
argument is accepted!
Now the argument reverts to the later time. The eighth salutation of 
jbro could not have been proclaimed in ignorance of the suppression of the 
British rebellion. A complete victory had been v/on. The salutation 
could, then, have been associated with either the victorious campaign 
against Boudicca or in recognition of all the victories sustained in 
Britain, during the entire period of Paullinus*s governorship. The salu­
tation coUld still have taken place after the hostile report of dassic- 
ianus, the observations of Polyc Utus and the appointment o f P etron ius.
If this is the case, then the Tacitean text needs to be supplemented.
The donative may have been issued a f te r  Paullinus returned to Borne. This 
would exp la in  why Nero w aited , until after the final victory, to assume 
the eighth salutation, because he wanted Paullinus w ith  him. One should 
bear in mind that the tessera not only had the name of Nero on it but also 
that of Paul Anus, together with the symbols of victory. We may also note 
tliat Tacitus never refers to any public statem ent which might have explained 
the re tu rn  of Paullinus. Nor does he suggest that either the reports of 
dassicianus or of Polyclitus were made public. And, finally, he does not 
suggest that Paullinus could not finish the war. However, "Tacitus lends 
credit to this pretext to the extent of accepting that British belief in 
Suetonius® intransigence did prolong their resistance and yet describes 
Suetonius* achievement as restoring to its former obedience a province that 
would othervase have been lost".(38) But this occurs in A gricolat (c.l6) 
rather than the Annals. Tlie government could, in fact, have maintained 
both views. They are not contradictory. Nero could well have honoured
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the general, relieved him and abandoned an aggressive policy in Britain*
The first point fits in well with his sensitivity to senatorial attitudes; 
the second with an attempt to conceal conflicts in the high command; and 
the third with pressure not to lose what daudius had achieved. Altogether 
it was a way of putting a brave face upon a disaster in Britain, except of 
course, that it did have a happy ending.
finally one might accept that in the Agricola^  there could not be two 
heroes. Once again we must realise that the account of Britain before 
Agricola, in the biography, does not aim to bring before us the biographies 
of others who preceded Agricola but to convey the position that Agricola 
inherited and explain how it came about. Though a procession of names 
passes before us, the text is actually problem centred. If there is a 
deficiency, the Annals is its location. The section devoted to the 
rebellion ends on diminuendo rather than crescendo! Tlie narrative falls 
away quickly and quietly into the removal of the governor, on some matter 
connected with ships. Dramatically it is effective. The reader is 
quieted for the commencement of the next section, after the excitement of 
an excellently conducted campaign, combined with the spice of conflict 
between high officials in the aftermath. TaciWs too has a taste for 
the picturesque! He does not write that EauTlinus received no recognition 
for his work. There is merely silence. The suppression of the rebellion, 
the inauguration of a fresh policy and the departure of the governor close 
the episode*
rOrhapB one might also bear in mind that by the end of the campaign 
PauAinus had completed the basic three year tour for a governor. Tlie 
successful completion of a military campaign, that had embraced much of the 
province, preceded by two years more localised but successful fighting, 
was not an inappropriate time to relieve one who had borne the burden and 
heat of a very heavy day. On the other hand, the more sceptical might 
conclude that the phrase which informs us tliat he was recalled for not 
terminating the war could have been true in the qfes of the government.
Perhaps orders were not directly disobeyed, after the array had been 
ordered to stand dovm, but it is possible to allow or encourage an army 
to behave provocatively even when offensive operations are not permitted. 
lîîkullCnus held his views as sharply as dassicianus adhered to his, this 
kind' of behaviour also becomes plausible in the attempted reconstruction 
of events. Webster states, and perhaps rightly, that PaullinuB had 
dedicated the province and the rebels to Mars Ultor for vengeance.(39)
This action suggests a deep commitment to a certain form of behaviour by 
the army, and follow-up in policy. Both the governor and his troops 
could well have thought that they had much to avenge. They could have 
carried out their intentions, even if they were denied full-scale military
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operations. It is at least arguable that Paullinus was too personally 
committed, in the conflicts in Britain, for him to initiate a fresh policy 
that looked for pacification and consequent development. There was a 
real dilemma for the government: how to change policy and demonstrate 
appreciation for sterling work by one who could not make the change.
Nero had sufficient motive for striking the name of Baulfinus along with 
his own upon the tessarae. Recognition for PaiüAnus could v/ell have 
been more than a sop to sensitive senators.
The section of the Annals has been subjected to severe criticisms on 
military, political and literary grounds. Militarily because it is held 
to be vague in dating, location and sequence;(40) politically because it 
does not do justice to the government and literarily because evidence is 
suppressed. The question of the status of Tacitus as a military histor­
ian has already been dealt with. Having taken the observations into 
account and having read the description of the rebellion we may agree that 
the text presupposes an author who was familiar with the military movements 
and informed about the stations of the legions. One may conclude that the 
criticisms are not well-founded. Those who have been critical of Tacitus 
on this point do not seem to have taken account of the difficulty he faced 
in giving precise locations, which could have meaning to his readers. 
Anglesey is mentioned; so is London and Verulamium, too. Colchester 
finds a mention in the story. If the site of the final battle is obscure 
it may well be because it was nowhere in particular in the Roman reader’s 
mind. There were no map references to be given. The physical lay-out of 
the battlefield was more important than its actual site. It cannot be 
said that the description of the terrain is vague. The lie of the land is 
directly related to the tactics employed by ïUulMnus and>the description 
has been sufficiently precise for Webster to h^ard an informed guess as to 
its location. "It is difficult, as one searches the terrain on the stretch 
from Wall southwards to find a place which closely fits this description by 
Tacitus. There is, however, a distinct possibility at îtocetter, where 
a ridge of old hard rock runs in a north-westerly direction converging on 
^ Watling Street near Ather&stone... It is still possible to visualize a 
number of possible defiles which open out to the river plain through which 
Watling Street runs,"(41)
Some historians do not consider enough the nature of insurrections. They 
are often disorganized, chaotic in development and expression. The central 
government often finds it hard to discover what is going on and the attempt 
to organize events in some kind of orderly sequence proves to be quite 
impossible. The nature of rebellions, also, causes problems for the 
historians who would describe them, for a coherent expression of their 
course presents them with grave literary problems. Tacitus opts for
'rib
giving an impression. This action fits in with what he considers will
engage the attention of the reader. It is easier to convey the ’feel’ 
of a rebellion by these means rather than by some form of narrative history. 
Only with considerable powers of hindsight, allied to certain preconceptions, 
can a sequence of events be established. Sometimes there seems to be a 
feeling by historians that a straightforward campaign should have been 
fought, with no "side-shows", so that they could present their readers 
with what actually happened. Unfortunately human affairs do not v^ways 
operate in that fashion and Tacitus recognises it. He should be allowed 
some credit for trying to convey events as he understood them. In the 
days of Msramsen viar was a comparatively orderly business, conducted by 
professionals on agreed terms. Rebellions do not have that nature and 
neither does guerilla warfare.
Tile political charge rests, at least, to some degree, upon a misunder­
standing of the position of the governor. We are no longer dealing with 
a republican type of governor, who either had or took carte blanche.
Bich of our analysis has accepted the possibility that there was a govern­
ment policy about Britain. This is held to account for the appointment 
and subsequent campaigning of Veranius, to which Ibiu^ idnus was heir by 
virtue of the untimely death of his predecessor. The legati Augusti pro 
praetore were not free agents to do as they wished. The importance of 
their mandata, received when an appointment was taken up, should never be 
under-emphasized, even though we have no copies of them. Nor should we 
forget possible mutations of policy, occurring during the course of a 
governorship, as a result of changes in provincial situations, as described 
in legatine despatches and government responses to them, correlated to the 
domestic politics of the capital itself, and the situations obtaining in 
other parts of the empire. Organizationally there must always be movement 
between the poles of principle and ad hoc responses. We should be in 
error if we assume that policy only altered with the change of governors; 
but we could assume that a change of governor could be made if he were 
either unable or unwilling to make the changes thought to be necessary by 
the central government. We use the fiction of a resignation in political 
life^, The Roman and British armed forces relieved officers of their com­
mands. They had to accept responsibüity for cariying out what was thought 
to be necessary. It does not follow that a personal adverse judgement was 
made about an official who was not thought appropriate for the task. He 
may well turn up later in another appointment, as we see in the case of 
Paullinus who became one of the senior advisers of Otho during the year 
69/AD.
Tacitus does not assign external blame for the rebellion, as does Dio 
Cassius, with the reference to the loans called in by Seneca (42). The
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whole thrust of his narrative, in both the Agricola and the Annals, 
seems to demonstrate that Britain was ferox provincia. Perhaps the 
calling in of loans supplied $he spark but the fuel was ready for burning. 
The conduct of Roman officials, bringing a client kingdom to an end, 
seems, to him, to have been the principal cause of rebellion. Paullinus 
is not blamed for the insurrection but the role of the procurator is 
censured. The policy of the governor, after the final victory w m  - 
achieved, was clearly a problem for both the government and Tacitus 
himself. The dissension to which this contributed removed the possibi­
lity of ending that section of the Annals in a blase of glory. Within 
the context of policy the abilities of the retiring governor had a bitter­
sweet quality about them, which could not be explained, perhaps, without 
distorting the proportions of the narrative. Thus, while the political 
criticisms of Tacitus may be diverted, the refutation of the literary 
critique is more difficult, because, once more he commits himself more by
innuendo than by fact. Yet, as we have seen earlier, the former may
leave as sharp an impression as the latter. The account closes with 
what appears to be an ungracious action by an unappreciative government, 
over some trifling naval incident. Yet it might be quite otherwise: 
a major policy disagreement over the treatment of Britain, made worse by 
some provocative military behaviour, by a force viithdravm from offensive 
military operations, which happenod^ito coincide with the expiration of 
the governor’s normal term of office. If this were so, then the end of 
the term offered an honourable way of escape for a government anxious to 
change direction but also acknowledge its debt to one who now opposed 
their policy. VJhat should the historian do, since he must select as 
well ^  present? Tacitus chose to omit the dismissal honours awarded to
Baullinus and drew the section to a close with a certain chord of
dissonance. That we may regret . morally as some falling away from 
telling the whole truth; but it does not detract from the value of the 
sources for the History of Roman Britain. Indeed it highlights a 
difficult problem in its history: should Britain be pacified? And if
so, how should it be accomplished? Whereas at the time of the appoint­
ment of Veranius conquest seemed to be important, especially of those 
areas to the West, where the terrain afforded protection to the Britons, 
now the near disaster of Boudicca’s rebellion had demonstrated the need 
for a different approach. The provinces as a whole must be settled and 
a total concentration upon the Western frontiers avoided. Both the 
central government and a succession of governors were to be occupied 
with these issues. Not until the days of Agricola would both policies 
come to some sort of harmony and fruition.
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4.4. PACIFICATION
The government had made its intentions clear: Britain was to be pacified.
The aggressive policy initiated by Nero, with the appointment of Q.Vera­
nius, was brought to a halt. There was to be a reversion to the earlier 
daudian programme of limited occupation. The arrival of Petronius 
Turpilianus personified the change at the highest provincial level. His 
seniority and the swiftness of his arrival, within a year of his consulate, 
demonstrate both the seriousness of the situation and the determination of 
the government.(43) He was not4 however, the only significant official 
on the scene. The Procurator, Julius dassicianus, who had argued for 
a policy of conciliation, presumably, remained in office during this 
period. He was himself a Celt who had married Pacata, a daughter of 
Julius Indus - a leader among the Treveri - a man who in his day had 
quashed a rebellion of his tribe against Rome. Thus, both in himself 
and through his matrimonial relationships dassicianus represented a 
breadth of sympathetic e3q>erience greater than that of many a metropolitan 
Roman official. He knew the benefits of conciliation. Now his success 
with the central government gave him the opportunity to administer his 
office according to his insights.
dassicianus finds no place among the literary sources for the pacification. 
Tacitus in the Agricolai emphasizes the role of the new governor as the 
reconciler in the province. Turpilianus was less inflexible towards the 
rebels than his distinguished predecessor, he writes, because he had not 
been the victim of their atrocities. As a result he did not take their
insurrection personally, as Paullanus had done. His approach to govern-
/ment was more moderate, even milder. He dealt with the issues handed over 
to him. How he did so Tacitus does not tell us. Tlie details are foreign
to his purpose. It would have been enough for him that the tribes were
brought back to their loyalty, the famine alleviated and the army placed 
in a more relaxed posture. V/e should not underestimate the magnitude of 
this achievement, even though Thcitus does not draw it out. The brevity 
of the reference should not disguise from us the importance of the work. 
(Annals 14.39. Agricola 16.3>) The absence from the Tacitean text of 
references to disasters, friction between officials and his usual astrin­
gent comments must indicate a reasonable degree of success, within what 
must have been a relatively short space of time. (Turpilianus was Curator 
gquarum at Rome in 63 AD.) His withdrawal after two years suggests, in 
itself, a satisfactory piece of work, from which a highly experienced 
official might safely withdraw.
Tiough Turpilianus does not seem to have undertaken any military expeditions, 
it was only to be expected that Ms administration should have been
undramatic. He had to quieten the province. For that he deserved well
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of the government. Appreciation was shown. He was Curator in 63 and 
received dn a me n fa Triumphal ia in 63. His close association with the 
levers of power was finally shovm when in 68 he was murdered as a friend 
of Nero. (Annals 14.29.; 13*72. Histories 1.6.37*)
Tacitus tells us that his successor, Trebellins Maximus, continued the 
same policy. He was not a prominent military figure, and this is not 
without significance, for it demonstrates the continued determination of 
the government to avoid further military adventures and develop the 
resources of the province instead. This steady movement into the paths 
of gentleness is obscured by the attitude of Tacitus towards the policy 
itself, and by the common translation of the word segnior which he applied 
to Maximus. (Agricola 1. 16.3*) lu current translations this appears as 
d^eficient in energy* or ’less energetic’•(44) Grammatically the terms 
can hardly be faulted but segnior ought to be understood with a phrase in 
the same sentence: comitate quadam curandi provinciam tenuit. These
words describe the style of Maximus’s administration. There was indeed 
an element of affability in his rule, even gentleness; comitate will bear 
these nuances. This, too, should be taken as an expression of policy.
The government had renounced sever!tas, for comitas. Pacification and 
development could hardly be achieved by a harsh, unsympathetic, punitive 
approach. Once the army had ceased its operations, the final submissions 
could be arranged in a different political climate. Thereafter a period 
of repose was surely needed so that crops could be tended, livestock reared 
and the ordinary course of commerce resumed. Peacefulness of atmosphere 
was a pre-requisite of success. The government had taken the first and 
crucial step by changing its policy towards the Britons. VJhat was then 
needed was time for prosperity, morale and confidence to rise. The 
governor needed to prosecute a policy of positive masterly inactivity!
This is what segnior should be held to mean. The word is more related 
to policy than it is to personality, even though the two need not be 
incompatible.
If this is true, then it follows that such a policy predates the rule of 
Agricola, which Tacitus was to emphasize later. Though the whole matter 
is dealt with in a dismissive manner it is nonetheless important, both for 
the province and for the status of Agricola. Behind the change of 
governors in 61.AD lay a determined policy of urbanization and sociali­
zation into Roman ways. This was continued after 63. Agricola in 77/78 
» was the heir to the policy not its initiator. (45) The change, however, 
may have been irritating to the army, which found itself playing a different, 
less aggressive role.
Of this policy Tacitus appears to be critical. He had far more sympathy 
for the "military solution". Yet it might be thought from the way in
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which he has handled the material that he was not at ease with the retribu-
/tive punishment handed out by Pai^inus. He does not specify vitiis 
blandientibus (pleasant or winning vices). This is less significant than 
the term itself which indicates a relaxation of atmosphere, with the,con­
sequent turning away of all parties from martial pursuits. Tacitus 
cannot speak well of these things because at a later stage he will be 
presenting Agricola himself as the initiator of such a development. Yet 
in the passage (Agricola .c.21.) there is the same contenptuous attitude. 
Simple, hardy, noble people become corrupted by these practices: "the 
promenade, the bath, the well-appointed dinner-table". They constitute 
not culture but enslavement. Rome binds the spirit and induces decadence. 
Tacitus is inclined to toy with the concept of the ’noble savage*. Some­
times he seems to think that the adoption of culture in its various forms 
had, in fact, undermined the character of the Roman people themselves, who, 
in their concern for private pleasure, forgot the public good, and so let 
in the principate.
At the same time one must also notice the bellicose attitude which he 
evinces from time to time. VJhenever there is a choice, he seems inclined
to support war. But the rebellion of Boudicca caught him out. The
/military quality of the actions of ïhullinus could not be gainsaid but 
war did not achieve its result even though it was crowned by success. The 
defeated peoples would not surrender. They feared it more than continuing 
in a hopeless conflict. On the other hand, with Ms general outlook, 
Tacitus could hardly welcome the alternative! In the best style of 
rhetoricians, caught in a trap, he covered his confusion both by complain­
ing about the use of imperial freedmen and by denominating the peaceful 
pursuits characteristic of Roman society as vice. It may have been 
effective in salons but it was unjust to the properties of the situation.
We have some indications from archaeology which enable us to see that the 
pplicy was not without success. In 66, XIV Legion was withdraivn from 
Britain. Thus reduced, the garrisons were rearranged. Cornwall was 
probably occupied at this time, so that there was no front to be maintained 
in the south west. Exeter could then be freed to become the tribal 
capital of the Dumnonii. Ilnd Legion moved to Gloucester and thence to 
Usk. XX Legion took over at Wroxeter. Tlie redeployment was well done 
for the concentration of troops facing the Welsh hills was not significantly 
diminished. The position was to be contained not relaxed. Tliere is some 
evidence to show that a permanent fort was built at Old Burrow to watch, 
across the v;aters of the Bristol Channel, for infiltrators or worse. 
Ihrthermore, the site at Uslc shows signs of being built up as a supply base 
for a major offensive against the resilient Bilures.(46) The civil war 
within the body of the empire put an end to this. Offensive operations
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may have been possible theoretically, but the involvement of the armies 
in making and unmaking emperors must have had a debilitating effect upon 
those who were concerned with higher policy. A governor, during such a 
time of troubles, could hardly avoid feeling insecure himself, since it 
was not easy to avoid taking up a posture towards the candidates. It was 
60 easy to back the wrong one. He might even be a claimant himself.
The legionary legates could not avoid involvement, either, if only to a 
lesser degree. The lower ranks might have had little perception of 
policy but be possessed of a keen eye for booty. Donatives from compet­
ing candidates often sounded well but payment was not sure, as Galba’s 
troops were to find out. Loot from a successful campaign conducted by 
themselves brought more certain rewards to the troops.
Could the Silures, therefore, be ignored? They were still militant.
Even if they had been periodically defeated, they had given Rome almost as 
much as they had taken. The Ordovices might, also, be restless still. 
However, with the death of Nero and the subsequent disturbances, Tacitus 
implies that Maximus pursued a policy of ’wait and see’, by desisting from 
large scale operations. The army, however, became restless. Erere is 
probably right in seeing the complaint of Roscius Coelius, of XX Legion in 
this context. The legate alleged that the army was in a despoiled and 
impoverished condition. (Histories 1.60.) Birthermore, Tacitus relates, 
Maximus had earned the contempt of the army by his miserliness and greed.
The attack can be understood as a complaint from a force frustrated of its 
booty since 61. The change of policy, indicated by the arrival of 
Turpilianus, denied the troops their full haul of plunder in the waice of 
the rebellion. The absence of a campaign against the Silures denied them
a second time. TTiere is nothing to suggest that ï^ ullinus did not have
the support of the senior officers and of the rank and file in his dedica­
tion of the campaign to Mars HI tor. Now he had gone and been replaced by 
men of a civilian style, and temperament. The aggressive treatment of the 
rebels had given way to softer ways. The army found that it was divorced 
from active duty* There could have been a problem of morale. The men 
needed activity to maintain it as well as discipline. The v/ork on the 
Western frontier could have been just enou^ to keep up their spirits.
The advent of the civil war and the abandonment of offensive operations 
might also have been enough to precipitate a crisis. Inactivity led to 
lawlessness. The legate of XX legion had already a feud with the governor, 
which ante-dated the arrival of both of them in Britain. A confused 
position grew worse. There were rumblings of mutiny, followed by a general 
loss of control. The governor had no means of asserting his authority for 
the implementation of his policy. The troops would not accept it freely. 
Recrimination followed at senior officer level. The Agricola conveys the
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situation well. Everyone, we are told, remained in office but each went 
his ov/n way. At least there was no bloodshed. In the end, however, 
the situation deteriorated to such an extent that Maidmus abandoned the 
province and took refuge with Vitellius. The various regiments, including 
the auxilia and the cavalry, had gone over to Coelius, so that the 
governor’s position, de facto as well as de jure became intolerable.
Tacitus was, no doubt, correct in asserting that the dissensions between 
the Legate of the XX Legion and the governor prejudiced the discipline of 
the army. They may haee been personal and of long standing as Tacitus 
suggests, but, at the same time, they could also embody differing views 
about the role of the aray; differences that could have been present, in 
varying degrees since the suppression of Boudicca. The strained atmos­
phere of the civil war brought these two things to a head. In the midst 
of these personal and policy differences we should note that the govern­
ment's policy of conciliation had started to bear fruit. Even the civil war 
was itself, in a way, was a blessing for the province. Since Britain was 
not directly involved it ensured a further period of repose for the people 
of the island and enabled the process of recovery which had commenced v;ith 
Turpilianus to continue. The development of a new way of life required 
time. Such profound bhanges need years even for the most modest of 
fundamental changes to be made. The more time there was, the better were 
the chances of new centres of living becoming established. As the civil
war went on and Vettius Bolanus arrived to replace I^feocimus, the new
governor was able to continue (intentionally or unintentionally) the 
policy of quiet recovery. That it did succeed we can see both from 
archaeology and from the fact that many decades were to pass before war­
fare swept through the southern part of Britain again.
As elsewhere, the mind of the army in Britain was turned towards imperial 
politics. Though it constituted one of the main army groups, the troops 
in Britain were on the side lines. There was insufficient wealth in
Britain to ogive it economic leverage in the power struggle and the troops
were, also . too remote from the main field of struggle. Nevertheless, they
constituted one of the main fighting forces of the empire, because they
had been involved in almost constant fighting. Perhaps they were the most 
battle hardened men of the whole army. In that sense they were an asset 
to whomsoever they gave their allegiance. Since Maximus repaired to 
Vitellius, he took the.opportunity afforded him of appointing another 
legate to the province. He might not have much control but he could 
prevent the influence of others becoming dominant*
How Vettius Bolanus came to be with Vitellius we do not know, but Tacitus
may not have done justice to him. He makes no adverse comment upon the 
character of the new governor. There are not even innuendoes. To
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Tacitus he was a decent man who won the affection of the troops* He was, 
however, too gentle for such a savage province. However, we might think 
that in view of the position which he inherited that Bolanus did rather 
well. There was a certain security and recognition of authority in the 
attitude of the army towards him. It was at least the first step towards 
the reassertion of control. We may infer that Bolanus was accepted for 
himself; but in the circumstances of the time - when there was no certain 
emperor - there was not much else which could be personified. In the 
absence of a central authority the acceptance of somebody because of tl%B 
personal attributes is not without its value.
If in general terms an expansionist policy was unlikely in Britain because 
of the emergency and the previous policy of the Neronian government, it 
was made more certain by the withdrawal of troops from Britain, at least 
in 69, when XIV Legion was absent. The withdrawal was made permanent in 
70. The replacement legion, II Adiutrix, did not arrive until 71»
Bolanus thus inherited a reduced force, whose numbers were not to be made 
up for sometime. Hence we may think, as we did v/ithMaximus, that the 
words used by Tacitus of the governor, though they may be personally 
correct, have greater relevance in relation to policy. (Agricola<'^ 8.1.) 
Bolanus evidently knew the nature of the province to be ferox for when 
Vitellius asked for more troops in Borne he replied that he felt that 
Britain had never enjoyed total peace and could not be regarded as a peace­
ful country. (Histories.2.97*) As Tacitus suggests, he may, by then,have 
been doubtful of continuing his support for Vitellius, but there is not 
only truth in his reply but recognition of the realities of his position 
in the province. In these difficult circumstances he may have conducted 
some operations against the Brigantes. Some forts may also have been 
built, as Statius indicates in his poem. Even if he did nothing more than 
that, he demonstrated military effectiveness in the frontier area where 
there were long-standing problems. Since nothing further is heard of 
military discontent, these actions might have been enough to satisfy both 
officers and men. The activity also gave him a valid reason for not 
identifying himself further with Vitellius, whose star was commencing to 
f actO *
During this period when the army had been restless, troops had been with­
drawn, and the position of the governor weak, the troubles of Brigontia 
may have flared up once more. This was almost certainly the occasion 
upon which Venutius overthrew Cartiraandua, who then appealed to the 
governor. His ability to respond, as we have Been already, was somewhat 
limited, but a force of infantry and cavalry did get through to her rescue 
if not to save much of the kingdom. (Histories 5*46. ) The fort at Brough 
on Humber and the 30 acre fort at I4alton may date from this time, as part
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of a policy designed to turn the flank of the Brigantes, by garrisoning 
the territory of the Parisii, who may have feared their powerful, unstable 
neighbours. If so, Bolanus may be credited with using his reduced 
establishment to good effect, thus showing that the poet's words were 
neither bereft of meaning nor the mere conventional description of a good 
general.(47) However, the operation has to be seen as a response to a 
situation rather than the taking of a fresh initiative.
Overall, therefore, we must conclude that the same policy of containment 
which had marked the rule of his tv/o predecessors v;as continued by Bolanus. 
Any change during this period would have been most remarkable and inherent­
ly unlikely. Rome,was the problem not the British tribes. Tacitus may 
complain of inertia against the enemy but that was inevitable. Throughout 
the Agricola' he maintains an offensive posture and is impatient of any­
thing that detracts from it. Nevertheless, Tacitus was right to designate 
the province as ferox even if he was wrong to attribute weakness to Vettius 
Bolanus himself• -
In some ways, from a literary point of view, the frustrations of Tacitus 
in the face of this policy are aggravated by the presence of Agricola 
himself in the province as a legionary legate. Throughout the Agricola > 
he is presented as the fighting general but here he seems to be firmly 
placed in a policy cast in a different mould, but one where he was effec­
tive, as Tacitus paradoxically points out. Agricola, he tells us 
(Agricola 7. ) passed over to the Flavian side in the civil war as soon as 
it was known that Vespasian was making a bid for power. Galba had used 
him during his short reign to conduct an enquiry into the misappropriation 
of temple treasure, which had taken place after the great fire of Rome.
(A man of praetorian rank was suitable for such an investigation.) Galba 
came and went. Any chance that Agricola might have adiiered to Otho was 
possibly extinguished by the brutal murder of his mother, to whom he was 
probably closely attached, and by the looting of the family estate by 
Othonian troops. His inheritance was thereby much reduced by this 
barbarism. There may also have been another factor which bound him to 
the Flavians : his relationship with Titus, Vespasian's eldest son. Tliey 
may have met during the rebellion of Boudicca when Titus could have been 
sent across to Britain with the reinforcements despatched from Germany to 
malce good the losses of the British campaign. Agricola was on the 
governor's staff. Only at this point does it seem as though their paths 
could have crossed before the events of 69. If this is so, and assuming 
a friendship or rapport between them, the immediate adherence to the cause 
of Vespasian is explicable. At the same time, the attitude of Domitian, 
the younger brother, to Agricola when he retired can also be explained. 
Whatever policy considerations there were, personal factors could well
125
have played a part. Agricola was one of his brother's men. He disliked 
his brother and very probably those who were his followers.
After using him to raise levies, and with the Vitellian governor still ih 
post, Mucianus (Vespasian's agent in R)me) sent Agricola to Britain as 
lemtus legionis of XX Legion. The fall of Vitellius, the absence of ' 
further pretenders and the arrival of Vespasian in the capital brought 
the civil war to an end. Order, discipline and stability were now. 
required in both the empire as a whole and the army in particular.
Agricola, however, found himself serving in a province where the authority 
of the governor had been sustained only by his personal attributes, rather 
than by his power, and commanding a unit whose previous leader had made 
the position of the last governor intolerable. Tacitus wrote that he 
arrived as successor simul et ultor. Ultor is a strong word; but 
Coelius does not seem to have been affected. He made the transition into 
the new regime very well* He became consul in 81. It is, however, a 
striking word. The interest of the reader is engaged. Tacitus can then 
follow it up with much more moderate material. The text makes clear that 
no punitive regime was instituted. Agricola, secure in the support of the 
new government, commanded troops who must have known that there was no­
v/here else to go and thus he simply assumed their loyalty. Tacitus admires 
the self-restraint of his father in law but if ever there was a time for 
moderatio rather than disciplina this was it. MDrale needed to be restored 
as well as discipline if XX Legion was to be an effective fighting force. 
Expediency was needed as well as a sense of honour. He draws attention to 
the flexibility of Agricola in working with Bolanus, besides the necessary 
deference that ought to be accorded to a senior officer. Agricola, we 
are told, restrained his ardor; and this we may translate as choler as 
well as enthusiasm. He may well have been obliged to check his desire 
for revenge or punishment. Bolanus seems to have been strong enough to 
ensure that. In fact this conduct for which Tacitus praised him was not 
dissimilar to that of Bolanus for which Tacitus criticized him! In fact, 
what he has shown indirectly is that both men were capable of acting on the 
extant realities of the position in which they found themselves rather than 
merely by means of general principles.
If, however, Tacitus thought that the historian should have a talfe to tell 
of stirring deeds executed by men of principle and talent, he was to have 
sufficient scope for his purpose in the years that followed the civil war 
when policy decisions were made which were to have a major effect upon 
Britain and his hero.
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5.1. THE BRIGANTES
The Brigantes have featured fitfully in the previous narrative. They 
will appear more significantly in the period now to be dealt with and this 
means a more careful examination of the tribe.
There is general agreement about their territorial area. It is thought to 
have extended from the Mersey-Humber line to perhaps a little north of the 
Tyne-Solway. The relief from Birrens in Dumfriesshire (RIB 2901) seems to 
indicate that the tribe occupied at least part of South West Scotland.
The region is a large one, for any tribe to maintain a close identity.
South Lancashire was a considerable area of marshland; the Pennines ran 
through the area like a spinal column; and the Lake District was both 
inaccessible and mountainous. The Eastern side of the Pennines possessed 
more favourable country and a better climate. We might expect from this 
condition that the tribe broke down into a number of sub-groups, some of 
which, at least, may have had their own names, like the Setantii of the 
lyide (Lancashire). The Parisii are not reckoned, however, as part of 
Brigantia. Both their name and culture are thought to indicate a separate 
identity. Nonetheless, a certain caution should be exercised. It seems 
paradoxical that the Setantii separately attested should be regarded as 
part of Brigantia while the Parisii on the East are not. If the Regnenses 
had been created from among the Atrebatic kingdoms, the Parisii could also 
have been a distinct grouping which was given separate status after the 
Roman occupation - for the same reason: control of the native population 
with a system of checks and balances.
A confederation made up of clan groupings which constituted one tribe or 
ci vit as would explain certain features of their history, with which we 
shall have to deal. However, the acceptance of this pre-supposition is 
not without difficulty. How ought a tribe to be defined? IVhat is a 
tribal sub-group? These are questions which a historian may ask of an 
anthropologist. Ethnic unity may be constituted or assumed; or there may 
be a sense of belonging; or there may be a dominant aristocracy which 
rules over different disparate clans. Such an elite may be either 
indigenous or foreign. In either case, they could be considered as an 
extended royal house. The tribe may, then, have possessed a number of 
chiefs who made up a tribal council over which a paramount chief presided. 
This supremo would be chosen periodically from among those qualified to 
lead. There was not likely to have been a system of hereditary right for 
the eldest child. Tribal opinion, especially among ;the chiefs, about the 
suitability of people to be leaders would be a more important factor.
These features may explain not only the emergence of Cartimandua but also 
the opigin of the problems she faced, for the resolution of which she called 
in the Romans (1).
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The min centres of pôpiû.ation seemed to lie in the lowland areas rather 
than in the hills. Birneaux has suggested that one meaning of the tribal 
name could, however, be the ’hill men’; but geography does not really 
support this appellation. He did suggest another meaning; the *free men*. 
G3iis title might fit in with their general attitude towards Borne and their 
relatively loose tribal structure.(2) If this is, indeed, the meaning of 
Brigantes, they might have thought of themselves as a kind of 'free 
Britain* beyond the rule of BorneJ Were this to be the case, then one can 
only conclude that their imaginations were remarkably detached from the 
political realities amongst which they lived. However, it is possible 
that hill men has something to do with height and thus they might be 
called the high people, in the social sense; the overlords. In that 
case, there is a hint of their possible confederate tribal structure.
Tacitus does not present the tribe in any of these ways nor does 
Cartimandua appear in his pages as a sort of constitutional monarch 
presiding over a tribal council. For him the Brigantes were a large 
tribe, ruled over by a Queen, both of whom required the persistent atten­
tion of Rome.
We are at some disadvantage in our studies because it seems clear that 
Tacitus mentioned the Brigantes and the dealings of the Romans with them 
in those parts of the Annals which are now lost. TIcie surviving passages 
may well pre-suppose explanations which were given earlier. îhrthermore 
our difficulties are compounded by Tacitus’s ov/n admission that he has 
departed from his annalistic method in his treatment of the events in 
Britain.
It has been inferred that the Brigantes had some kind of treaty relation­
ship with the Romans from a very early stage. VJhether Brigantia was a 
client kingdom is perhaps more doubtful. Tacitus never says so; though 
he might have done so when they were first mentioned. Even so the term 
might have occurred appropriately later on. Cartimandua is never referred 
to as a client queen; only as queen regnant. However, we should remember 
that any ruler who was amicus populi Romani was by definition a client, 
as the Romans used the teim. What does seem clear is that the Roman 
authorities felt themselves to be under an obligation to support Cartimandua 
whom they regarded as a friend of Rome. After all she handed over 
Caratacus to them after he had fled to her after his defeat at the hands of 
Scapula. It was, however, against the Romans that the Brigantes rose as 
soon as he campaigned against the peceangliQud seemed to be reaching the 
Celtic Sea. The attack seems to have been a diversionary tactic aimed 
at keeping contact with the tribes then under attack. VAiether it was a 
general tribal uprising seems doubtful. The Romans seem to have taken no 
action against Cartimandua. Hence she may not have been involved.
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Perhaps it was carried out by a tribal sub-group. The few trouble makers 
were executed; the rest of the people were pardoned. The general style 
of the treatment does not suggest either a break in the alliance or a large 
scale attack.
dearly, as the Roman array campaigned against the tribes of the Welsh hills, 
the governors had an interest in maintaining friendly relations with the 
tribe on the northern frontiers of the province. But this need not pre­
suppose a client kingdom. Nor does it seem obvious why a tribe in the 
North of England should surrender to a military force well nigh two 
hundred miles away during the daudian invasion. The notion of a treaty 
of friendship is a better solution, probably negotiated soon after the 
lines of the province had been drawn by Scapula, for then there was some­
thing approaching a common frontier. At the same time Cartimandua may 
well have wished to involve the Romans in her cause as part of her policy 
to strengthen her position among the tribal leaders. One might even ask 
whether she ruled effectively as queen over all the tribe? Her issue of 
coinage may be interpreted as an assertion that she was indeed queen 
regnant. Her recognition as paramount chief clinched the matter, for her 
if not for her opponents, who were probably local chieftains.
The Roman offensive into the North West might have rendered her position 
unstable. The suggestion is that refugees from the invaded areas had 
withdrawn northwards into Cheshire and South Lancashire. Even exiled 
chieftains might have been taken into the Brigantian tribal system. None 
of them would be well-disposed to Cartimandua’s pro-Roman policy. The 
Brigantian attack to which Tacitus makes reference was likely to have 
originated among such recent immigrants. The tribe as a whole was evident­
ly not affected nor was the position of Cartimandua. She displayed her 
affiliations when she iianded over Caratacus. Scapula’s action may well have 
strengthened her position within the tribe. It certainly demonstrated the 
strength of her allyj
later the tribe was again torn by internal dissensions. Cartimandua was 
then in conflict with her husband Venutius, whom she had probably married 
as part of a dynastic plan to maintain both her own position and that of 
her family. Again she had to be rescued. Ihe incident displays what 
seems to have been the precariousness of her position and also the lengths 
to which the provincial government was prepared to go in order to maintain 
her in power. They evidently knew that her opponents would be their 
opponents. The value of this support was displayed during Boudicca’s
rebellion. The Brigantes never moved. No doubt Cartimandua, like
Cogidubnus, was anxious for the successful emergence of ïtoman supremacy 
from this conflict.
So far we have covered ground that has already been referred to in earlier
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passages. We have attempted to fill in the relevant details in those 
places where the absence of the text of the Annals denies us more 
accurate and first-hand knowledge. We now come to events which affect 
the stage we have reached in the history of the province, but which, it 
is also clear, may not actually have taken place in 69 AD. (Annals. C.14. 
29-57*) the Histories (5*45*) Tacitus tells us that Cartimandua
divorced Venutius in favour of Vellocatus. Clearly this was one more 
stage in the attempt to undermine Venutius and the influence he repres­
ented among the Brigantes. Vellocatus was his armour bearer which might 
not have been the humble post it sounds, but rather the designation of the 
client in chief. Tlis might well have split the Venutian group, and con­
vulsed the royal house. Cartimandua had to be rescued once more but it 
would seem as though, at the very least, she lost a substantial part of 
her kingdom. Venutius was largely successful. Tacitus admits that he 
was the ablest of the British leaders, after the capture of Caratacus; 
but he was persistently anti-Roman. The imperial government had a war 
on its hands, since it had steadily supported the defeated queen, who had 
now been supplanted as the de facto ruler of an unstable state. We 
cannot, however, be sure about the divorce’s date. Tacitus may well have 
been running together events again, which had occured over a long period.
The divorce and the coup it implies might have taken place a considerable 
time before 69*AD. (Annals.12.40.) The resultant war could have dragged 
on if it had not been won by the year of the four emperors. The civil 
war prevented any large scale action, but as we have seen, Bolanus might 
well have been able to conduct a successful holding operation, with the 
rather meagre resources at his disposal. The stage was set for Pe tillTius 
Cerialis and for Agricola himself, when the Flavian dynasty had established 
itself. As Richmond has aptly remarked, if Brigantia could have been a 
stable buffer state the conquest of the North might have been unnecessary; 
but no other dynasty caused Rome so much trouble, in Britain, and nowhere 
was the issue so great. Response to that situation changed the nature, 
character and garrisoning of the whole province.(3)
5*2. FLAVIAN EXPANSION
Before the advent of the Roman civil war the Neronian government had been 
faced with serious frontier problems on the West and North of the province. 
They were contained rather than dealt with during the rebellion of Boudicca 
and the subsequent policy of pacification. The Ordovices and the Silures 
had been defeated on more than one occasion without being thoroughly 
crushed or annexed. The Brigantes were particularly unstable and their 
queen, politically, was accident prone. None of these tribes could be 
considered an attractive prize from any point of view. They had little
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wealth and the Brigantes, at least, subsisted on a pastoral economy.
By the time of the civil war we learn that the army had become restless.
It believed itself to be in a despoiled and impoverished state. (Histories 
1.60.) %is may well have been a comment about the loss of booty.
Overall the discipline and morale of the forces had clearly suffered.
This could hardly have meant anything other than a diminution of their 
effectiveness. Ihrthermore the possibility of continued dissensions, or 
at least mutual suspicions within and between units, as a result of the 
civil war, cannot be discounted. The conventional response to such 
military problems always seems to have been realistic manoeuvres if war 
was not to be had. The temptation to find a pretext for conflict is 
sometimes overwhelming. Better the Brigantes than a season of artifici­
ally contrived training for the improvement of military morale and 
fighting capacity.
However that may have been, there was now a different emperor and with 
him a fresh policy. Vespasian had himself been legate of the Ilnd Legion 
in Britain during the daudian invasion. He may well hkve thought that 
Nero and his advisers were wrong to call a halt to the advance after the 
Boudiccan rebellion. The problem ought to be dealt with once and for 
all. The natives of the northern and western highlands ought to be 
reduced, occupied and ruled so that they would remain quiescent ever 
after. Such an aggressive policy did not contradict the process of 
Romanisation that had been encouraged after the departure of Pauliinus; 
since this vms related to the more settled part of the province which 
needed to be pacified and developed. There such a policy had been pro­
secuted for virtually a decade and seemed to be bearing fruit. There had 
been no rebellion, for example, while the troops were preoccupied with the 
events of the civil war. The Midlands, South and South West might well 
be regarded as more secure than at any time in the past. The army could 
face the frontiers with a high degree of security behind it. Finally, if 
officers were to be appointed to senior commands who actually knew some­
thing of the troubled areas, they would themselves be quick to appreciate 
positions which could lead to danger. Agricola who had been on the staff 
of Pfeullinus was already in post as legate of the XX Legion. The 
governorship went to Betillius Cerialis, who had been Legate of IX Legion 
during the rebellion of Boudicca in which it had suffered heavy casualties. 
At first sight the references to Cerialis are wholly complimentary. He 
belongs to the series of great leaders v/hc feature in the rule of the 
Flavians. (Agricola ,c.17.) The various references in the Annals are more 
qualified and circumspect. The fact is that he was probably the son in 
law of Vespasian, through the marriage of the emperor’s only daughter,
Flavia Dcmitilla, who was, almost certainly, dead by the time these events
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took place. During the civil war he had received high command partly 
because of his connexion with the Flavians and partly because of his not 
inglorious military career. Here is a hint that Tacitus did not think 
too highly of Cerialis but felt obliged to watbh his language. Hie word 
which Tacitus seems to use in order to characterize Cerialis is te méritas, 
for which the Ihglish word dash would be a charitable translation.
Precipitate or ill-considered actions might be the ordinary meaning of 
the word. Cerialis is often depicted as arriving late on the scene, 
suffering a set-back, lacking authority over his troops and even acting 
thoughtlessly. (Histories 4.78|;79l5 * 1 5 * &22. Annals 14.52.) He is 
associated with a whole vocabulary of defeat. His victories are often 
attributed to chance factors., Hie A g r i c o l a perhaps not unnaturally, 
leaves the reader thinking that the successes of his campaigns were really 
due to Agricola (and perhaps the other legionary legates.) His successes, 
moreover, are not always followed up effectually. ’‘Tacitus did not like 
this man. In fact he loathed him."(4) Nhy this should be we do not know.
It may be associated, in some way, %fith the Q.Betillius Rufus who was 
consul in 83 AD. He might well have been the son of Betilius Cerialis 
or even Cerialis himself enjoying a third consulship. In either case, 
it seems clear that the family enjoyed the favour of Domitian. Thus 
within the Flavian party as a whole, if Agricola were associated with 
Titus, then Cerialis would be close to Domitian. That was enough to 
ensure an unsympathetic treatment. In addition, because of his previous 
appointment, he may well have been an adviser to Domitian during the 
German expedition of which Tacitus disapproved. Agricola himself might 
have held the same view since it deprived him of troops and detracted from 
the gloria won in the Caledonian campaign.
Little of this comes through in the Agricolao. Here all is set fair for 
brilliant campaigns led by great generals leading brave troops. Together 
they banished the native hopes for freedom. Within the overall purpose 
of the Agricola Cerialis is important because he was the governor under 
v;liom Agricola served as legate of XX Legion. Hie governor’s offensive 
gave the rising praetorian scope to carry forward his career. Clearly 
the nev/ government had made up its mind to initiate a new policy, for it 
did not lie within the discretion of a governor to treat his province as 
a personal fief where he might act at will. The mandata were determin- 
itive. The speed with which Cerialis threw his army into the attack 
reflects the clarity of the government’s appreciation of the position and 
their resultant strategy. The incautium of Cerialis gave them their 
energy. He went into action immediately and against the Brigantes.
The XX Legion was involved in the campaign. Cerialis used Agricola at 
his own legatine level and then as his capacity was both proved and improved
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he was moved up in the command so that he led more than a single legion.
This was a particularly important aspect of ’training on the job’. Those 
who were, in some fashion, viri militares had to look for such opportun­
ities of enlarging their experience, since it was essential for those who 
held the highest positions to know how to command a combination of units. 
Agricola got his chance under Cerialis to complete his military education.
The description of the campaigns in the Agricola; is necessarily brief.
The result of them was great success, even thopgh the nature of it is not 
immediately clear. Tacitus writes magnumque Brigantium partem aut 
victoria ampleaeiusi est aut bello. (Agricolao 17.) This could be trans­
lated as ’a great part of Brigantia was embraced by victory or war’.
Mattingly expresses the sense as meaning that Cerialis ’had operated if 
not actually triumphed over the major part of their territory’.(5)
Ogilvie in the loeb edition of the Agricolae writes ’by permanent conquest 
or by forays he annexed a large portion of the Brigantes *.(6) In his 
edition of the Agricole- with Richmond he explains the phrase as expressive 
of the range of Cerialis’s operations. (7) Some resulted in permanent 
conquest which was victoria and some were merely forays which overran their 
territory which was bella. The distinction is between ground over which 
victory was gained and then consolidated by means of a military presence 
and territory v/hich was covered during the course of a campaign but which 
v/as not annexed at that stage. We shall see the same sort of thing 
occurring during the campaigns of Agricola. If units were dropped into 
forts immediately ground was marched over the fire power of the array still 
remaining in the field could be significantly diminished. Consolidation 
came after the final defeat of the enemy. Then the process could be 
undertaken systematically and with a high degree of all round security.
By the end of his governorship Cerialis had consolidated a good deal.
Over the rest he had fought successfully but the military engineers had 
not yet done their work.
Archaeological evidence suggests that he attacked in the East and struck 
North West. The IX Legion had moved North to York from Lincoln probably 
at the command of Cerialis. (Tacitus gives no grounds for thinking that 
Bolanus had ordered such a move.) This might then have been the principal' 
strike force. The XX Legion commanded by Agricola was in the North West 
Midlands, possibly at Wroxeter, perhaps in the process of moving to Chester. 
Such a change as this, however, was probably more related to the situation 
in Wales than it was to the planned offensive. In the subsequent 
campaign, therefore, the XX Legion faced two directions: North and West.
Hie operations undertaken by Cerialis and his subordinates have left little 
mark on the ground so that archaeology cannot easily supplement the pages 
of the historian. The absence of forts datable to this period makes the
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task of sketching out the operations difficult. However, we may also 
think that the absence of forts gives us a clue as to the nature of the 
campaign itself. Marching camps rather than permanent forts might well 
have been characteristic of it. If so then the fighting may well have 
been fluid and far ranging. Battles no doubt occurred but between 
times the army was moving fast to harry the enemy. Stanv/ick, a site 
apparently of importance in the Venutius*s defence .system, was successfully 
assaulted: an act comparable in some ways to Vespasian’s attack upon 
Ikiden Castle. (8)
Hie objective of Cerialis*s main thrust is unknown but it looks as though 
it might have been Carlisle or some place beyond it. Venutius clearly 
had support from beyond Brigantia and this must have been located to the 
North of the civitas. Hie role of Agricola in all this eludes us, 
together with that of his legion. Perhaps prudence dictated that the 
XX Legion remained on the alert in its depot not only to protect the strike 
forces rear and flank but also to maintain the watch on the Welsh tribes.
In the last resort the legion could also turn South. Hiere were, after 
all, lessons to be learned from the dispositions made by Pau]j6 nus when 
he attacked Anglesey. Such a policy does not preclude either the des­
patch of detachments of the legion or the departure of the legate to the 
main army. It is not impossible for Agricola to have been on Cerialis*s 
staff during the whole of the campaign. Hie relationship between him 
and the Legate of IX Legion cannot be Imown. Political factors may have 
been more important than military ones, in the sense that Cerialis and 
Agricola had been Flavians from the very start. They had nothing to 
prove to the new regime. Hiey were utterly reliable. No one could have 
foreseen at that stage that the future lay with Domitian rather than with 
Titus i Hie outlook and affiliations of the other legionary legates 
unfortunately hidden from us. However, from the remarks dropped by 
Tacitus we may infer, that Agricole was treated as the senior legate and 
acted as the deputy of Cerialis as well as his assistant. This would 
explain the role finally assigned to him by the governor.
Nhile the Annals may contain disguised criticism of Cerialis, in the 
Agricola; he is commended for his offensive spirit and for the use that he 
made of Agricole. His term of office was brief; no more than the usual 
three year term, 74-?4, when he returned to Rome to take up a second consul­
ship. (Agricola may have left with him, or about that same time.)
Important results had been achieved during his governorship* Politically 
the province was secure in its loyalty. He arny had been revived as an 
efficient fighting force and a troublesome border state had been defeated 
within the bounds of its own lands. He next stage should have been to 
annexe the territory. Cerialis doesiot seem to achieve much of this, if
13Ü
anything, though it is perhaps just possible that a fort or two was built 
in the southern part of Cartimandua’s old dominions. Time had been 
against Cerialis but it was not pressing upon Frontinus. He too receives 
honourable mention by Tacitus: Cerialis would have surpassed any successor, 
had it not been Frontnus. The tribute is graceful. It may not be
without significance that Frontinus was alive and an elder statesman of 
the empire when the Agricola was published. Wo historian should spealt 
ill of the living without weighing the consequencesi(9)
For some reason Frontinus did not follow up the work of Cerialis against 
the Brigantes. They were left awaiting a final disposal. Instead 
Frontinus moved against the Silures. They had been quiet for some time. 
Why did Frontinus turn against them? Did he activate a dormant problem? 
Rome was in danger of being caught once more in a war with two fronts.
Had his mandata been clear or explicit in detail, Frontinus could hardly 
have evaded the Brigantian issue and he would have been ill-advised to 
stir up a quiet tribe well to the South and West of his main theatre of 
operations, if hostilities with the Brigantes were still continuing.
But if the Silures were becoming restive for some reason^  then Frontinus 
might trust to the drubbing given the Brigantes by Cerialis to keep them 
quiet long enough for him to deal with the Silures. Agricola, however, 
took no part in these operations* He had become governor of Aquitaine. 
The details of Frontinus*s labours are passed over with considerable 
brevity. Tacitus notes approvingly that he ‘surmounted not only the 
valour of the enemy but also the physical features of the land*.
(Agricola 17.) Arcliaeology has testified to his success.
New forts are found at harbours all along the South Welsh coast. Ilnd 
Legion Augusta was moved to Caerleon on the river Usk. From these sites 
passages could be forced more easily up the valleys. Along these roads 
were built and forts established with the result that each block of hills 
was cordoned off. (10. ) However, such a massive engineering programme 
could not have been executed before the military defeat of the enemy.
The general movement seems to have been from South to North, starting with 
sea borne forces making landfalls at suitable harbour points from which 
they fanned out to search for and then destroy the main centres and forces 
of opposition.
Frere comments that though Tacitus mentions only the Silures in this 
campaign of Frontinus, no weight can be put upon this limitation. The 
sketch in the Agricola, merely indicates that Frontinus was fighting an 
enemy different from Cerialis*s. The Silures were merely the best known 
of the mountain tribes. He argues that there can be no doubt that the 
Ordovices were overrun by the forces of Frontinus. XX Legion probably 
moved in from Wroxeter through the Severn valley to central Wales and a
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nev; depot was started for II Legion at Chester. This was certainly 
uncompleted when Frontinus left Britain, as the water piping bears the 
date of 79 AD. Detachments of troops were certainly stationed in the 
territory of the Ordovices since Agricola’s first act as governor was to 
avenge an attack upon such a military group.
T%ie programme of annexation profoundly effected the disposition of forces 
to the South. Garrison were required for at least twenty forts and 
these had to be drawn from the parts of the province which had been 
conquered earlier, where the policy of Homanization and pacification was 
being pursued. Its success was demonstrated by the quiet which continued 
even after the military presence was withdrawn from a number of areas.
Time and persistence had done their work. At this stage Frontinus left 
and was succeeded by Agricola.
The reader cannot help but be struck by the change of tone in the 
Agricola v^ hich occurs with the successful coup of Vespasian. First of 
all the emperor set in motion a policy of conquest with which Tacitus i;as 
clearly in sympathy. The objective of the empire was expansion and the 
purpose of a governor was to fight. Agricola, Cerialis, Frontinus and 
Tacitus himself were all supporters of the Flavians. It would have been 
offensive to patronize in writing colleagues and friends. Since some of 
them were still alive it might also have been imprudent as well. Further­
more as far as Frontinus was concerned it is worth remembering that he 
remained unemployed during the rule of Domitian and so by the standards 
of Tacitus hié hands were cleaner than those of the writer himselfI 
Tacitus had participated in public life and then tried to justify his own
actions and those of colleagues who did likewise. But Frontinus had
stepped out of public life, just as Agricola had done at the termination 
of his governorship.
Nov; the reader comes to the heart of the Agricolao. Everything has been
prolegomena for this period when Agricola, the ideal public servant, ruled
Britain and brought to fruition all that had ever been hoped for since the 
days of, the daudian invasion. The details of the earlier chapters are
intended to give the reader an understanding of the condition of Britain
at the time Agricola arrived so that by the end of the book the magnitude
of the achievement of his father in lav; can be truly appreciated. A
v;arlike province, garrisoned by three legions supplemented by a numerous 
force of auxilia had never been properly reduced. Nhen a province is an 
island the coastline constitutes its natural frontier. Such a frontier 
had never been attempted. Earlier campaigns had not borne the fruit that 
might have been expected. The successes of Cerialis and Frontinus gave 
Rome the chance to solve the problem of Britain. Agricola was the man to 
do it.
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5.5. BEITAnJ MDER AGRICOLA
We are faced immediately with a problem of dating* It seems as though 
the arrival of Agricola could have been in either 77 or 78* There are 
arguments on both sides, which the Tacitean text,of itself cannot solve* 
However, as we have discovered earlier the sequence of events is more 
important than the chronology. Nonetheless we ought to try to secure a 
fixed check point.
in 77 the consules ordiaarii were Vespasian and Titus and the consules 
suffecti were Domitian, Agricola himself and others. Their consulates
could have been for as short a period as two months. Even with that
span there was time enough to marry his daughter to TacitusHmself, be 
awarded a pontificate and secure his appointment as governor of Britain.
As consuls entered office in January as ordinarii let us assume that 
Vespasian and Titus did so and continued in office during that month and 
February. H e n  let us assume that Domitian and Agricola served during 
March and April. Tacitus tells us, in the Agricola >, that when his 
father in law entered upon his province it was already midsummer (media 
iam aestate transgressus.c.19.) The Roman summer was the period between 
15 May and 15 August; so for him to arrive in Britain at midsummer meant 
arriving about midway during this period. Hcitus declares that statiia 
Britanniae praepositus est (c*9* Agricola ). Here is an inclination to 
translate this as to mean that the provincial appointment followed -
i%on the completion of the consulate; but in fact the sense 
requires us to translate it as meaning that the appointment followed upon 
the marriage of his daughter. H u s  if Agricola ceased to be consul on 
30th April and then had to marry his daughter to Hcitus, receive his 
pontificate and travel to Britain, he had very little time. Here seem 
to be rather too many events for the time available, if they were to be 
conducted with any dignity.
Let us examine the problem in a different fashion. If Agricole arrived 
in Britain during' the summer of 78 then the word statim loses something of 
its force. It would mean that Agricola remained in Rome for a period of 
about 13 months if his consulship were to be as short as it often was at 
that time. Perhaps that might be shortened to 6 months if the wedding and 
the pontificate occu]^d during the period of the consulshiiD. Here is a 
choice between a period of about 22 days in 77 to hold the marriage, become 
a pontifex and then be on the road in time to reach Britain by mid-summer 
or a longer period in Rome at the end of which Agricola arrives in Britain 
in the mid-summer period of 78.
H e  year 84 saw the seventh imperial acclamation. Coins displayed in 
commemoration the words IMP.GAEG.DIVI VE8P F. DOMITIAN AUG.GERN). COS.X on
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the obverse and on the reverse P.M.TRIB.PIZ IMP VII. P.P.S.C. and there 
was an illustration of a trooper riding down a barbarian, v;hile another 
lies dead. The illustration is highly relevant to the victory at Mens 
Graupius which was won substantially by the Cavalry. It might then be 
assumed that the battle took place during the high to late summer of 84. 
Domitian*s triumph in the Chattan war had occurred in 83. H e  battle 
of Mons Graupius then could be held to have been fought in 84. This 
year was the termination of the governorship of Agricola, which must then 
have commenced in 78•
Before finally accepting these dates, we should remind ourselves that it 
is not impossible for the battle to have been fought in 83, but that news 
of it did not reach Rome until after the victory over the Chatti.
Agricola had to wait for his share of the honours; another insult to the
governor in the eyes of his son in law. Hcitus, however, does not
indicate that there was a critical situation in Britain at the time of 
Agricola’s arrival. The massacre of the troops stationed among the 
Ordovices was of local significance. No general uprising occurred.
There is nothing to suggest that Frontinus left a situation that was 
seriously deteriorating which required an immediate handover. Statim 
if taken in relation to the appointment has a dramatic rather than a 
chronological tone. It is part of the vocabulary used by Tacitus to 
build up the picture of the able public servant. He is a man who must 
be about his business, ready to answer the call, whenever it might come, 
even to the extent of constraining his own important private concerns.
We might then ask if we can find any urgency about the position in Britain 
that required the departure of Agricola within a few weeks of the termin­
ation of his consulship. He evidence seems to be lacking. A long 
inter-regnum would not be desirable, in principle, and if Frontinus had 
left sometime before him Agricola might well have been urged on his way.
His consulship was a token, rather in the same way as his praetorship.
He was never an active official in Rome within the cursus. His work lay
in the provinces. He metropolitan offices were the various levels of 
status that he needed to acquire before he could pass on to the next piece 
of provincial administration. It should have been possible to prepare 
for his daughter’s wedding while he was consul. However, we need to 
remember that it is only guess work that assumes Agricola’s consulship 
was for so short a duration as two months, and that the ordinarii served 
for so short a period as well. He governmental process may well have 
proceeded at a steady pace so that Agricola laid down the consulate later 
in the year, married off his daughter, had been initiated into his priestly 
office, and prepared himself to become governor of Britain. If statim is 
taken to refer to what happened after the marriage then it means that the
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APPolQtaeot «as made after it# Events eouXd have taken place 
without a rush*
Scholarly opinion ia  divided on th is  aubjcct# Furneaux and 
Anderson arc in  favour of 77* O gilvie and Richmond decide that 
the 7th acclamation and coinage are d ec is iv e  and conclude that 
Agricola came to B ritain  in  78# Frere a lso  prefers 78, and so 
does Burn# E# B irley a lso  accepts th is  date but M attingly holds 
to  77 and some years before R.G# Collingmood accepted 78 as the 
year o f entry in to  the province# (11) The general opinion i s ,  
th erefo re , in  favour of 78# The general tenor of the evidence  
w il l  support i t#  There i s  no apparent reason to w rite a h ec tic  
h a lf year for Agricole in  77 because the overa ll s itu a tio n  in  
B ritain  does not require i t #  The sense of urgency comes from the 
s ty le  o f Tacitus in  fu lfilm en t of h is  l ite r a r y  purpose in the 
A gricola , where statim  has something of the same force of euthus 
in  the Gospel according to St# Mark# N evertheless the evidence  
need not be in terpreted  in  such a compressed fashion# A gricd a  
could have done everything decently and in  order and y e t arrived  
in  77.
Ahen Agricola did arrive the summer was more than half over# The 
army was not in the field but dispersed throughout the province# 
Clearly further campaigning was not expected* If Tacitus uses 
aestas both in the ^ense of summer and of campaigning season, then, 
it may be argued, by the time Agricole has taken stock of the 
position and made his plans the campaigning season was indeed 
over. Agricola bad decided upon an Immediate attack, but bad 
to bring together an a£ hoc force of detachments from the legions 
and a small number of auxiliaries, presumably from the units which 
were conveniently placed to take part in the campaign; speed 
being an important element in the campaign, before the onset of 
bad weather in the .velsh mountains.
The occasion for taking the field rose when the Ordovices had 
almost exterminated a regiment of cavalry shortly before Agricole 
arrived in the province# It was a humiliation rather than a 
serious reverse if the Ordovices had already been absorbed into 
the province; but, perhaps, rather more ominous if the campaign 
were still in progress# The dispersion of the army by mid­
summer suggests that the Ordovices had been occupied unless it is 
argued that they did not warrant the att*®^ ®^** * substantial
force# A good deal depends upon the translation of the word
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Ggentern* It might mean operating, in which caee the occupation 
wao proceeding; but it could eloo mean atotioned or encamped 
and this might auggeet that matters bed proceeded further, whether 
in the form of total or partial occupation of Ordovician territory 
we cannot tell# Both Ogilvie and Richmond (p.61») and Furneaux 
and Anderson (p.64#) use the word in thin latter sense#
The incident is important, however, because it shows the attri­
butes of a good governor# Promptitude and aggression are more 
important than social niceties# The new governor marched with 
his force through the land killing the inhabitants as they went# 
When he turned to Anglesey, not surprisingly, the islanders 
offered no resistance. The assault was important, however, be­
cause it displayed two further attributes of a good governor; 
ratio and Constantin, Agricole came to the Menai Straits without 
any ships to make the cEOssing, unlike Suetonius Paullinus, on a 
previous occasion, so hastily had the task force been put together# 
Ingenuity kept up the momentum of the attack# Agricole used 
auxiliary cavalry to cross the Straits# (12.) Indeed the hall­
mark of this campaign was their physical and military excellence, 
as they swam, fully armed by the side of their horses and got © 
foot-hold on the island# It may be that they were not confronted 
by any serious opposition# The islanders may have been either (ro 
weak or dispirited to launch effective forays against the vulner­
able troops as they came ashore* The fate of the Ordovices on 
the mainland may well have sapped their will to resist# The feat 
is nonetheless noteworthy# The real tragedy lies somewhat hid­
den in the text# Agricola massacred the Ordovices# Bis campaign 
in the end, was not so much a military offensive as a rigorous act 
of reprisal, in the course of which the tribe was virtually wiped 
out# Tacitus mentions this but does not play upon it* The de­
solation of the scene after the battle of Hons Graupius is applic­
able hero: "everywhere was dismal silence, lonely hills, houses
smoking to heaven"* (Agricola c#53) The words of Calgscus arc 
also relevant to the land of the Ordovices: "they make a desert
and they call it peace"# (Agricola c#30) What bad been promised 
for the Silures was achieved for the Ordovices# No wonder, in 
after years, Wales seemed to cause the Romans so little trouble# 
There were not sufficient people to resist# They had been kil­
led. Genocide achieves a grim pacification.
In this fashion the old policy of Suetonius Fsulllnus was imple­
mented# îlo insult to the Roman - power could or would be overlooked
14"r> a#
Agricole bad made his own policy clear# He bad a mandate to 
advance# T h o s e  w h o  opposed h im  w o u ld  be ruthlessly annihilated# 
The O r d o v i c e s  were a warning to t h e  Brigantes# Indeed they were 
a signal t o  all B r i t i s h  o p p o n e n t s  o f  H om e w h o  r e s i s t e d  annexation 
i n t o  t h e  i m p e r i u m ,  w i t h  t h i s  p o l i c y  Tacitus w a s  in agreement# 
E l s  w h o l e  outlook, as w e  h a v e  seen, inclined h im  to i t *  H e  con­
cludes t h a t  a s  a  result o f  t h i s  act A g r i c o l a  began t o  be r e t a r d e d  
a s  a g r e a t  man; clarus b e i n g  t h e  w o r d  a p p l i e d  t o  one o f  c o n s u l a r  
r a n k #  However, Tacitus perceived t h a t  Agricole, p e r h a p s  unlike 
Psulllnus, s a w  beyond r e t r i b u t i o n #  F o r c e  m i g h t  h o l d  d o w n  a  
conquered p e o p l e ,  but i t  could n o t  accomplish much more i f  t h e r e  
w e r e  continued injustices. F r o m  t h i s  one m a y  i n f e r  t h a t  t h e  
lessons o f  Boudicca’s rebellion h a d  not been l o s t #
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Military success was not enough* A suitable provincial policy and style 
of administration must follow that would secure, at best, the hearts of the 
people, and, at the least, their passive obedience. Agricola struck his 
own manner v;hich was, in effect, a reform* Hough the phrases are tinged 
with panegyric their contents are significant. Freedmen and slaves were 
kept from the public in administration. The govemor’s staff was selected , 
from among the competent and honourable. Personal acceptability and 
acquiescence in obliging suitors were not the criteria for appointments.
He allowed delegation but insisted on information on the whole sweep of 
provincial policy. Thus he was able to overlook minor errors, since they 
did not spring from corrupt or incompetent acts and at the same time was 
able to demonstrate that serious cases would be rigorously dealt with.
His endeavour, says Tacitus, was to put the efficient in post rather than 
spend time castigating the maladroit. Whether anybody can be so uniformly 
correct in the selection of subordinates is doubtful, but the administra­
tive principles enunciated by Tacitus, on behalf of Agricola are of the 
greatest ic^ jortance, to anyone in the service of the public. Stated as 
objectives they could only increase the confidence of the people in the 
imperial provincial administration. Whether petitioners and suitors in Rome 
appreciated the merits of the policy we have no means of knowing.
A number of practical reforms followed which related to the taxation ^ stem, 
both for grain and cash. Delivery points were made more convenient for 
the British deliverers. An end was made to the practice of purchasing 
grain in order to hand it back in tax, together with other forms of 
extortion which benefitted neither the natives nor the government. Tacitus 
does not tell us how long the administration had been so corrupt, but he 
makes it clear that reform was necessary and that Agricola carried out the 
changes immediately after the short campaign against the Ordovices. He 
fact that the governor turned his attention to these internal considerations 
at 60 early a stage in his rule demonstrates the acuteness of the position.
He later Neronian governors had stabilised the province and begun the work 
of pacification but perhaps had not been able to do much more. He 
discontent vdthin the army itself may have been an inhibiting factor.
Certainly abuses seem to be implied during the period of the Civil War, 
indicated by the attitude of the legate of XX Legion and the general restless­
ness of the army as a whole. After the accession of Vespasian, order and 
discipline had to be restored as a minimum level of policy; thereafter 
military considérât ions dominated the official lives of the Flavian governors, 
up till this point* Ibr the first time, perhaps, in a number of years there 
was a period of repose during which the internal administration could be 
overhauled in such a way as to fonvard the policy of romanisation and 
pacification. Greater trust in the government was not only desirable but
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necessary. This could only be won, not forced; to be achieved an improved 
quality of imperial rule was inevitable. Justice and mercy must be hall 
marks of such an administration. Tacitus does not deal with the matter 
explicitly; but the contents of c.19 and part of c.20 in the Agricola 
clearly indicate the problem with which Agricole had to deal. Previous 
governors had made the days of peace hardly less dreadful tiian those of 
war. dassicianus had been right both in his appreciation of the position 
and the consequent policy that was required.
When these pressing matters had been dealt with Agricola could address 
himself to the frontier area of the province. But before we turn to his 
work there we ought to note that Agricola’s time would be spent substantially 
in the field, far away from the administrative centre of the province from 
which the fresh policy alone could emanate. It is one thing for a governor 
to order changes and make suitable appointments but another to ensure that 
the policy is implemented and the officials conform to the procedures laid 
down. Agricola could hardly do this himself, except, perhaps, for certain 
periods during the winter when the troops were in winter quarters. If the 
administration were to be consistent and fair then it needed constant super­
vision, especially in the area of justice. Hus it is not surprising to 
find at this time that a judicial official has been appointed. He could be 
a significant resource to a governor seeking to carry through reforms and 
would be able to supervise the worl^ ng of the provincial judicial processes. 
He first recorded holder of the title Legatus iuridicus was C.Salvius 
liberalis, who was probably in post during 79 (15)» the time during which 
Agricola was carrying out his overhaul of the government service. While 
he was able to concentrate on the various legal codes that operated in a 
province and ensure that they worked correctly, he was bound to be involved 
by that task in the endeavour to treat the natives in a softer fashion than 
had been the case in the troubled years before* As he was subordinate to the 
governor, though appointed by the emperor, the former had an official whom 
he could make accountable for the implementation of the new policy and 
structure of administration within the province. None of this appears in 
the pages of Tacitus because he concentrates upon the vision and executive 
action of Agricola as the ideal governor. He detailed application of what 
has been decided does not concern him. He turns instead to the field of war. 
With Wales quiet after his act of retribution, Agricola faced Brigantia, in 
whole or in part. He could build on what Cerialis had accomplished. We 
siiall need to attend carefully upon what Tacitus actually writes and dstin- 
guish it from the impression he manages to present. He latter is 
persuasive* Agricola conquered a vast tract of land; more, indeed, than 
any of his predecessors - either collectively or individually - but against 
that impression we sliall have to place the explicit contents of the relevant 
chapters.
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Season 2 : campaign of 79: In c.20 of the Agrioolac we read that there
was a general march forward. This must have been in a northerly direc­
tion. But it was a season of surveying and consolidation. Here were 
sudden raids, however, on a number of peoples and places. But no actual 
battles were fought. Brigantia was formally absorbed into the imperium 
Romanum without difficulty. Cerialis had worn the tribe dovm and perhaps 
occupied part of their territory. Agricola finished them off with ease. 
Possibly a few isolated centres of resistance had to be disposed of.
On the other hand, in view of his action against the Ordovices, his sudden 
raids seem to have been part of a deliberate policy of terror. Afterwards 
clemency was exercised and peace offered. Tacitus tells us that is what
Agricola did. His policy is one mirrored exactly by Sir Charles Napier,
when he occupied the Sind. Indeed his words are almost a translation of 
the Latin text: "He great recipe for quieting a country is a good thrash­
ing first and great kindness afterwards; the wildest chaps are thus tamed." 
(14) It is the standard formula of the "brain-washer" for gaining control 
over those with whom he has to deal! After the ground had been occupied 
forts were built and troops were stationed among the people.
Tacitus does not write in any detail. He observes that many states 
(aultae civitates) were induced to give hostages and abandon their hostility 
to Rome. Indeed it could be said that nowhere else had been taken over so 
easily. Nei#ibouring pepples did not lift a finger. From the text we 
should distinguish the enemy (hostes) whose territory hewas Annexing from 
the many states (multae civitates) which entered into a dependent relation­
ship with Rome, through the hostages. Hey are said, by Tacitus, to have 
been surrounded (circumdatae ) by forts and garrisons. Does Tacitus mean 
that the tribes, who had not been conquered, were surrounded by such a 
Roman military presence? If he does, an odd impression had been created. 
Brigantia had been annexed but not garrisoned. Other states which have 
not been occupied have been surrounded by forts and garrisons. Is not 
this a military nonsense? Archaeology suggests that many forts in the 
North of England are Flavian in date. Is one to infer from this sentence 
that for the most part they had been established by Cerialis? If the 
nnsv/er is yes, then it follows that Agricola was annexing land already 
occupied and garrisoned. If the ansv/er is no, then Agricola is the 
founder of many of the forts in Brigantia and the sentence in Tacitus must 
refer to them. However, by writing in a concise and exaggerated fashion 
he manages to convey the impression not only of a large tract of land being 
occupied but an additional area being enveloped by Rome through the fama 
of the general. He literary art is superb but confusing to the historian. 
If, in fact, the Brigantes were so broken that Agricola could ignore them, 
that is a tribute not to him but to the work of Cterialis in previous years.
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Bat some time had elapsed since Cerialis had campaigned against them; 
enough for the bruised spirit to recover, at least in part.
Hcitus has, however, made reference to the assistance that Venutius 
received from tribes beyond Brigantia. There is nothing to suggest that 
Cerialis had dealt with them in any significant fashion. They constituted 
a threat to Borne, however, because they were unconquered and hostile.
He day of reckoning arrived for them when a Roman force drew near to 
their frontiers. His time it was more an army of occupation rather than 
a punitive force. As they saw Brigantia taken by a steady methodical 
campaign so they were forced to perceive that their old position in relation 
to Rome must be abandoned. If they were not themselves formally occupied, 
it might well only be a matter of time before they lay under that threat.
If Rome reached out to them, they would be well advised to agree with their 
adversary quickly.
All this was useful work by the governor but there was hardly much dash 
about it. Above all there had been no military set pièce. He scenes 
and the drama that Tacitus thought that his readers enjoyed were almost 
totally absent from this year’s campaign. He historian was left to make 
what he could of the prosaic work of occupation.
He extent of Agricola’s advance during the first season is by no means 
clear. Multae civitates is sometimes thought to refer to the Brigantes, 
even though the term is in the plural not the singular.
He identification might fit, however, if the confederated nature of the 
Brigantian state were agreed; but at c.17. in the Agricolao Tacitus had 
referred to the Brigantes as a civitas. Hus the implication is that 
there were treaty relationships with tribes to the North and West of the 
Brigantes: the Votadini and the Selgovae, at the least; and perhaps tribes 
unloiovm to the West in the lake District, with the Setantii of the lyide 
being regarded as independent of the Brigantes. He general point of 
arrival by the army, at the end of the campaigning season seems to have 
been the northern frontier of the Brigantes; though it is not entirely 
clear where that line of demarcation lay. However, somewhere along the 
line of the Tyne Irthing valleys might not be unreasonable. Hough there 
might have been one or two areas forward of it. We ought not to accept 
too easily, however, that the Romans had regard to the tribal areas which 
they found. Here was no reason why they should conform to them in the 
course of a campaigning season.
If the point of arrival is unclear, the place of departure is imprecise. 
Cerialis seems to have used Lincoln and then moved into the Vale of York; 
thereafter he appears to have veered West across Stainmore. His would 
then have left an area North of Wroxeter and South of Penrith relatively 
untouched. It may well have had no real significance, for until the days
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of the Industrial Revolution it was one of the poorest and least populated 
areas of the British Isles. The area was also cut off from the zone to 
the South by the Chat Moss, an area of extensive marsh. Any movement 
North was further impeded by a number of West flowing rivers like the 
Mersey, kibble, Lune, Kent, Duddon and Esk, to say nothing of Solway 
Firth itself. The region was, potentially, as difficult to traverse as 
the lowlands of Germania of which Tacitus gave graphic details. The army 
seemed to be almost water-loggedi Only by a careful use of the higher 
ground could on advance North be made more conveniently. Unless, of 
course, the fleet was used. But it was on the inland hills that such 
human settlements, as existed, lay. The extent to which the Roman fleet 
was employed, at this stage is unclear. Later it would appear as a 
factor of some significance. Here we should give full weight to Tacitus’s 
comment that the estuaries v/ere thoroughly investigated during the course 
of the advance. It could mean that Agricola had some seaborne support 
vessels and that he kept his men within reach of convenient landfalls for 
them. The woods and forests that were also thoroughly explored had 
importance as centres of resistance and impediments to lines of communic­
ation. V/hile the description of the role of Agricola may contain conven­
tional statements about the attributes of a good general, they may also 
have been pointers to matters of practical significance. He led the ari^ y 
through difficult terrain. This inference and the emphasis upon 
aestuaria inclines one to think that Agricola advanced along the western 
side of Britain from a basis therefore possibly located at Wroxeter or 
Chester, then in the process of being built.
Season 3; Campaign of 80. V/ith the Brigantes taken lût® eC
empire it was now the time for their Northern allied to face the hour of 
trial. Some had actively given support to Venutius; some had sought to 
buy off Roman intervention during the previous campaigning season.
Agricole made no fine distinctions. He marched and took them. By the 
end of the campaign he had reached the Tanaus. There seems ho good 
reason for considering this to be any other than the R. Tay. No verbal 
connexion with either the Fbrth or the Clyde seems appropriate; while to 
identify it with the Tweed is to reduce the campaign to almost insignificant 
proportions. If it is some other river not yet identified, one can only 
thinli that the stream must have been (and will still be) unimportant.
There are no rivers of any size with which the word could be associated.(15) 
If then the river Tay were reached, the march of the army must have con­
tinued directly North, away from the areas of Galloway and Ayrshire.
That this occurred will be apparent later. But once again there were no 
battles1 Tacitus surmises that the tribes were too overawed to resist
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even though the weather was particularly bad. There was no drama in this 
campaign either. The skills of engineering do not often excafe a dashing 
style. Tacitus maintains the pace of his narrative as best he can by
emphasizing once more Agricola’s skill in the siting of forts. If he vras
winning no battles, at least his garrisons were not capitulating. In 
addition to his ability as an engineer, he planned well as a quarter master, 
by provisioning each fort with supplies sufficient for a year’s siege.
Such a decision might be considered over cautious, unless allowance is made 
for the previous difficulties of campaigns in Britain and in particular for 
the possibility of random rebellions in territories newly occupied. The 
tribes were new both to conquest and direct contact with Rome. These 
troops did not come and go; they remained in situ permanently. Here 
was no longer the chance of recovering during the winter what had been 
conceded during the summer. Hey were netted in a fort and road system 
which could be used to attack them if they displayed signs of disaffection. 
Tacitus must have found this material barely suitable for his purpose and 
style so that he had to summon up all his art in order to sustain the 
interest of the reader. Here might also be hints which point to a 
certain exasperation within Agricola himself. Did he really plan such 
campaigns or was it forced upon him by the tactics of the enemy? It is 
difficult to fight against those who offer no resistance. Nor was there 
much scope for valour in any form of arbitrary killing which aimed to 
strike terror among passive tribes. Tacitus writes that Agricola did not 
detract from the performance of his subordinates. To the worthy he was 
gracious and to the undeserving he was unpleasant. Indeed, we are told,
there were those who considered him to be too sharp with his tongue when
he reprimanded people. Tacitus excuses the manner of the governor by 
writing that hurting is better than hating. Hen he had spoken Agricola 
retained no permanent resentment. Hose who hand out punishment rarely 
do; but recipients may nurse a sense of grievance, at the way in which 
they have been treated. Hether Agricola was of a harsh temper we have not 
the means of judging. If he were the point is unlikely to be emphasized 
in eulogistic writing. Nonetheless the attention ivhich Tacitus devotes 
to the manner of Agricola at this point, in order to excuse it, may well 
indicate a certain irritation in his subject on account of the nature of 
the campaign. He governor’s dissatisfactions showed themselves in his 
working relationships. Could fama and gloria be acquired through campaigns 
as he had led?
Season 4 ; Campaign of 8l. He fourth season was no better. He building 
of forts continued. He ground over which the anay had marched and on 
which some forts had been built was covered more thickly with fortifications.
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He main construction work was well to the south of the Tay. First it 
was along the Fbrth-dyde line, where the distances from the open seas 
were the shortest and the estuaries most extensive. Second there was 
work in hand to the South of this area. Thus the line of the Tay may 
not have been held. There may have been withdrawal to consolidate.
The image presented to us of an enemy driven into a sort of island to the 
North of the Fbrth and Clyde rather presupposes this policy.
Tacitus makes no attempt to extract any drama or inject colour into this 
year’s marching and building. He merely comments that the Forth-dyde 
would make a suitable frontier. The pressure to acquire fama and gloria 
could not aTow Agricola such a prudent resting place. It v/as not only 
the general but the troops themselves who desired a forward push. In 
addition, he writes, the glory of Borne required it* dearly a great 
victory with prisoners and booty was sought. Hether the central 
government saw the position in quite the same way we do not know* It 
was the year Titus died and Domitian succeeded him. We cannot assess 
any changes that might have been in the mind of the new princeps. The 
governor may have wished to press northv/ards and found that his mandata 
(presumably dating from the reign of Vespasian) allowed him to do so.
Season 5 : Campaign of 82. Chapter 24 of the Agricola ■ begins on a more 
dramatic note than that on v/hich it ends. At the beginning Agricola is 
described as sailing across an unnamed stretch of v/ater in the leading 
vessel, (nave prima transgressus).(16) Thereafter, v/e are told, the army 
fought repeated and successful battles among tribes hitherto unknown,
(ignotas ad id tempus gentes). Here at last vas action stimulated by the 
brave leadership of a general who led from the front. Hov/ever, none of 
the engagements is described. The interest of the reader has been roused 
but remains unsatisfied. Instead v/e are left wondering v/hat water 
barrier might have been crossed. partem
Since it seems clear from the context and specially in the light of eamque  ^
Britanniae quae Hiberniam aspicit that Agricola was in South West Scotland 
it has sometimes been assumed that Tacitus is referring to a crossing of 
the Solway Firth. We should notice, however, that it is a fair trans­
lation of the text to write, he also manned with troops that part of the 
British coast which faces Ireland.(my italics). There are, in fact, two 
operations recorded in the text not one. There would be little military 
prowess displayed in crossing the Solway to occupy tribal land which had 
been, at the least, skirted before in earlier campaigns and v/hich now lay 
v/ell to the South of his subsequent campaign limits. Nor can we really 
maintain that the tribes of Galloway, and perhaps Ayrshire, v/ere unknown to 
the Romans. They were very probably those v/ho gave aid and comfort to 
Venutius in earlier days.
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There is more daring, prowess and fama in sailing on the Clyde to land on 
its Northern bank to advance inland and along the coast. Here the tribes 
were unknovm. Over I50 miles from the Brigantes the very distance must 
have tended to diminish any military assistance that might have been con­
templated. Perhaps, Tacitus deliberately left the stretch of water 
unspecified; perhaps the original text made the point of departure clear.
We may conclude that if Agricola did sail from say Maryport in Cumbria, and 
Tacitus knew it to be the case, he may well have been embarrassed by the 
fact, because it was inconsistent with the picture he v/as building up. 
Because Agricola was advancing North throughout his period of office we 
too easily assume that his significant military movements were always from 
South to North. Butthere is a case where first a lateral!and then a 
Southward movement could well have talcen place. If the Forth-Clyde line 
is held, with perhaps some outliers even further North, why should 
Galloway-Ayrshire be garrisoned by a daring water offensive from Maryport 
in Cumbria? The tactic seems odd. Overall the text will make better 
sense if the Clyde is taken to be the stretch of water used. The context 
seems to require it# Thereafter Reed's suggestion of a series of search 
and destroy operations along the firth and West coast during which there 
were battles when the troops landed is helpful.(1?) The use of a land 
based army is not totally ruled out by this plan, but it may not have been 
significant since Agricola was unlikely to have moved all his fighting 
forces by water across the water.
On this basis we have grounds for thinking that Agricola was moving along 
the West coast, as he had up the East coast. The enterprise may not have 
been worthwhile militarily, though perhaps it was useful as an addition to 
knowledge of the island. Agricola would not have been the last soldier to 
find campaigning in the West difficult. Though the troops fought and won, 
the sea and the mountains were less easily defeated. Communications are 
difficult, other than by sea, the climate is wet and during the winter 
Arctic in the hi^lands. The battles could have been successful but unpro­
ductive. Henceforth Agricola and his successors kept v/ell clear of the 
West and of the highland massif.
The exp].oration of these western areas continued in other forms. Tacitus 
v/rote that Agricola also garrisoned the area facing Ireland. This does 
not imply conquest so much as a formal occupation by troops. Perhaps it 
was hardly likely that the tribes of Galloway would have been left in 
complete freedom as Agricola moved North tov/ards the Forth. Now troops 
were stationed among them. Their v/inter quarters might have been there. 
Tacitus, however, tells us of this action by Agricola because he clearly 
v/ishes to direct our attention to Ireland. It could be seen across the 
channel. Thus a season’s campaign has been devoted to scouting the West
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coast and assessing its importance for Rome. Agricola thought it could 
have been easily occupied and he had held an Irish chieftain, who had fled 
to him, as a possible diplomatic weapon. The idea evidently appealed to 
Tacitus who gives a brief description of the island and once more states 
its position between Britain and Spain, vdth the implication, perhaps, 
that the occupation of these three lands would enclose another ocean 
for Rome and make her rule universal. The dream was never realised. 
Ireland remained forever beyond the empire.
Season 6 ; Campaign of 83. The Scottish Lowlands had now been absorbed 
and garrisoned. Agricola could make fresh plans. The West was unsuit­
able terrain. He marched East along the lowland valleys and coastal 
plain. In this the army worked with the fleet. Agricola feared a 
general movement of the highland tribes which could have cut him off from 
the South, even if they had stood on his front. The plan was wise.
The tribes in themselves might not have been formidable but when assoc­
iated with unknown and often difficult terrain the danger of defeat by 
some imprudent step could never he far away. For tiiis exercise at least 
a part of the fleet must have been brought up the East. As it seems to 
have been also serving in the Weht, we might assume that it was divided 
into tv/o operational squadrons (with a third guarding the English Channel, 
no doubt). The tactic was relatively unusual and Agricola deserves the 
accolade which Tacitus gives him.(18)
The tribes suffered a form of psychological shock from the use of the 
fleet, since they were probably unused to vessels of that size and number. 
That in itself might have been an effective weapon in the carapaing. The 
advance vias sufficiently threatening to provoke active resistance.
Roman forts were attacked, but the impression given is one of random and 
sporadic raids rather than of a concerted effort. This would come later. 
Agricola*s intelligence service could help him now but little. Both the 
enemy and the ground over which they were marching were unknown. Rumour 
took the place of fact. There were exaggerated reports about the size 
of the opposition and lacitus suggests the advice was given on the desir­
ability of retreat in relative freedom rather than under intense military 
pressure. Agricola was not to be deflected. On the basis of the infor­
mation he had, the army was divided into three sections so that one force 
might.aid the others and yet continue the advance. The plan seems to 
have worked well for when an assault was made upon IX Legion the attackers 
found themselves attacked, as the reinforcements from the other divisions 
closed in on them. However, it may be that a disaster of some magnitude 
had been narrowly averted. The Caledonians were able to trek away 
tlirough the marshes and forests. They were evidently not discouraged.
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The Roman advance had been halted. On the other hand, Tacitus indicates 
the general improvement in the morale of Agricola’s troops. The pre­
science of the governor was not to be overlooked. A march even to the 
farthest limits of the land could be contemplated. Things going well 
are to the general credit, but those which turn out badly are the respon­
sibility of one man, Tacitus siirewdly noted.
The tension of service in northern parts seems to have proved too much 
for one unit. A cohort of the Usipi (from Germany) rebelled. Having 
killed their officers they set sail in three ships for their native land.
In many ways the introduction of this material into the Agricoles might 
be considered odd because it is relevant neither to the biography of 
Agricole himself nor, particularly, to the portrait of an ideal public 
servant. Dramatically, of course, these adventures tend to relieve the 
boredom of campaigns which have been marked more by surveying and building 
than by daring and battle. Tacitus, however, would, from time to time, 
introduce digressions at significant points in a work. They marked off 
sections and ushered in significant parts.(19)
At the same time, the incident also illustrates something of the psycho­
logical difficulty of fighting in Britain.
To many people, in those times, Britain was situated at the edge of the 
world. Readers of Caesar knew the difficulty he experienced in getting 
his troops ashore. Claudius had experienced problems at the port of 
embarkation; and now, hundreds of miles to the North of these incidents, 
a unit sent over from Germany reacted in a striking fashion. There is 
thus a subtle purpose in devoting a whole chapter of a brief work to this 
act of insurrection and daring. If men capable of such feats fled from 
the campaign proceeding towards the world’s imagined corners, how competent 
was the leadership of a governor who brought an army so far so successfully. 
Tacitus could afford to describe the flight, which seems to contradict the 
point which is being made, because it may well be that the Usipi were not 
with the most advanced parts of the striking force but holding a position 
to the South and East. The clue to this is given in the phrase circumvecti 
Britmnniam. Of course the verb could have been used loosely and mean no 
more than that the troops hugged the coast as they sailed South and then 
ventured across the Southern North Sea. On the other hand, as we have 
seen, the fleet had been used on the West coast, and it may well have 
been that it continued to be used in two squadrons in order to safeguard 
Roman positions on both sides of the island. If this is so then we may 
suggest that the Usipi were stationed somewhere along this Western coast 
and that they sailed either North or South to reach the North Sea in their 
bid to reach their homeland. In either direction the voyage was of some
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magnitude, matching the feat of the classis Britannica accomplished after 
the battle which was to come.(20)
Season 7 : Campaign of 84. Now committed to an advance along the lowland 
strip of North and East Scotland Agricola reverted to the tactics he 
employed in his second campaign. He used the fleet and presumably the 
marines on board, to make random and offensive descents on a variety of 
places along the shore. Once again there was the devastation caused by 
sudden raids associated v/ith a general panic about what might happen next. 
These openings were followed by the army on land moving forward in light 
marching order. Agricola was able, writes Tacitus, to include in his 
force loyal British troops which hints significantly at the success of the 
policy of peaceful Romanization that had been proceeding in the lands far 
to the South.
After the battle of the previous year and with the continued advance into 
Caledonian lands (21) as Agricola VJas approaching the fertile territory 
of the Moray Firth, the Caledonian food centre, a battle was highly likely. 
The resulting battle at Mons Graupius is the climax of the governorship 
of Agricola and the emotional peak of the Agricolav itself. As with so 
many literary judgements this is subjective but the reader will note the 
way that as the history of Roman Britain builds up to: the governorship 
of Agricola, so in turn his years of campaigning rise to this pealc and 
thereafter his life declines into more placed times during which the 
ingratitude of princes brings the book to an end upon a somewhat discordant 
note.
The battle is to be located mentally at the limits of the British shore, 
perched on the edge of the world. The speech written by Tacitus and put 
into the mouth of Calgacus makes this clear. "Now the uttermost parts 
of Britain lie exposed ... There are no more tribes to come; nothing but 
sea and cliffs." He speaks at the world's end on its last stretch of 
liberty. (Agricolac.c.gO.) The victorious general who personifies the 
might of Rome has discovered and conquered the remotest and obscurest 
parts of the land. Nowhere and nothing is free from the power of the 
imperial people. By these means the extent of the march of Agricola and 
the comprehensiveness of his achievements are magnified.
The speech itself is one of the best knovm passages of literature. In it 
Tacitus expresses the desire of men for liberty and their horror of foreign 
rule. By inference, he critizes the principate for the way in which it 
despoils the foreigners and subjugates the Roman people. The speech, 
however, does not add much to our knov/ledge of Roman Britain but a little 
light is throim upon social conditions which do not often find a place in 
history. The conduct of victorious troops v/ith women - members of
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families - and the general behaviour of Roman officials in general, even 
though they were charged with winning over the hearts of the Britons to 
the imperium Romanum are condemned. The requisitioning of goods and men 
together with the heavy physical endeavour of building roads are brought 
before us in this superbly constructed speech. The misery of war and 
occupation is conveyed to us and this must be regarded as much a part of 
history as the outwardness of events and policies. The material is of a 
general kind, as iê so often in the Agricolae, but stimulates the imagin­
ation of the.humane. Life was not always sunnier in the provinces.
At the same time Calgacus alludes to the mixed nature of the Roman 
comrannwealth. The auxilia are not mentioned specifically but reference 
is made implicitly to them in the observation that the army recruited from 
many diverse peoples® The auxiliary forces had been important throughout 
the campaign and the forthcoming fight would be won by them; but Tacitus 
hardly ever makes mention of them. For him they were no doubt drawn from 
the lesser breeds beyond the law. He is concerned with the history of
Roman citizensj^though auxiliaries did become citizens on discharge.
The speech constructed for Agricola himself reviews the progress of the 
campaigns and hints at the frustrations he had experienced. Bothfhe 
general and the army had outdistanced their predecessors. They knew 
Britain from marching to occupying it. The days of rumour and hearsay 
were over. There had been problems of morale. "Often on the march, 
when you were exiiausted by swamp, mountain and river, I overheard the 
exclamations of the bravest, 'When will the enemy be delivered to us?'
*men will they come?'" Their opponents had been elusive, having prac­
tised a retreating defence, which stretched the Roman lines of communic­
ation to a considerable length. Agricola pointed out the problems of 
supply. He is driven to praising them for their endurance in fording 
rivers and bypassing forests! While it may be rhetoric there is an 
element of truth in his observation that the battle was to be fought not 
because the Britons wanted to fight but because after six campaigns, in 
the North, the elusive, retreating enemy had at last been brought to the 
test. Tacitus thus refers obliquely to the difficulties experienced by . 
Agricola in bringing matters to a head. How different it might have been 
if a decisive battle had been won during 80. The years of marching, 
building and surveying would have benn undertaken at leisure with a greater 
sense of security. Agricola had not been frustrated, in the end, but it 
had taken him a long time to achieve his purpose. He had only managed 
to bring it off because he was left in office longer than any of his 
predecessors or successors. He is made to recognise these points when 
Tacitus writes in his speech, "Make an end here of your campaignings".
If the battle were indecisive or the enemy slipped away there would be
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more marching into the unimown land of Caledonia* A clear cut victory 
would round off what was begun by Claudius and his generals - on the 
assumption that the battle took place "at the world's edge and Nature's 
end*" In fact there was still a good deal of Scotland left, to the North 
of Inverness!
There is nothing in Tacitus to give an indication of the location of Mons 
Graupius* Various intelligent guesses have been made. Play upon 
Grampian and Graupius has no doubt played its part. The line of Roman 
forts and marching camps has been traced North of the Tay and West of 
Fraserburgh. The site of the battle is often assumed to be somewhere 
near to the most northern and western of these camps, which gives a site 
remarkably near the Battle of Culloden. Bennachie is a popular choice^
(22) If this were an archaeological study the location would be important 
but for us it is not. Tacitus is concerned to provide us with a scene in 
which his hero wins a decisive battle that concludes the war to occupy 
Britain and places the Roman eagle on the edge of the world. There was 
nothing further for Agricola to do and nothing was left for his successors 
to accomplish. The physical site of a battle was a detail on the margin 
of historical concern.
The disposal of Roman troops emphasized the importance of the auxilia. 
Agricola had 8,000 infantry from the auxiliaries in the centre and 3,000 
auxiliary cavalry divided on his wings. His legionaries were stationed 
in front of the camp fence (pro vallo). They were thus behind the 
auxilia but on open ground over which they could deploy freely should the 
need arise. Vdien he saw the disposition of the enemy, who had placed their 
front line men on level ground and then spaced out the others up a gentle 
slope, which placed them higher than the Romans, Agricola spread out his 
line. This thinned his ranks and made control proportionately more 
difficult but when confronted by such superiority he thought he must safe­
guard himself against the possibility of being overwhelmed right across 
his front. His staff advised him to bring up the legionaries but he 
preferred to hold them in reserve. He himself dismounted and stood at 
the head of the auxiliary infantry. Meanwhile the Caledonians had been 
going through the actions which generally marked their military prelimin­
aries. There was shouting and singing and an uncoordinated dash for the 
front positions. Here the war chariots were already moving round on the 
plain.
The Britons had short shields which were little use against the volleys of 
spears and javelins thrown by the Romans. However, they showed dexterity 
in avoiding the fusillades. In their turn they launched dense volleys 
of spears, eschewing, at this stage, the employment of their long swords. 
These exchanges, evidently, brought, no advantage to the Romans so Agricola
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changed his tactics, sending in six cohorts of auxiliaries (Batavians and 
Tungrians) for hand to hand fighting, with their sharp pointed swords.
The Britons could not easily respond to this, because they required space 
for swinging their swords, which with sharp blades but blunt points were 
used for slashing rather than stabbing. They were, therefore, in more 
open order than the auxiliaries who could come on in close formation, 
using their weapons in a forward and back motion. Their greater density 
made it easier for them to break the British lines. In this fashion they 
advanced steadily through the mass of the enemy and up the hill. The 
Roman cavalry were now thrown in the assault. They had, it seems, been 
watching the war chariots, but as the battle progressed these were left 
driverless and thus of no military value. The cavalry came alongside 
the advancing infantry but found that the density of the other combatants, 
together with the unevenness of the ground brought them to a halt.
Meanwhile the auxiliary infantry were henmied in by their own cavalry and 
menaced by the random careering of the driverless war chariots. At this 
point, the British reserves, waiting on the top of the hill, began to 
move into the battle area, gradually trying to surround the tightly 
packed Roman troops. The force mi^t well have been enveloped had not 
Agricola thrown in some cavalry which he had held in reserve should an 
emergency arise. The enemy's ploy was foiled as they in turn started to 
be surrounded by Roman troops. From that embrace they were never released. 
Those who stood fast were cut down* Those who broke out were hunted down.
A number of them attempted to make a stand in front of the forest. They 
had some success in defeating the most advanced of the auxiliaries.
Agricola countered the tactic by sending his lightly armed troops into the 
woods and following them with his cavalry, both mounted and dismounted.
The Britons v/ere flushed out and denied the security of a firm back line. 
Once more they were confronted by an organized attacking force. They 
broke, fleeing in small groups as they could, being saved, at last, by 
distance and the night. The Britons lost 10,000; the Romans 360.
By morning the eneny had gone. The land was desolate. Militarily it 
could be said that they had been both defeated and yet had made their 
escape. At any rate they had not been completely destroyed. The signi­
ficant thing was that they showed no signs of regrouping to give further 
battle or opposition. This was Agricola's famous victory. He marched 
away; took hostages from the Boresti (an otherwise unknown tribe) and 
ordered the fleet to circumnavigate Britain.
The direction of Agricola's march is unclear, but it would seem to have 
been in a generally eastern, then southerly, direction. He was not 
advancing further into terra incognita but conducting a leisurely withdrawal 
into his winter quarters. Tacitus regarded Mons Graupius as a truly
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decisive victory. (Veram magnamque victoriam.) It placed Agricola above 
the emperor himself in terms of military capacity and effectiveness.
By making this comparison Tacitus turns our interest towards imperial 
politics and personalities. As Agricola continued his journey South, 
he was recalled, handing over to his unnamed successor a peaceful and 
secure province. Agricola was never to be employed again. He drank 
the cup of peace and idleness to its dregs*
The rest of his life was spent in decent obscurity* Once or twice his 
name was raised as a possible adviser in later times of trouble or as a 
possible candidate for the governorship of either Africa or Asia, the summit 
of the senatorial governor's career. Nothing came of this talk. Agricola 
remained a private person to the end, unused, as we have seen, by an emperor 
"unfriendly to high qualities". Domitian may not have employed Agricola 
but he was not persecuted as one might have expected, from the portrait 
painted of him by Tacitus* Instead we find him writing that Domitian was 
pacified by the moderation and discretion of Agricola. If he did not 
invite renown, at least he did not court ruin. There is no more of the 
history of Roman Britain in the Agricola which is preoccupied with the 
injustices of public life and so presents us with "a sense of injur'd 
merit". The writing of Tacitus in this fashion is extremely effective 
and easily carries the reader along in believing that Agricola had con­
quered Britain and been badly treated for it. We must, therefore’, retrace 
our steps in order to check the impression made upon us.
First Agricola had not conquered Britain. Mons Graupius, where ver , it 
lay in North East Scotland, was not at the extremity of the island. The 
wedge to which Tacitus had referred earlier in the Agricolac still remained 
beyond the reach of Rome. The area of Moray, Ross and Caithness was never 
to be occupied. The central and western highlands were never invested.
And the West coast beyond the Clyde also remained virtually untouched.
This constituted a large inhospitable area where communications were 
difficult except along the western coast by sea and where garrisons would 
inevitably be cut off from each other in a climate that was Arctic during 
the long winter months.
Whether these regions were worth conquering is perhaps another matter. 
Perhaps the Romans still hoped for further territory in expectation of 
finding considerable mineral wealth but there is nothing in the literature 
of the time to suggest that these areas of Caledonia were central to their 
thinking. The regions were never systematically explored, to the best of 
our knowledge, apart from the landfalls made by the fleet in its voyage of 
circumnavigation. The entire area remained terra incognita. That 
Agricola never intended to occupy it seems clear from the location of his 
forts. They stand at the foot of the glens. He placed his men in
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positions where the Caledonians would have to come to him and remain con­
fined to their highlands. He contented himself, with considerable 
acumen, with controlling the lines of communication in Northern Scotland.
His earlier work had shown that it was not feasible to proceed up the 
West coafet. He moved his weight to the East, gaining control first of 
Strathmore and then pressing his enemy in order to provoke a battle which 
if successful would cripple the opposition and leave Rome in secure 
possession of the Scottish lowlands. Agricola had thus consolidated what 
Cerialis had first won during his campaigns and invested the Brigantes.
He had then annexed the entire Scottish lowlands, keeping well to the 
South and East of the traditional Highland Line. It was a notable 
achievement, even without the high rhetoric of his son in law. This 
rather than the battle at Mons Graupius was his achievement. The battle 
was a means to an end rather than an isolated exhibition of military 
prowess. With this work accomplished the right time to lay down his 
onerous command had come. Whether it qualified him for other employment 
is another matter. But of the magnitude of his work in Britain there is 
no doubt.
As v/e have seen earlier, geographical details are not to be expected in a 
work of this size and nature. Tacitus could not possibly have listed the 
number of military sites which Agricola established. It is to archaedogy 
that we look for the supply of necessary detail. By its very nature 
archaeology finds it easier to designate a site Flavian rather than Agri- 
colan and the fact that the troops built with wood and turf, which were 
replaced later by stone, makes the taëc of dating difficult. Nonetheless, 
there seems to be general agreement that a great many of the forts North 
of a line from Chester to Malton are Agricolan in date. And so is the 
road system which connects them. If Professor Ogilvie*s(23) maps are 
accepted then we come to the conclusion that Agricola may Mve been 
responsible for the foundation of at least 93 forts during the term of his 
governorship. If he garrisoned them as well, as he progressed North, he 
must have seriously diminished his fighting strength. While it is poss­
ible that some forts were held on a care and maintenance basis after the 
initial campaign, a figure of at least 100,000 is reached - and if a 
cohort were posted to each of them then some 250,000 men were called for.(24) 
This is plainly ridiculous. It can only mean that though the forts were 
established they were not held in strength during the subsequent years.
Yet if this is so, the policy stands in marked contrast to that prosecuted 
during the rule of earlier governors when a military presence was sustained 
over newly occupied zones for sometime. It may well be that the Brigantes 
had been so broken by Cerialis, that Agricola needed to do no more than 
ensure a minimum standard of occupation after the initial annexation.
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While the archaeologist might not always support that, in general a com­
promise might be found in the suggestion that the forts were not left 
empty but possessed a token garrison* Unless this kind of argument is 
accepted it is difficult to see where Agricola found the troops to fi#it 
at Mons Graupius - not that it was a large force of auxiliaries that was 
involved in the battle* (Of the number of legionaries we have no know­
ledge*) As far as the Scottish Borders were concerned, the same policy 
may well have been followed, alongside the practice of taking hostages, 
to which Tacitus had already referred* Howsoever these forts were 
garrisoned the engineering and surveying capacity of both Agricola and 
his troops stand out* It was a remarkable achievement. The real great­
ness of Agricola, as a general, might seem to lie vdth the engineers and 
strategists rather than with the fighting generals. His strategic grasp 
was sound. His reconna#ance of the area to the North of the Clyde gave 
him the information he needed about an appropriate way fonward. He made 
his thrust through Strathmore which he carefully secured and held the low­
lands in a firm grip which kept the highland tribes out of them. Neither 
of these aspects, perhaps, attracted the imagination of Tacitus but they 
were of great importance in the life of the province. Tacitus does, 
however, dravr attention to the skill of his father in law in siting forts; 
none of them was found to be badly sited in the subsequent years: a verdict 
v/hich archaeologists have, on the whole, confirmed. The strategic plann­
ing of the northern campaigns is not highlighted in the Agricola .
Tacitus tells a simpler story of how a devoted public servant sought an 
elusive enemy, and having found him defeated him decisively by the 
employment of all the military arts - including a rather unusual skill in 
the use of the fleet. However, nothing that Tacitus relates is really 
contradicted by archaeological discoveries.
\4fhether the position which Agricola had won could be held in the long term 
is another question to which we must address ourselves. The Roman fron­
tier positions (it would be too strong to term it a limes) rested upon the 
Firth of Clyde and a line of forts from Dunblane to Auchinove, forming a 
North-West facing elipse along the coastal strips and valleys of Eastern 
Scotland. The legionary fortress at Inchtuthill ims the power base for 
those dispositions. The forts were held for a number of years, though 
there is some doubt about the length of time, but thereafter there was a 
retreat to the South. By the time the Agricole' was written he could 
say of the Emperor and his government that no sooner had Britain been 
conquered that it was let slip, (perdomita Britannia et statim missa.)
To that question we shall have to turn, but first we ought to note the 
achievement of the fleet and of the policy of Romanization.
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5.4. THE CIRCUMNAVIGATION OF BRITAIN.
The command to circumnavigate Britain was given to that section of the 
fleet working with the land forces in Northern Scotland. In itself the 
command implied the knowledge that Britain was, in fact, an island. The 
voyage physically confirms what had already been supposed and which the 
mutinous voyage of the Usipi had indicated. The latter seem to have had 
skill enough to avoid both the troops and the fleet operating along the 
shore of Scotland. When Tacitus remarks that panic had already heralded 
the voyage of the Roman fleet, he may have meant that the report of the 
battle at Mons Graupius disturbed the Caledonians; but the raiding 
parties of the Usipi in search of food and water along the Western and 
Northern coasts may have had greater influence. The natives might have 
found it difficult to distinguish the depredations of the rebellious 
troops from the random terroristic raiding which Agricole had prosecuted 
over a number of years. We should notice that Agricola allocated suffi­
cient forces for the purpose, (datae ad id vires). Hence, it seems to 
follow that the voyage had more than a geographical purpose. The flag  
was being shown round those regions into which Agricola would not be 
penetrating, reminding the defeated tribes^  people of both the strength 
and length of the arm of Rome. The expedition and the battle confirmed 
the Roman position in Northern Scotland.
The geographical information was a bonus. Plutarch, in Delphi, 83/84, met 
Demetrius, a schoolmaster from Tarsus, who told him that he had taken part 
in an exploration of the Western Isles. This converation fits in with 
chapter 24 of the ARricola with its description of the voyage along the 
West coast of Scotland. %e exploratory element need not be excluded 
altogether; but should be subordinated to the overall military purpose.
We should expect the voyage to proceed North and then West to be followed 
by sailing down the West Coast once more. This would fit in with the 
description of the sea conditions to which reference has been made already. 
The text of the passage is not altogether clear. Where is portus 
Trucculensis to which the fleet returned? Once again the text may be 
corrupt. What can it mean to read unde proximo Britanniae litore 
praelecto omnis redierat? (Agricole?" c.38j There are variant readings s 
prelecto for praelecto; and also prelects; and omni for omnis. Part 
of the translation ought to be adjacent shore. But what might that mean? 
The general view seems to be the shore nearest to Rome, which is the 
English South Coast. It might be the litoral near which the army was 
stationed, but if so nothing much is added to the sense by the statement. 
The text, corrupt though it may be, nonetheless conveys an impression of 
a mission completed without loss. Since it is clear that an instruction
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Was given to sail round Britain we should conclude from the passage that 
duty vms performed and the fleet returned to base. However, the base need 
not be the fleet's principal depot. Ogilvie and Richmond incline to 
Richborough, as the principal supply base but the military sense does not 
require it. If the troops were still in North East Scotland supplies 
brought in by sea might still be necessary and though there may not have 
been offensive operations with the recall of Agricola some kind of support 
role may well have been necessary. If the fleet is left in Richborough, 
the army is left in the Northern forts without any means of communications 
except overland through tribes which had been annexed during the previous 
six seasons. That might well have been risky. The fleet (or the 
squadron which had been serving on the East coast) might well have put in 
at Richborough, picked up supplies from the main depot and then sailed on 
to rejoin the army in the North East. If the troops were to stay in the 
North they would need replenishing.
If this is the general sense of the passage, then we can hardly thinlt of 
portus Trucculensis being located at Ullapool in Loch Broom. What was the 
point of stationing a fleet at a point many miles away from the regions 
which had been occupied and quite isolated from any Roman troops, separ­
ated from their comrades in arms by the most formidable of the Scottish 
Highlands? This location places the fleet in the very area of Scotland 
which Agricola had decided not to occupy. Only if there were some 
policy of ruling over the Broch People of the Highlands and Islands would 
this make sense. There is no evidence of any such purpose or policy.
The Ravenna cosmography mentions luliocenon and the Notitia Dignitatum 
refers to Tun(n)ocelum, as the base of cohors I Aelia Classics. That 
might be identified with the sites at either Moresby or Burrow Wells in 
Cumbria. An argument mi^t then be constructed for a base somewhere 
between St. Bees Head and the Solway Firth. The translation then might 
read: "The fleet was accompanied by favourable weather and the whiff of 
success and made for the port of Tunocelum from which, after a coastal 
voyage of the nearer side of Britain it returned intact". Yet the 
troops in the North East might need various forms of support. Their 
main depot was at Inchtuthill, on the river Tay. Though it may not have 
been navigable for ships of the size of transports, nevertheless there 
may have been some porting facilities within easy reach of the legionary 
base and for the forts to the North East in Strathmore. Garpow may yet 
prove to be of importance in this respect. If this should prove not to 
be the case then Cramond on the Forth might have served the same kind of 
purpose. Trucculum is sometimes thought to mean stormy, even though a 
stormy port is almost a contradiction in terms. We should do well to 
remember that the wind is almost always fresh in the North East; gales 
are not infrequent, so that navigation, even along rivers, might well
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have proved to be d i f f i c u l t  up to some distance upstream* On 
these general grounds, th erefore , %# might p ro v isio n a lly  lo ca te  
portus Trucculensis somewhere in  eastern Scotland* (25) '«ben 
T a citu s's  father in law la id  down h is  command, nothing has been 
abandoned. The army s t i l l  hold the lowlands of Scotland, together  
with a l l  of Dortlîern England and the f l e e t  was returning to  i t s  
more normal d u ties  o f transport and supply. Agricola presented  
to the emperor a land now conquered and an undimished resource to  
h is  auGcesaor.
5. 5. TEE IIVIIIAN POLICY OF AGRICOLA.
As we have seen , during h is  f i r s t  w inter in  the province. Agri­
cole s e t  about a reform o f the p rov in cia l adm inistration# He 
follow ed th is  up the follow ing winter with a p o licy  which a c c e l­
erated the romanization of B r ita in . Tacitus makes i t  clean that 
A grico la 's f i r s t  in ten tion  was to wean people away from w ar-like  
a tt itu d e s  and persuade them of the v ir tu es  of peace and q u ie t . 
(A gri. 21 .) Though the te x t  1© rather gen era lised , we can be 
a l i t t l e  more s p e c i f ic ,  by drawing on other parte of h is  works. 
F ir st  o f a l l  i t  se e ma probable that the developments would take 
place in  the south and Kidlanda of the province. The Weat had 
only recen tly  been conquered and the memorlea o f war were s t i l l  
fre sh . For the North fresh  campaigns were planned. The p o licy  
would therefore be most probably applied East of the fo sse  ‘^ Say or 
of the Severn and South of the Cuae. Second there was a certa in  
urgency about th is  p o lic y . The campaigns in  the North would be 
more secure i l  the m ilitary  l in e s  of supply and communication 
led  back in to  s e t t le d  lo y a l te r r ito r y . Frere i s  r ig h t to ©ay, 
"the extension of self-governm ent by the establishm ent of new 
areas o f lo c a l adm inistration or c iv ita te a ,  was an e s s e n t ia l  pre­
lim inary to A grico le 'o northern campaign.” (26) The procurator 
Ju liu s C lassiciaR us bad seen the ne*d for at le a s t  a more humane 
p o licy  and th a t, in  the course o f tim e, would tend towards a more 
c iv i l ia n  l i f e - s t y l e .  Ostoriua Scapula had taken the f i r s t  step s  
by attempting to prevent people in the province from carrying arms 
( in  accordance with the law) but th is  hod provoked a r e b e llio n  
among the Ic e n l. Thereafter warfare tended to  dominate the 
( o f f i c i a l  mind' o f the province. But some progress had been 
made as we read during r.oudicca'o r e b e llio n . When verula»cium 
and London were attacked , Tacitus informs us that the former was
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a ffiUDicipiaa and the l a t t e r ,  though prosperous was not a co lo n y .
He had a lre a d y  re fe r re d  to th e  c o lo n ie  a t  Camulodunum, in  h is  
account o f  the r is in g .
In  some ways the Homan f^ p ir e  may be thought o f as a number o f  
s e lf -g o v e rn in g  lo c a l  com m unities, grouped in to  p ro v in ces  and the 
whole ru le d  by the em peror. There had been fo r  a long  tim e a 
p o lic y  o f s e t t l in g  ve te ran s  in  c o lo n ie s  placed on conquered land  
(o r  o therw ise  a c q u ire d ). In  a d d it io n  the Homans were prepared  
to  reo rg an ise  t r i b a l  u n its  in to  s e lf-g o v e rn in g  com m unities, w ith in  
l i m i t s ,  as long as the s a fe ty  o f the  s ta te  was not im p a ire d . For 
a period  th ere  were c lie n t-k in g d o m s  o f  which perhaps the two best 
known were tho^e o f Herod in  P a le s tin e  and Cogidubnus in  B r i t a in .  
However, the g en era l p a tte rn  was fo r  va rio u s  k in d s  o f  lo c a l  
government.
The f i r s t  was o f  a s t r i c t l y  roman c h a ra c te r , w ith  a c o n s t itu t io n  
baaed on t l ia t  o f Home i t s e l f .  T h is  was the c o lo n ia , which was a 
s e ttle m e n t o f tim e -e x p ire d  le g io n a r ie s  placed in  a town w ith  a 
t e r r i t o r ia m  o f cou n trys ide  which was adm in is te red  from  i t .  The 
t i t l e  o f colony could be co n ferred  as an honorary t i t l e  on com­
m u n ities  w ith  a d i f f e r e n t  o r ig in  but t h is  award does not appear 
to  have been made in  B r i t a in .  T a c itu s , in d e e d , emphasizes th a t  
the t i t l e  had no t been g iven to  London d es p ite  i t s  s iz e ,  w ea lth  
and im p ortan ce . The colony rece ive d  a c h a r te r  which co n fe rred  
a number o f r ig h ts  upon i t ,  in c lu d in g  those of e le c t in g  fo u r  
annual m a g is tra te s , d u o v ir i i u r i  decundo, fo r  ju r is d ic t io n  and 
d u o v ir i  a e d ile s  f o r  b u ild in g  and f in a n c e * In  a d d it io n  the c o l -  
on ly  was to some e x te n t ,  f re e  from  the in te r fe re n c e  o f the p ro ­
v in c ia l  governor.
Next there  was the ,)unicipium  where th ere  was a community o f  
Homan c i t iz e n s ,  o r i f  not o f f u l l  c it iz e n ©  o f those who enjoyed  
the s o -c a lle d  L a tin  f ra n c h is e . whereas the colony was an o f f ­
shoot o f Home the un lc ip ium  was a community taken in to  the s ta te  
from o u ts id e . Nonetheless i t  had a c o n s t i tu t io n .  The 
q o a t tu o r v ir i  corresponded to  th e  two p a irs  o f d u o v ir i  in  the  
co lo n y . The te r r i to r iu m  m ight embrace a l l  o r p a r t  o f the 
t r i b a l  la n d s . Verulamium d id  not ru le  over the e n t ir e  lan d s  o f  
te C a tu v e lla u n i, f o r  we know o f t h e i r  c iv i t a s ,  though i t  i s  
poss ib le  th a t  itw a s  ad m in is te red  from Verulam iua ( r a th e r  am d is ­
t r i c t  and re g io n a l c o u n c il o f f ic e s ,  a t  the p resen t t im e , may be 
found in  the &ame tow n .) There was in  both c o lo n ia  and
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muRlcipium an ordo rather like a senate whose membero were 
celled decurions end they were ex-isagistrates# This was the 
Gtending executive body of the town* The âugostales of the town 
were a college who maintained the worship of the emperor to which 
great importance was attached as a means of promoting the spirit- 
ual unity of the empire *
There wore also smaller towns which perhaps began as a cluster 
of huts in the shadow of a fort# As life developed they too 
might acquire the forms of self-government# The place was known 
as a vicus and its councillors vicanl* Kogistratee were appoint­
ed known as magistri or vicomagistri and in addition there were 
two aediles* with these we are not immediately concerned*
What is of importance is that Verulamium had become a municipium 
within two decades of the roman invasion# Even if it were 
never followed by other munlcipia, remaining unique during the 
occupation, nonetheless it remains an important and early illus­
tration of a policy of romanization*
ije need not assume that these settlements were accepted fosily# 
The colony might cause particular difficulty* It was founded on 
land which bad been seized from local people and was an obvious 
intrustion into the ways of the tribe nearby* Colchester, 
Tacitus informs, constituted such an affront to the Trinoventes* 
This was compounded by the bad behaviour of the veterans them- 
selves# Together with the rough treatment of royal bouse of the 
Icenl and callin in of loans from among the aristocracy these 
factors helped to provoke Boundicca*s rebellion# The status of 
the municlpium and the behaviour of the inhabitants do not seem 
to have been specially offensive to the rebels# except that no 
doubt, they were regarded as traitors# At any rate Tacitus 
tells us nithing that might indicate provocation#
Tacitus in the Agricola (c.21*) sums up these developments in 
local government in a single striking phrase: he writes that
the toga CBoe into fashion# Of course that may be taken as no 
more than © change in the style of dress, but as this garment 
was eymbolic of Roman virtues and government we ought to appre­
ciate it ao part of the policy of conferring distrlnctive local 
government status on towns and. tribes# The status of Verulam- 
ium shows that something was being done before the arrival of 
Agricole and we may also infer from the description of the
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governorships that followed Isu llin u e  that i t  continued a f te r  
the suppression of the reb e llio n  with i t s  punitive afterm ath. 
Petronioffi Turpilianus seems to have been appointed to follow  a 
more f le x ib le  p o lic y . Tacitus w rites  that he s e t t le d  outstand­
ing problems, by which be means, one supposes, the legacy of the 
reb e llio n  but that in  i t s e l f  means a more humane po licy  o f paci­
f ic a t io n  which in  turn means forms of Roman l i f e  and p r a c tic e .
T reb e llie s  Maximus, we are to ld , s e t  up a mild mannered adminis­
tra tion  during which the Britons learned to Indulge in  pleasant 
v ic e s .  CAgri. 1 6 .3 .)  Here we may have a clue which in d ic a te s  
that a coherent po licy  o f romanization was being promoted.
Whether th is  continued during the troubled time of the c i v i l  war 
we cantot know. M ilitary problems loomed large a t th is  period , 
sin ce there was considerable unrest in  the army as a whole, which 
was independent o f the struggle fo r  supretie power in  Rome. The 
cause lay in  Britain i t s e l f  among so ld ie r s  who had becom used 
to campaigning, with a l l  i t s  rewards. Their r e s t le s sn e s s  may in ­
d icate that a more c iv i l ia n  regime was being e sta b lish ed , with 
the changes in  l i f e  s ty le  that th is  required both among the B rit­
ons, the Roman army and the p rov incia l in fra stru ctu re . That the 
policy  of o f f i c i a l  encouragement continued we may in fe r  from the 
in scr ip tio n  found a t  Verulamium* I t  does Indeed mention Agricola  
and seems datable to 79 AD but th is  may in d ica te  not only the  
thrust of bio po licy  but that o f fro o tin u e , hi® predecessor. I f  
the in scr ip tio n  were se t  up when the build ing wa® completed $ then 
i t  may w ell have been started  during the governorship o f Frontinus 
(p a r ticu la r ly  i f  A gricole could be shown to have entered the pro­
vince in  78 AD.) By putting together these h in ts we may conclude 
that there had been a policy  o f romanization before Agricola took 
possession  of h ie  province but that i t  i s  hard to find  the archaeo« 
lo g ic a l  evidence for i t  a t the moment. Tb^re i s  no l ite r a r y  
evidence; nor i s  i t  l ik e ly  th at any i s  now going to  be found. 
Tacitus sho%e that Agricola him self could see the need for a 
p olicy  of p a c ifica tio n  and romanization. I f  the n a tiv es were 
l e f t  as they hod been found there would always be the ttireat o f  
wa* . The establishm ent of an equitab le system o f taxation  can 
a lso  be regarded as part of the process o f r^ t^an iza tio n . This 
was the area of l i f e  In which the rulero came in to  more d ir e c t  
contact with the ru led . Here some kind of common lanruage was
1Ô7.
required# Tblo was the piece where the British seeded some 
knowledge of Latin and Roman procedures# As the provincial 
administration and the army had found it was also the place 
where grievances could and did grow# Agricole bed been con­
cerned soon after his entrance into the province to reform the 
administration at this point, for as Tacitus had observed, the 
Briton© were prepared to fulfil their obligations as long as 
they were managed with justice* There was the levy, imposi­
tions of various kinds together with the tribute, which the 
reader will remember, occasioned trouble in Palestine, as we 
read in the Gospels, In addition to these demands for money 
and goods there was the aonona which was a grain tax on which 
the army depended. It was the administration of this tax that 
bad fed earlier grievances to which Tacitus had referred in his 
review of the governorships of Agricole's predecessors# (Agri.lS,) 
Calgacus dwelt upon these iniquities in the speech wich Tacitus 
wrote for him and to them he added the demands of forced labour. 
The importance of Agricole's fort and road building programme 
has been mentioned but a larger labour force was necessary than 
the army could supply. The local tribes people were pressed 
into service* They bore the heat and burden cf the day, while 
the army, no doubt, provided the more skilled and supervisory 
activities* (Àgri, 31,)
Calgacus is also made to comment upon the social and sexual be­
haviour of the Romans# Hospitality was abused; wives and 
sisters were subjected to the lust of Roman occupiers. It 
would be rash to generalise about this, nonetheless we have to 
recognize that sexual encounters and relationships are ways in 
which different groups encounter each other and to that extent 
they may be regarded as e significant, though informal, part of 
the process of acculturation, and one th^t could easily be pro­
ductive of local clashes and liaison©*
by
The improvements madc/Agrlcola in the provincial adminlGtration 
together with a general policy of local devolution might have 
improved military security for the northern campaigns, but there 
was much else to be done before the Britons could be ©aid to show 
a Roman face, A more detailed programme was needed* This 
Agricola supplied# He gave official patronage* He exhorted 
people to build, but more than that he assisted them# This must 
mean grant aid* The local tribes were unlikely to have the
capital accessary for such enterprises# Their economic 
structure did not produce that kind of wealth. They had Wen 
heavily taxed in vexatious nays so that there may not have been 
much of a surplus in the more developed areas and the experience 
of the Icenl with loans made available by such Romans as Seneca 
had not been a happy one# Official assistance wa© the best way 
forward# However, it was not merely a matter of money# ’ Archi­
tects and engineers were necessary# These were not to be found 
among the Britons, nor is there evidence that there had been an 
influx of civilian professionals into the province * The design
of some towns seems to indicate that the governore made army 
engineers and technicians available for this work. The build­
ings they erected on their military style ground plan were those 
characteristic of the Roman world; temples for religion, fora 
which served not only as trading places in the style of markets 
but were the focal point round which the official buildings of 
the town were grouped. (The one word conjures up the rest, 
rather as the word togs evokes the development of local govern­
ment*) In addition bouses were built. These were presumably 
constructed in more durable material and in a more Roman style 
than the natives bad hitherto used* The word domes in the text 
will have included villas (country houses) as well as those in 
towns# Furneaux and Anderson point out that the remains in such 
towns os Csewent end wroxeter, Silchester and Both all indicate 
that romanization grew apace under the Flavians# In general we 
may assume a fairly comprehensive building programme for the 
tribal centres of the Midlands and the South but the time span 
of each governorship is too narrow for us to be able to date each 
development to a particular governor# There is no need to de­
tract from the work of Agricole# %e only need to set it in con­
text, remembering that the literary evidence is better for him 
than for his predecessors and successors#
Important as this building programme may have been and critical 
as the political reconBtitution of tribes into self-governing 
units was, the process of cultural change takes place in the 
minds and spirit of people# It takes a long time. Several 
generations may pass before xertain fundamental attitudes arc 
interiorizod# Into this complex problem of acculturation we 
cannot now delve# But we should notice that there was a clear 
recognition of the need for an education programme#' The sons
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of chieftains were given a liberal education, (Their fathers 
being left to live out their days in the old way,) It seems 
clear that the epear head of this programme naa Demetrlua of 
Tarawa, He was a grammatikos or grammar school teacher who 
appears in Plutarch's Be Hefectu Oracwlorum, where he seems to 
be an route from Britain to Tarsus in 83 AD discussing at Delphi 
the decay or oracles* In his discourse he mentions some of his 
experiences during an imperial expedition of enquiry and survey.
It may well hove been that he accompanied Agricola and the army 
and navy on the northern campaigns, ■ He certainly was closely 
associated with the governor# He appears on two inscriptions 
at York* (RIB 662,663), One of these is dedicated to the gods 
of the governor's residence, so we may conclude that he lived 
there and held bis school for the young generation there, îlo 
doubt a number of leaders picked up some Latin just by having to 
deal with the provincial officers and the army but this policy 
ensured a systematic induction into the language and its litera­
ture, Gradually the old susrkions were dropped and rhetoric 
become an attractive skill.
Agricola also operated a policy of "positive discrimination" by 
using Britons rather than Gauls# The language at this point 
is concise so that the meaning Is not exactly clear; but it 
seems unlikely that the Britons were naturally better than Gauls, 
Ho doubt some people may have wished to think so; but that is 
partisanship. The use of Britons fitted into the overall 
policy. It could not be done all at once; but as opportunity 
offered they were used. The same sort of process was going on 
in the army, Britons wre being recruited into the auxilia and 
appear in the later stages of Agricola's campaigns in the North* 
(Agri, 29)* He cannot be sure when this training programme be­
gan. The men are said to have proved themselves during the long 
years of peace; which may indicate cither that they had served 
for some time or that they were recruited from tribes with a 
proven record of loyalty.
The programme went deeper than politics and education. It del­
ved into religion and life and style * Temples were built. The 
rites and dedications reflected the polytheism of the Roman world; 
Gods many and Lords many. The Gods the Romans brought assimila­
ted the Gods of the tribe and land and vice-versa. The importance
of these cultlc activities should not be andcr-catimetod» They
tended to bind people together at a deep level of their exiatence 
and fusthemore involved people of all social classes as well as 
on both sides of the political divide as rulers and the ruled» 
last, but not least# religious activities claimed the attention 
of more people than the number of those who sat in the tribal 
council# spoke Latin and wore a toga# Religion is the point 
at which people try to find and then express meaning in life#
Here it was that hearts were turned towards Home by a policy of 
toleration and by the promotion of the imperial cult# with which 
the provincial council was closely associated#
More superficially but not the less important was the adoption of 
social practices which when once taken up were found to be both 
agreeable and fashionable # The Roman bath was more than a matter 
of hygiene# It was e way of leisure# Cleanliness there may 
have been but there was gossip and lounging# games and athletics 
clubbableness and a beauty salon for the seie-conscious# with 
this was closely associated the portico# This was more than a 
covered walk way# It was the place where the toon met Informally 
to chat and exchange news as well as the place where travelling 
teachers and entertainers might be found# Finally# if it is 
true that " a man is what he eats" then changes in diet are also 
significant# The meals of the mediterranean ^ orld were radio- 
ally different from those of the northern lands; , while the diet 
of the tribespeople who were fundamentally herdsmen was différent 
from those who tilled the ground# The well appointed dinner 
table draws our attention to this important change# It was not 
only a matter of following the Roman menu and manner of serving 
the meal# It was also a stimulus to changea in local agricul­
ture end horticulture since the n m  foods had to be grown# where 
they could not, particularly in the production of olive oil and 
large quantities of grapes then trade with other provinces waa 
stimulated#
■By these means Britain gradually ceased to be the warlike country 
it had been over the first fifty years of the Roman occupation.
The extent to which it was romanized has been a matter of debate 
for many years and the question lies beyond our present concern* 
Here we are to notice the way in which the process began and was 
continued# For this Agricola deserves much credit# But ?ie 
should err if we were to recognize only him. The role of his
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predecessors# whose work we have reviewed# deserves honourable 
mention and me must not forget those who come after* But# in the
lost analysis# the credit probably ought to go to the emperor and 
hi© council in Rome, They were able to formulate a policy of this 
kind, Doubtleea the superiority of Roman ways was accepted by 
them without question# almostunconsciously, but they could not 
have constructed © policy of romanization in Britain or anywhere 
else if they had not been able to conceptualize their presupposi­
tions # stand apart from them# analyse them and arrange them into 
an ordered programme that embraced buildings, education, army 
recruitment, leisure, social habits# religion and the process of 
government and administration themaelvea. What perhaps seamed 
important to them was not always what seemed important to the 
people affected or indeed to the modern scholar. The most visib­
le contribution to the history of Britain made by Agricole vies the 
network of roads he built# © by-product of bis campaigns and con­
struction of forts - a feat which Tacitus paaaos over in silence. 
To him and his contemporaries it probably seemed so obvious and 
routine that it did not warrant notice. The expert siting of 
forts seemed to show much greater ability. Yet much depended 
not only upon the forts but on the communications between them.
The supping and servicing of these forts end their road system 
shows an administretive genius at woric. Once more the mundane 
was significant but it was not the kind of history that Tacitus 
was predisposed to write, especially when pressure of space 
could be urged in the cause# (27)
Agricole had opportunities in the province denied his predecessors 
partly because of the policy set down in his mandata but also 
partly because he stayed in the provinoe longer than any of bis 
predecessors, . Ee bad time to carry things through and was 
there long enough to see at least some fruit for fais labours, 
Moreover he had the assistance of a le flatus lurldicus* This 
official may have been concerned to arrange the absoz'ption of the 
lands of Cogldubnu,; into the province# assuming that the Icing 
died about this time. He may also have been appointed to re­
lieve pressure on a governor who spent much of his time campaign­
ing, But these arguments are not entirely convincing. Other 
client kingdoms had been taken into the (Impure without thé neces­
sity of making fundamental changes in the provincial infrastruc­
ture and other governors had boon occupied with military matters
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w ith o u t g e tt in g  an iu r id lc u s . S ince he was in  post a r ly  in  
the governorship  o f A g ric o le  i t  can h a rd ly  be argued th a t  the  
appointm ent was made because the governor was over-burdened , 
C e r ia l ia  and F ro n tin u s  m ight have been s c e p tic a l about the  
s p e c ia l p le ad in g * However, i f  th e re  was a p o lic y  to  romanise 
t r i b a l  government and g ive the t r i b a l  c a p ita ls  t h e i r  own char­
t e r  then th ere  was not on ly  a good d ea l o f a d d itb n a l work to  be 
done, b u t the s e rv ic e s  o f a p ro fe s s io n a l o f f i c i a l  on the spo t 
were needed. When the process had gone on p ra g m a tic a lly  and 
o c c a s io n a lly  the o ld  a d m in is tra t iv e  machinery could handle i t ,  
now w ith  much to  be done in  a R e la t iv e ly  s h o rt apace o f t im e ,  
something d i f f e r e n t  was re q u ire d *  T h is  app'Ointment m ight w a ll  
be the moat im p o rtan t in d ic a to r  o f the programme o f ro m an iza tio n  
and the f a c t  th a t  i t  was made d u ring  the governorship o f A g ric o la  
could in d ic a te  th a t  i t  was under him th a t  the p o lic y  was moat 
e n e r g e t ic a l ly  and s y s te m a tic a lly  a p p lie d *  When he l e f t  B r i ta in  
he could show th a t  the South was moving towards s e lf -g o v e rn in g  
c lv i t a t e s ,  t l ia t  B r i t is h  le a d e rs  o f  the nex t g en era tio n  were being  
educated as L a tin s  and t h e i r  s u b je c ts  used in  the army and in  
c i v i l i a n  a d m in is tra t io n .  The t r ib e s  o f  w ales and the North  
B r ita in  had been crushed and annexed* The B r lg a c tla n  problem  
had a t  l a s t  been la id  to  r e s t *  The l im i t s  o f B r i ta in  had been 
d escribed* th a t  would the c e n tr a l  government do w ith  the oppor­
tu n ity  which now presented i t s e l f ?  The answer was an in te n s e  
disappointm ent t© T a c itu s *
' 173
5.6. THE FATE OF AGRIGOU'S CONQUESTS.
There is no word in the Agricola': of the fate of the northern lands 
conquered by Agricola. Tacitus leads the reader to the retirement of 
his father in law and regrets the failure to use him further or find a 
high appointment for him commensurate with his merits. There is but 
one brief phrase in the Histories(I.1.); nerdomita Britannia et statim 
omissa. To what does the phrase refer? It can hardly be a comment 
upon the policy of the Neronian government, even though, as we have seen, 
there was, perhaps, a time when the conquest hardly seemed worthwhile. 
Withdrawal miglat have been contemplated. Nor can it refer to the period 
of the civil war 69 AD nor to the reigns of either Vespasian or Titus.
During the former period the status quo was maintained and thereafter an 
aggressive policy of expansion was initiated. Thus it follows that 
Tacitus must be referring to a subsequent period which he was dealing 
with in the Histories. In brief, the phrase must refer to government 
policy after the governorship of Agricola and before the close of the 
period covered by the Histories, (c.96 - and no later.)
As Agricola left the battlefield of Hons Graupius for retirement from 
active public service, both he and the emperor could think rightly that 
Britain had been thoroughly reduced. The territory which had not been 
occupied had, at the least, been circumnavigated. There was a coherent 
frontier line running along the Clyde and along the highland line, with 
forts carefully placed at the mouth of the glens backed by the legionary 
base at Inchtuthill and possibly supplied by the fleet. If the 
resources could be secured for the new boundary, then all Britain was 
within the orbit of Rome. There were signs, however, of strain upon the 
military strength, which Agricole had at his disposal. We have already 
noticed the way in which garrisons were \d.thdrawn from the South and we 
have speculated about the number of men required to garrison the forts 
in the newly occupied areas. Frere writes, correctly, "Clearly he had 
reached the limits of his resources, despite the subdivision of certain 
units between fortlets."(28) Unless he had substantial reinforcements
neither the plain of Moray nor the Highlands themselves could be occupied. 
Having regard to the nature of the terrain and litoral on the West there 
might have been a fundamental question about the nature of the occupying 
force itself. The fleet and marines might be more necessary than 
legionary and auxiliary forces.
Basically it was a question of numbers. The case could be made in 
British terms vâthin the limits of the mandata handed over by Vespasian 
in 78. The question now was; could the case be made in imperial terms 
within the problems to be faced in the mid-80s and 90s? The short
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answer seems to liave been No. Tacitus presents Domitian as one who 
acted out of petty spite against Agricbla. VJhile there may have been 
an element of jealousy and perhaps suspicion in the emperor's attitude, 
even Tacitus cannot deny that his Father in law was accorded the honoured 
treatment of a victbrious general.(29) That Domitian never used 
Agricola again may also be a matter of regret but even this may be under­
stood within the conventions of the cursus honorum. Alongside these 
factors some eleœht of policy needs to be sought for. The basis for it 
may be found in the critical situation that was developing in Central 
Europe. A powerful kingdom was arising in Dacia which posed a threat to 
the empire along the line of the Danube. Domitian had attempted to 
strengthen the Roman position in the angle formed by the upper reaches of 
this river with the Rhine. This was at least one purpose behind his war 
against the Chatti. The weight of numbers on this frontier was far 
greater than that along the highland line in Britain. Beyond the Danube 
were vast plains with peoples on the move. In the highlands there were 
relatively few, with nothing but the sea beyond - which itself required 
a form of surveillance for which the empire was unprepared. In general 
and strategic terras the Danube must have priority over the Grampians. 
Moreover, the government could not assume that all the lands to the South 
of Agricola'B line of forts could be left ungarrisoned. Wales needed 
troops until the time of Hadrian. The Brigantes were still capable of 
insurrection. There was no point in holding the highland line if the 
regions to the South were insecure.
Domitian needed troops. The power balance of the Empire discouraged the 
raising of fresh legions. A governor's ambitions rai^ t be stimulated! 
Britain was a convenient province from which to get them. Perhaps of all 
the provinces it was the one with battle-hardened men and from which 
troops could be withdrawn, with the least risk* if the victory at Mons 
Graupius was as final as most people thought it v/as! So from Britain 
Domitian withdrew II Legio Adiutrix, several auxiliary regiments, includ­
ing the British and most of the Batavian cohorts*(30) The question then 
for the governor of Britain and for the central government was; could the 
position left by Agricola be supported with reduced numbers? The answer 
was No. The XX Legion was withdrawn from Inchtuthill to Chester and a 
number of adjustments were made to the auxiliary dispositions. Fendoch 
in Glenalmond was certainly abandoned. Newstead became the pivot upon 
which the defence of the lowlands depended. But at the time of the 
accession of Trajan all lowland Scotland South of the Forth-Clyde line 
was still being held. The pressures in Central Europe continued to exer­
cise their sway upon imperial policy and with the Eastern advance of 
Trajan combined to bring about a further withdraws, in which Scotland
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North of the Cheviot, perhaps of the Tyne-Solway, was evacuated.
Tacitus seems to have been at work upon the Histories during the earlier 
years of the reign of Trajan; perhaps between 104-109* Thus it may be 
that by the time he v/rote the opening lines the total abandonment of 
Agricola's Scottish conquests had been brought about. He thus dismisses 
the phased withdrawal over two reignsiin one biting phrase.
Once again it is to archaeological evidence that we look for evidence about 
the commencement of the retreat. We are hindered by not knowing the names 
of Agricola's immediate successors. Sallustius Lucullue would appear to 
have been one who followed him fairly soon. He was executed for supposed­
ly naming a lance after himself, but that may mask some feeling of unease 
about the loyalty of the army itself to the princeps. His death may have 
occurred about 89 but we know nothing of his provincial policy. A certain 
Nepos was governor about 98 and he may be P.Metilius Nepos who was 
succeeded by T.Avidius Quietus. In neither case do we have firm evidence 
about their work. However Professor E. Birley has shown that the troops 
were withdrawn from Britain by 92.(31) The first stage of the withdrawal 
ought to have been consequent upon those postings. There is some evidence 
to show that the fortress at Inchtuthill was evacuated and destroyed before 
it v/as completed. The date may be as early as 87. Furthermore, there 
is no evidence to show that at the same time any forts, perhaps with the 
exception of Ar#^ (and that is doubtful) were held North of the Forth- 
Clyde line. The alterations in the forts to the South continued apace. 
Hartley's examination of the Samian V/are seems to suggest that the changes 
were made between about 84 and 8?; in other words very soon after the 
recall of Agricola. It was Domitian who abandoned the newly won territory. 
The final evacuation of Scotland may have been completed by 105.(32)
E.Birley and Pryce came to the same conclusion some years earlier. They 
point out that reference to the withdrawal in the closing pages of the 
AKricola might offend against nietas even though it provided ammunition 
for criticising Domitian. By the time the Histories were being written 
Tacitus was freed both from that convention and from the biographical form.
He could now raise the subject quite explicitly. Sir George MacDonald 
tried to extend the period by a further thirty to forty years but the 
endeavour has not been successful. His caveat, however, serves to remind 
us of the element of exaggeration in the writings of Tacitus. Britain 
may have been reduced but it was not abandoned. Nor were all the gains 
lost. Wales was held and so was the whole of Brigantia. The Selgovae 
and Novantae suffered vary lag fortunes. But whether formally occupied or 
not they were never free from the influence of Rome.
*/p
Though the style is compressed the word statim is seen to have a certain 
force. Those who have seen the coins of 86-87 in mint condition, 
dropped in the course of demolishing the legionary base, will appreciate 
the sudden even precipitate change of plan. There was an emergency on 
the Danube.
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(1) I.A.RicWond.J#R.S. xliv. The A^icolas Gives prominence
to queens; Boudicca and Cartimandua. But we should not assume that 
female leadership was norimtive in Celtic life; far from it*
(2) fhrneaux & Anderson, p#91«; Ogilvie & Richmond, p.205, however, 
suggest that hillmen could be translated as top men; i.e. overlords*
If this is true then the title tends to substantiate theories about the 
confederate nature of the principality. The Brigantes would be the 
ruling aristocracy.
(5) Richmond in JRS op.cit.
(4) A.R.Birley. Britannia. 1973* P*179*
(5) H.I!attingly* Tacitus on Britain and Germany. London. 1st ed. 1948,
p.6?>
(6) R.H.Ogilvie. Agricolaf. Loeb Classical Library, rev.ed. 1970, p.59*
(7) R.H.Ogilvie & Richmond. Agricolar. Oxford. 1967. p*20$.
(8) R.B.##heelcr. Stanwix Fortifications. Oxford. 1954.
Sir Mortimer identified three stages in the fortifications: phase 1 
enclosed 17 acres and was possibly constructed about the time of the 
Glaudian invasion. This may be regarded as a hill-fort. Phase 2, is, 
perhaps, not later than 60 AD and extended to 150 acres. This mi^t be 
said to have followed the Roman invasion in the South. There were now 
defences running for two miles. The 5rd. phase took in 600 acres and 
had 5^ miles of defences. (The 4th. phase may in fact be Anglo-Saxon.) 
Within the large area an attempt may have been made to contain as much 
water and pasturage as possible. Thus argued Wheeler Venutius may have 
been preparing, as best he could, for a siege. Me does not seem to have 
considered the possibility that such large areas would be required for the 
assembly of an army mainly composed of two horse war cliariots. The site 
was of crucial strategic importance because it was the natural focus of 
communications, especially for tribes rallying from the North and North 
West.
(9) He does not seem to have been in office under Domitian. He was 
curator nauarum under Nerva; suffect consul in 98; and ordinarius, with 
Trajan in 100.AD.
(10) Frere. op .cit. p.120ff.
(11) Fumeaux & Anderson, p.95; Ogilvie & Richmond, p.518; Frere, p.125;
E.Birley, p.15; Burn, p.88; Coliingwood & Myres, p.H5; Mattingly, p.20. 
But see Liverpool Classical Monthly, Vol.1, no.2, Feb.1976. The date of 
Hons Graupius. A.R.Birley.
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(12) Ogilvie rightly points out ( hp .cit.p.2l1) that there would be 
troops with Agricola who had taken part in the assault on Anglesey 
executed by Suetonius Pai^inus. Agricola himself was likely to have 
been present as a member of the governor’s staff. They might be 
expected to have known of fords across the Straits. It is possible to 
ford the Straits on foot over Caernarvon Bar, as Ogilvie points out 
(Admiralty Chart 1464;Menai Strait), at low tide. But there is no ford 
from Bangor. A strict interpretation of the text would allow to state 
that the auxiliaries crossed by the fords and they had the facility of 
swimming with their weapons and their horses, which is not quite the same 
thing as writing that they actually did so. The Ordovices were expecting 
a sea borne attack and thus perhaps were surprised because the Roman 
troops came ashore at a point where they were least expected and which, 
therefore, was somewhat more lightly held.
(13) Burn (bpi^ *cit.p.88.) asserts ”E.B.Birley believes that Salvius went 
to Britain rather later, in 81". In his bibliography he refers to 
Birley’s Roman Britain and the Roman Army. In his article Roman law and 
Roman Britain (p.54) the work of the iuridicus is examined but no date is 
given for the arrival of Liberalis. If 81 were the year of arrival, it 
would appear that Agricola might well have asked for help, after a period 
in which he had tried to combine inforcement of his reforms with cam­
paigning. -
A.R.Birley in his forthcoming publication of the Fasti shows that liberalis 
Cels 1011) could have been in post 78-8I. The appointment could thus be 
explained as an innovation to compensate for the governor’s absence on 
lengthy campaigns in the far North, when possibly the death of Cogidubnus" 
entailed the extra complex work of incorporating his client kingdom into 
the province. The evidence is not decisive. He could have been pro­
consul of Macedonia 82-3 and consul in 84, but then there should have been 
another iuridicuq between him and Javolenus Prisons who must have arrived 
in 84. But of this man, if he existed, we have no knowledge. He may 
have been iuridicus 78/79-81, or 81-84. Fasti;p.l88-l89.
(14) B.Farwell. Queen Victoria’s little Wars. London. 1975* p.27*
(15) FUrneaux & Anderson think that Tanaum/Taum cannot mean the R.Tay 
because "Agricola cannot possibly have got so far thus early in his 
campaigns". (6p:#cit.p.106.) A number of other rivers ar^  considered 
but even the Scottish Tyne is thought to be "a long way from Agricola’s 
probable starting point". But if Agricola could march from Wroxeter/ 
Chester to Carlisle in one season, there is no reason why he could not 
march from Carlisle to Perth. The distances do not vary much. Ogilvie 
( bp ; .cit.p.57*) and Burn (I op ,cit .p. 103. ) are both quite clear that 
Agricola reached the River Tay.
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(16) Furneaux & Anderson argue that the text is corrupt here and that no 
plausible emendation has been proposed. They quote Haverfield’s sugges­
tion that Agricola began the first part of his journey by vessel; but do 
not think that the text will bear this sense. Ogilvie & Richmond do not 
venture an opinion. Burn seems to incline to the view (Aôp»cit.p.130.ff.) 
that it is to the crossing of the Solway to which reference is made.
V/hile that may be true the statement than lacks the dramatic content of 
the rhetorical force. As Ogilvie & Richmond remark (^ op»cit.p.233#)
"The stretch of water most easily understood from the context is the Clyde."
(17) N.Reid. Britannia Vol.2, 1971. pp.l43-l48.
(18) The classis Britannica was based on Boulogne (Gesoriacura) during this 
period. In 2nd.c. another headquarters fort was built at Dover. The 
fleet had been used for offensive warfare earlier during the advance of 
Vespasian into South West England as well as of Frontinus into South 
Wales. The more normal functions were of transport and supply. Agric­
ola seems to have used the fleet for all these purposes as well as divid­
ing it into two squadrons, though of this we cannot be absolutely sure.
(19) Ogilvie & Richmond, op .cit.p.245.
(20) The relevant passage in Dio Cassius indicates that the troops were 
stationed on the West coast and therefore rounded Gape Wrath.
(21) The Caledonians are to be regarded as one of the British tribes.
In these Northern campaigns there is a certain interchangeability of terms 
because Tacitus wishes to convey to the reader that it is Britain as a 
whole that is being conquered. The Caledonians and their allies, who are 
unnamed, constitute the last free peoples in the island.
(22) see A.L.F.Rivet & C.Smith. The Place Names of Roman Britain. London.
1979.
(23) Ogilvie & Richmond, .op. cit.p.56,58,61.
(24) Richmond points out (lop .cit.p.44.) that if we knew more about the
size of the garrison stationed: on the Claudian-Neronian frontier we should 
have a better idea of the strain imposed on military resources by this
advance. "If area counts for anything, the increase in territory policed
by military troops as a result of the Flavian conquests was very great."
On the other hand, man power could be recruited from the newly annexed 
areas. Agricola had British troops at his disposal, as we have seen. 
Furneaux and Anderson suggest that the forts along the Forth-Clyde isthmus 
were evacuated when the next year’s advance began. ( op.cit.p.114.) This 
may have been the case in general but would it not have been dangerous to 
do so as a matter of principle throughout these campaigns? Much of
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Britain lay open to insurrection and the ariqy was much further away than 
in the days of Suetonius Paullinus. Some garrisons must have been 
retained if only to safeguard communications to the South and hold the 
newly occupied tribes.
(25) Burn’s argument for the location of portas Trucculensis is that the 
fleet had already explored the West Coast in earlier years, but had not 
sailed right round the Northern capes. At some point, probably well to 
the North, it had turned bade. Therefore when the fleet sailed from the 
Moray Firth area round these capes and reached the point at which it had 
turned back some time before the circumnavigation was complete. The 
nortus does not have to be a base to which it returned, for example, during 
the winter. Tacitus does not say this. The disappearance of the word 
Trucculensis or some mutation of it may be accounted for by the influx of 
Gaelic and Norse. (Burn bp :.cit.pp.35-63.) The argument tends to rest
on the assumption that the fleet operated as one, which may not have been 
the case. If it did then there was a good deal of sailing to be done, 
before the circumnavigation, in order to get the ships on the East coast 
from the West - and that was practically a circumnavigation in itselfI 
J.G.F.Hind (Britannia 1974. p.285#ff.) answers Burn’s argument well but 
does not examine the needs of the Eastern troops and therefore places the 
portus still in the North West. Ogilvie and Richmond (I; o p *  cit .p.282.) 
incline towards Richborough, Furneaux and Anderson (6p.cit.p.141.) con­
sider Carpow or Cramond more likely locations.
(26) Frere. op .cit.p.134.
(27) Frere. op ;.cit. pp.135-6.
(28) Frere. bp .cit. p.136.
(29) It was now the convention that only members of the imperial house 
received an actual triumph. Successful generals received the rewards and 
trappings but not the actuality. We need not think that the distinction 
conferred was a means of recalling Agricola. Scapula and Corbulo had 
remained in post after their awards. (AnnalS,12.28;11.20.) The point at 
which Vespasian was awarded his is not clear, but he seems to have stayed 
on in Britain after the initial campaigns in which he had played so distin­
guished a part. His award may therefore come either during or after his 
successes. The evidence is somewhat imprecise; but he could have 
remained in the province until 47. (see Britannia. 1972. How long did 
Vespasian serve in Britain? D.E. Eichholz. p.l49.ff.) Agricola had 
been governor of Britain for an abnormally long period. He was overdue 
for recall. Tacitus gives the impression (Agyicola c.40.) that he was 
fobbed off with a reward that was both specious and spurious. But we
should note that even he has to acknowledge that Domitian took the initia­
tive in the matter of triumphalia ornamenta by proposing it and the Senate 
decreed it.
(30) Burn. “ . :«cit. p.l6l.
op
(31) Birley. op :.cit. p.21.
(32) B.R.Hartley. Britannia. 1972. The Roman Occupation of Scotland. 
p.I.ff. JRS xxvii. p.93; xxviii. p.iM. The fate of Agricola’s 
Northern Conquests. T.D.Pryce and E.B.Birley. See also xxix. p.5.ff.
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